

Congressional Record.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION.

SENATE.

FRIDAY, February 15, 1918.

The Chaplain, Rev. Forrest J. Prettyman, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, we pray that we may be led through the hours of this day without sin, that Thou wilt give to us divine inspiration to follow that which Thou dost mark out for us, and that at the close of the day we may look back upon the service we have rendered with a conscience void of offense toward God and man. Bless our Nation. Prosper us in all of our work. Hasten the day for the reestablishment of peace and brotherhood in the world. We ask for Christ's sake. Amen.

The Journal of yesterday's proceedings was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE.

A message from the House of Representatives, by J. C. South, its Chief Clerk, announced that the House insists upon its amendments to the bill (S. 3389) to authorize and empower the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation to purchase, lease, requisition, or otherwise acquire improved or unimproved land, houses, buildings, and for other purposes, disagreed to by the Senate, agrees to the conference asked for by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. HARDY, Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia, Mr. GREENE of Massachusetts, and Mr. EDMONDS managers at the conference on the part of the House.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. COLT. I present a resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island, which I ask may be printed in the RECORD and referred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[State of Rhode Island, in general assembly, January session, A. D. 1918.]

Resolution indorsing the so-called daylight-saving bill now before Congress and urging the Senators and Representatives from this State to give it their cordial support.

Whereas the contingencies of war have brought renewed attention to the demand for changing hours of time standards; and

Whereas the various European countries now at war have adopted such changes in time standards known as daylight saving; and

Whereas the pronounced saving in artificial lighting and in the use of fuel and the greater opportunity for recreation on the part of the people will be obtained by the adoption of daylight saving, so called: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island hereby urges upon the Congress of the United States that it pass such legislation as may achieve the desired results; and be it further

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives in Congress from Rhode Island be, and they hereby are, requested to use their efforts to obtain the passage of said legislation, and the Secretary of State is hereby instructed to forward a copy of this resolution to our Senators and Representatives in Congress.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
PROVIDENCE.

I hereby certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original resolution approved by His Excellency, the governor, February 8, 1918.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the State of Rhode Island this 11th day of February, in the year 1918.

[SEAL.]

J. FRED PARKER,
Secretary of State.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. I have a telegram from the Chamber of Commerce of Lansing, Mich., making certain suggestions regarding the pending railroad bill, which I ask to have printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LANSING, MICH., February 13, 1918.

HON. WILLIAM ALDEN SMITH,
Washington, D. C.:

Referring to the pending railroads compensation bill, the Lansing Chamber of Commerce does not feel that it is necessary and is therefore opposed to any provision that will take from the Interstate Commerce Commission and State commissions any part of the jurisdiction they now have over freight rates. We are also in favor of fixing a definite time when the control of the railroads shall again pass into the hands of their private owners and we express the hope that you will advocate amendments not inconsistent with the above.

LANSING CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. I also have a series of resolutions from the Chamber of Commerce of Traverse City, Mich., bearing upon the same subject, which I ask may be printed in the RECORD without reading.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolutions adopted by the Board of Directors of the Traverse City Chamber of Commerce.

Whereas the Hon. William G. McAdoo, Director General of the Railroads of the United States, recently testified before a committee of the United States Senate that certain small lines of railroads which were not necessary to the Government for the conduct of war operations may be released from Federal management and control; and

Whereas preceding legislation has established no differentiation between trunk lines and the smaller lines, and has placed both the trunk lines and their feeders under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and subject to its rules and regulations, and to all Federal statutes for the regulation and control of railroads; and

Whereas the operating expenses of the said smaller lines have been largely increased to comply with the requirements of Congress and the Interstate Commerce Commission; and

Whereas release of the smaller lines from Federal operation and control will work great loss and damage to them, depreciate their credit, increase the difficulty of procuring cars to move tonnage, and bring many of them into dire financial straits; and

Whereas, under orders of the Director General of the Railroads, the right of routing freight has been taken away from the shipper and put in the hands of the railroad company with instructions that such freight must be routed via the shortest open route, which said instructions will result in the loss of certain revenue to the smaller lines, and thus increase the already severe burden placed upon them; and

Whereas the railroads of the United States form a great circulatory system, and disruption of any part of the system causes a general reduction of efficiency on the part of the entire system, as has been amply illustrated by the congestions prevailing at certain centers during the past 12 months; and

Whereas industries valuable to the Government in the prosecution of the war are located on many of the smaller lines, and any failure on the part of said lines to furnish service to said industries located on their tracks and dependent upon them will not only work a local hardship to the communities affected but will work a national hardship in delaying preparations for war: Therefore be it, and it is hereby,

Resolved, That the board of directors of the Traverse City Chamber of Commerce respectfully urges and requests that the said smaller railway lines of the United States be continued under Federal management and control in the same measure and degree as the trunk lines and be accorded the same degree of protection and credit; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of the above resolution be forwarded to the Hon. William G. McAdoo, Director General of the Railroads of the United States, and to the members of the Michigan delegation in Congress.

TRAVERSE CITY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
W. J. HOBBS, Secretary.

Mr. STERLING. I send to the desk a letter from Mr. Charles H. Eyler, secretary of the Farmers' Grain Dealers' Association of South Dakota in relation to the pending bill, and especially to that provision of the bill relating to rates. I ask that it may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SIoux FALLS, S. DAK., February 11, 1918.

HON. THOMAS STERLING,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: At the present time Congress is asked by the administration to enact a railroad bill. Very much care should be taken to protect the shippers' interests as well as the railroads. We must concede the logic of one-man control to a certain extent in war time, but there is always danger of establishing precedent that would destroy the rights guaranteed by a republican Government.

Our association asks that the Interstate Commerce Commission retain the same jurisdiction over rates as in the past. We are more than glad as loyal Americans to bear the inconveniences of war operation of our railroads, but hope that we will have the same right of appeal to a body of disinterested men in the future as in the past.

We ask you as our representative to use your influence to have this embodied in the new law.

Very truly, yours,

FARMERS' GRAIN DEALERS' ASSOCIATION,
CHAS. H. EYLER, Secretary.

Mr. GRONNA. I have a letter from the secretary of the Votes for Women Club of Grand Forks, N. Dak., transmitting a resolution of the club. It is a very brief letter, and I ask that it be printed in the Record without reading.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

GRAND FORKS, N. DAK., February 11, 1918.

Senator A. J. GRONNA,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR Mr. GRONNA: At a special meeting of the Votes for Women Club of Grand Forks, held in the city hall, Saturday evening, February 9, resolutions were passed urging our Senators at Washington to do all in their power to bring about the passage of the Federal suffrage amendment.

A special vote of thanks was passed to you for your support of the cause in the past and expressing appreciation for your work in our behalf at the present time.

Will you please present the following resolution to the United States Senate and request that it be read into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? We would appreciate this very much:

"Resolved, That the Votes for Women Club of Grand Forks, N. Dak., call upon the Senate of the United States to pass at once the Federal suffrage amendment, establishing at home that democracy for which the men of this country have been called to fight abroad."

We thank you very much for attending to this for us, and we would be glad to know in what issue of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD we shall be able to find this resolution.

Very truly, yours,

MARY E. McCUMBER,
Secretary of the Votes for Women Club,
Grand Forks, N. Dak.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I present a communication from the Nebraska State Railway Commission and ask to have it printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the communication was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

LINCOLN, NEBR., February 11, 1918.

Senator G. M. HITCHCOCK,
Washington, D. C.:

We protest proposed basis of compensation to railroads under Government operation as excessive. Railway operating income plus income from other sources give percentage returns on capitalization of three principal roads in this State as follows: North Western, 12.04; Union Pacific, 14.14; Burlington, 25.63. Suggest limitation to regular dividends of last three years. By all means, strike words "reasonable compensation" from first section of bill. They surrender all that has been gained in rate regulation. We also protest giving the President power to initiate or make rates; should be left where it now is.

NEBRASKA STATE RAILWAYS COMMISSION.

Mr. GALLINGER presented a petition of John E. Perley, jr., Post, No. 37, Grand Army of the Republic, Department of New Hampshire, of Laconia, N. H., praying for an increase in the pensions of veterans of the Civil War, which was referred to the Committee on Pensions.

Mr. PHELAN presented a petition of Pacific Coast Division of the Bohemian National Alliance, praying for the liberation and unification of their race in Bohemia after the war is ended, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

CLOTHING FOR AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN FRANCE.

Mr. SWANSON. There has been some difference of opinion disclosed in the discussion as to the supply of clothing to our soldiers in France. I have a letter which gives specific information on that subject from a most eminent and respectable citizen of Norfolk, and I desire that the portion of it appertaining to that subject may be read for the information of the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. The Secretary will read.

The Secretary read as follows:

NORFOLK, VA., February 13, 1918.

HON. CLAUDE A. SWANSON,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Having repeatedly read in the public prints statements made by certain persons in the Senate and House regarding our troops not being supplied with proper clothing, etc., I avail myself of the opportunity of quoting you an extract from a letter just received from my nephew to his mother.

His regiment, the Eleventh United States Engineers, joined the English battle line, and he is now in a hospital from a wound received in the fight:

"I am sorry you are shipping some underclothes, as you write, because I have tried to tell you that I did not want them. I have no place to keep them and much less any use for them. We are issued all that we can possibly need, and we can't throw away issued ones when they are dirty, as they all have to be accounted for."

OFFICERS' ALLOWANCES IN THE FIELD.

Mr. JONES of Washington. Mr. President I am receiving quite a number of letters with reference to commutation affecting the officers of the Army. I see the chairman of the Committee on

Military Affairs here, and I wish to ask him a question for information that I may use in writing to people interested.

It is stated that under the law and custom of the military department officers are in effect penalized when they go to the front. In other words, it is suggested that, taking two men, each of them a colonel, located here at Washington City, they are given an allowance of \$12 a room for seven rooms. In other words, they receive \$84 a month as room rent, we might say. Then, if Col. A is taken from here to the trenches in France he loses that allowance, his family are not furnished quarters, and whatever expense is necessary to get them quarters he must pay out of his own pocket. In other words, he is penalized for going to the front, while Col. B, who stays here, continues to draw this allowance.

I wish to ask the chairman of the Military Committee if that is correct?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, it is substantially correct as the Senator has stated.

Mr. JONES of Washington. I simply want to suggest that I hope the Committee on Military Affairs will take care of a situation like that. It seems to me that it is very unfair and very unjust.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. If the Senator will permit me, I will say that after the Senator talked to me about this matter yesterday I looked into the question and had prepared a statement that I desire to submit to the Senate and have placed in the Record. The statement will show what the officer is required to furnish at his own expense under the regulations of the department and the estimated cost of each item.

Mr. JONES of Washington. I wish to suggest to the Senator that my inquiry does not go to the uniforms at all.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I am going further. I was going to elucidate that, but I wanted to show the Senator what the expenses were.

Mr. JONES of Washington. I am glad to have that information, too.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. In addition to that, I have had prepared the monthly pay of an officer with troops and the monthly pay of an officer in Washington, the difference in salary, and the percentage of reduction, so that it will give the Senator the information he asks for.

Mr. JONES of Washington. It covers the allowances, and so on?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Mr. JONES of Washington. Commutation of quarters, heat, and light?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. We will take, by way of illustration, a second lieutenant. His monthly pay when he is in the line with the troops is \$141.67. His monthly pay in Washington, because of commutation of quarters, is \$173.66, a difference of \$31.99 between the salary he gets with the troops and the salary he gets here in Washington. There is a reduction of 18 per cent if he goes out to serve his country in line. The reduction varies according to rank from 18 per cent to 25 per cent. The Senator took a colonel by way of illustration. His monthly pay with the troops is \$333.33. His monthly pay in Washington, which includes commutation of quarters, and so forth, is \$444.14. The difference in salary, then, between active service and inactive service is \$110.81, or a reduction of 25 per cent when he goes out to perform service.

The Senator himself introduced a bill to meet this situation, and the Secretary of War has also prepared a bill that will meet the condition and allow commutation of quarters in the field. That bill was acted upon by our committee this morning and will be in due course reported out. So I think that will answer the question which the Senator asked, and will meet the situation. The statement referred to is as follows:

"List of articles and the minimum cost of each a dismounted Army officer is required to have by section 4, 'Regulations for the Uniform of the United States Army' (Special Regulations, No. 41), and 'Information as to Uniform and Equipment for Officers in France,' headquarters of American Expeditionary Forces November 16, 1917. Total minimum cost is \$646.90:

Estimated cost.

1 basin, canvas	\$1.00
1 bedding or clothing roll	12.50
1 belt, Sam Browne	7.50
1 belt, waist	.50
4 blankets, olive drab	24.00
1 pair boots, rubber, hip	5.00
2 suits, woolen, at \$45	90.00
2 suits, medium, at \$35	70.00
1 bucket, canvas	2.25
Canteen, with cover and strap	4.50
1 cap, service	4.00
1 chair, camp	2.75
12 collars, white linen	2.30
1 comfort	5.00

1 compass	\$1.90
6 pairs cuffs, white linen	2.40
1 cup	.25
4 pairs drawers	8.00
1 field glass	39.00
Flashlight and extra batteries	1.75
Fountain pen, paper, envelopes	3.50
1 pair gloves, leather	3.50
2 pairs gloves, woolen	4.00
12 handkerchiefs	1.50
1 hat, service	5.50
4 shoe laces, extra pair	.40
1 lantern or lamp	4.50
1 pair leggings, leather	15.00
1 pair moccasins	2.50
Notebook and pencils	1.50
1 overcoat, olive drab	45.00
1 pair overshoes, arctics	2.75
1 pistol, belt, and holster	30.00
1 portfolio, leather	5.00
2 shirts, woolen	10.00
6 shirts, cotton or linen	12.00
2 pairs shoes, high	22.00
Silker, leather or fleece lined	45.00
6 pairs stockings	6.00
1 sweater, sleeveless	4.00
2 tags, identification	1.00
Toilet articles	15.00
1 toque, knitted	2.50
6 towels	6.00
1 tub, canvas or rubber	18.00
4 undershirts	8.00
1 vest, leather or flannel	10.00
1 watch	25.00
1 whistle	1.00
1 trunk locker	10.00
1 cot	4.50
1 mess kit	3.50
Miscellaneous articles	25.00

"At least one-half of an officer's equipment must be replaced each year, and the above list does not consider 'dress' equipment for town wear. Officers also are required to furnish their own food, which adds about \$32.50 a month to the above; he also must have bed linen, and his laundry bill will approximate \$5 a month.

"I herewith submit a table of salaries of officers on duty with troops in the field and the comparative salaries of officers on duty in Washington, the latter receiving commutation of quarters, heat, and light, which is not paid to officers on duty with troops, which shows that officers on duty with troops in the United States receive from 18 to 25 per cent less than officers of like grade on duty in Washington. Officers on foreign duty receive an additional 10 per cent. Officers with troops in this instance are considered to be on duty at Camp Meade, Md., a few miles distant:

Grade.	Monthly pay with troops.	Monthly pay, Washington.	Difference in salary.	Per cent reduction.
Second lieutenant	\$141.67	\$173.05	\$31.99	18
First lieutenant	166.67	212.79	46.12	22
Captain	200.00	259.74	59.74	23
Major	250.00	323.27	73.27	23
Lieutenant colonel	291.67	378.83	87.16	24
Colonel	333.33	444.14	110.81	25
Brigadier general	500.00	614.01	114.01	19
Major general	666.66	794.36	127.70	19

"It must be remembered that the United States Army officers on duty with troops in the field must provide quarters and subsistence for their dependents in town, as they are not allowed to have them at cantonments or in the field, as well as officers on duty in town, and it is an established fact that such an arrangement is much more expensive than living with one's family.

"Attention also is invited to the fact that Army officers are to-day paid under a schedule framed in 1908 and under conditions existing at that time. Government statisticians have estimated that since 1913 alone living expenses have increased more than 43 per cent.

"The Judge Advocate General of the Army has held that the act of Congress of February, 1907, contemplated the payment to officers of the Army of \$12 per month for each room they did not receive from the Government or were furnished by the Government to live in under a schedule which provided that a general should be furnished 11 rooms; a lieutenant general, 10; major general, 9; brigadier general, 8; colonel, 7; lieutenant colonel, 6; major, 5; captain, 4; first lieutenant, 3; and a second lieutenant, 2 rooms. To this it was provided that officers should receive heat and light or be paid in lieu thereof a sum based on climatic conditions.

"Congress, in adopting the pay schedule of May, 1908, which is the governing factor in the computation of officers' salaries at present, had before it the former schedule, and, it is understood, purposely made the salaries of officers low that they might receive the commutation for quarters, heat, and light.

"Many officers have been compelled to resign. I am advised, since the outbreak of war because they could not support themselves and families on the salary received, and many others, whose services would be of inestimable value to the country in the present crisis, have refused to don the uniform for the same reason."

Mr. JONES of Washington. I am very glad the committee has acted. I know the committee has been very busy, and it has not been because it did not recognize the situation that it has not acted before. I have received quite a number of letters in reference to the matter and I wanted to get the facts.

Mr. NEW. Mr. President, in this connection I might say that in the closing days of the special session, either in the first few days of October or the last few days of September, I introduced an amendment to the war-risk insurance bill providing for the payment of commutation of quarters just as is provided for in this bill. I went to the Secretary of War at that time and urged the acceptance of that principle. At that time he was very much opposed to it and declined to give it his approval and the influence of the department was exerted against it when my amendment was considered.

At this time the Secretary of War has changed his view evidently, and he is not only in favor of the allowance but sends to the committee a letter three or four pages in length in which he employs exactly the argument that I employed to him several months ago in endeavoring to get him to accept the principle. I was in favor of it then, and I am in favor of it now.

I very much hope that the bill will pass when it is considered, because I think it eminently just, but in the meantime these officers have been without this just allowance for at least five months, when they might have had it had that amendment been accepted at the time it was offered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. If there are no further petitions or memorials, reports of committees are in order.

QUARTERS OR COMMUTATION TO COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted a report (No. 270), accompanied by a bill (S. 3863), to provide quarters or commutation thereof to commissioned officers in certain cases, which was read twice by its title.

BILLS INTRODUCED.

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. CHAMBERLAIN:

A bill (S. 3864) to add certain lands to the Minam National Forest, Oreg.; to the Committee on Public Lands.

By Mr. WEEKS:

A bill (S. 3865) to authorize credits for enlistment in the naval service of the United States in the operation of an act entitled "An act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States," approved May 18, 1917; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

A bill (S. 3866) granting an increase of pension to Arthur G. Bosson; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. SMOOT:

A bill (S. 3867) granting a pension to Catherine Grace (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HALE:

A bill (S. 3868) to carry out the findings of the Court of Claims in the case of Frank S. Bowker (with accompanying paper); to the Committee on Claims.

A bill (S. 3869) granting an increase of pension to Levi R. Gray (with accompanying papers); and

A bill (S. 3870) granting an increase of pension to Ellison Gilbert (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. NORRIS:

A bill (S. 3871) granting an increase of pension to Edgar Taylor; to the Committee on Pensions.

CALLING OF THE ROLL.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Morning business is closed.

Mr. JONES of Washington. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names.

Ashurst	Frelinghuysen	Johnson, S. D.	McLean
Bankhead	Gallinger	Jones, N. Mex.	McNary
Beckham	Gerry	Jones, Wash.	Martin
Chamberlain	Gronna	Kellogg	Nelson
Clait	Hale	King	New
Culberson	Harding	Kirby	Nugent
Cummins	Hardwick	Knox	Overman
Curtis	Henderson	Lewis	Page
Dillingham	Hitchcock	Lodge	Pittman
Fletcher	James	McCumber	Polindexter
France	Johnson, Cal.	McKellar	Pomeroy

Saulsbury
Shafroth
Sheppard
Shields
Simmons
Smith, Ga.

Smith, Mich.
Smith, S. C.
Smoot
Sterling
Stone
Sutherland

Swanson
Thomas
Tillman
Townsend
Trammell
Underwood

Vardaman
Wadsworth
Warren
Weeks
Wolcott

Mr. CURTIS. I desire to announce that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. SHERMAN] is detained on account of illness.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Sixty-seven Senators have answered to their names. There is a quorum present.

WAR CABINET AND DIRECTOR OF MUNITIONS.

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. President, I have delayed making any comments in the Senate relating to the examination of the operations of the War Department until the investigation, which was undertaken in December, had been substantially completed. I now wish to submit some remarks in advocacy of the constructive legislation proposed by the Committee on Military Affairs as a result of its investigations—the war-cabinet bill and the bill providing a centralized head of purchasing. In order to make these comments intelligently, it seems to me I can not do otherwise than point out to the Senate some of the reasons for proposing this legislation and why members of the committee believe these bills should pass.

Before the convening of Congress in December, and since the beginning of the war, members of the committee have received a great number of complaints and criticisms against the manner in which the War Department was conducting the preparations for our participation in this great conflict. Naturally complaints have come to all Senators, but a much greater number have come to members of the Committee on Military Affairs. These complaints can be divided into three classes: First, those coming from disappointed contractors or seekers for Government work. Second, those coming from young men who have enlisted or been drafted into the military service and who found themselves living under conditions to which they were unused, unfamiliar, and to which they did not readily adjust themselves. Third, those criticisms which seemed on their face to furnish evidence of a failure on the part of some one to do something which should have been done.

No member of the committee expected to find perfection in the operations of the War Department under the trying conditions existing during the past 10 months. It was not humanly possible to take the military organization we had at the beginning of the war, expand it to many times its original size, and bring it to what it is to-day without making mistakes. The same thing would be true of any enterprise of a business character, for anyone familiar with business operations must realize that the failure of individuals to comprehend a situation or measure up to it necessarily means mistakes in carrying out even the best digested plans. I do not place any great reliance on individual failures or cases indicating errors due to the human equation, but when such failures are of sufficient number in any particular activity to demonstrate a lack of proper planning, coordination, systematic effort, or careful supervision, then they become an indictment of that particular activity.

The question will naturally be asked: Could not and would not these mistakes be corrected without an investigation by a congressional committee? My answer would be that undoubtedly changes for the better would be and have been made in some instances; in fact, I know of many changes experience has demonstrated as desirable, and those changes are being made from time to time whenever the requirement develops. But it should be said further in answer to that inquiry that it is always more difficult for the person or organization conducting an activity to see mistakes than for others to do so. The reason for this is that a manager is naturally prejudiced in favor of the policy followed as a result of his judgment, and he inherently feels it incumbent upon him to defend his action against any criticism. This is well illustrated by an interrogatory made of the Secretary of War at one of the hearings of the Military Committee. When asked if there were things undertaken or carried on by his department since the beginning of the war which could have been done better he replied somewhat flippantly, in effect, that he did not know all the men in the world and therefore could not pass on their capabilities. When he appeared before the committee the second time, the Secretary had modified this position, for he said:

And we look back over the past and realize that there have been delays and that there have been shortcomings; that there have been things which might have been done better. In so great an enterprise it is impossible for frankness not to find those things.

Undoubtedly the second statement is exactly correct. I want to repeat that many improvements have been made in the operations of the department during the last 10 months, but at the same time it is impossible to expect a department whose head makes such a statement as the one to which I first

referred to make many changes which an outside investigation have shown to be necessary, for his answer is in effect an omnibus apology.

It has been charged that the action taken by the committee resulted from personal or political bias, and the committee has even been criticized for taking officers and officials from their normal employment for examination purposes. I think it is proper for me to say that never in my experience in the House of Representatives or the Senate have I seen a congressional investigation so devoid of partisanship, so little, in fact, that it was negligible up to the time the proposed bills were introduced. There has been no attempt or desire to crucify anyone or anything. On the contrary, the investigation has been conducted upon the principle that the people have a right to examine and regulate the administration of their Government, and that they should exercise that right whenever it seemed best for them to do so. Speaking for myself, I wish to say that I am in favor of a continuation of the exercise of that right whenever anything incident to the war, or otherwise, develops which seems to justify an investigation; and evidently the Secretary of War is in agreement with that position, for he said at his second appearance before the committee:

I do not need to urge that your committee, that the Members of the Senate and the Members of the House, that every citizen in this country, official and unofficial, from the highest to the lowest, realize that this is their enterprise, not quite so much as it is mine in the sense of responsibility, but their enterprise, and to ask from you and from them every suggestion, every criticism, every constructive thought that occurs to any of you, and I ask you when shortcomings are pointed out to you, whether they be well founded or whether they be not well founded, that you will instantly convey them to me, so that by the processes which the department has I may search out where blame is to be attached, where remedies are to be applied, and where strengthening and improvement of the organization are possible.

That is exactly the position of the committee, and I submit to the Senate that that could not be done satisfactorily unless the committee examined these complaints, sifted out those which had no sound basis, and presented the balance of them to the department, either through recommendation of legislation or in some other way. Incidentally, I may say, that a great many of the suggestions developed as a result of the committee hearings have been adopted or are in process of adoption by the War Department at this time.

The committee has not found everything wrong in the War Department; it has found many things to commend, and it should be a just cause of pride to all of us that so much has been accomplished in the preparation of our armies to take their place at the front. To a considerable extent, this is due to the ready response made by the high-class business men of the country, who rallied to the support of the Government in the emergency following the declaration of war on Germany and have performed, frequently under most trying circumstances, most important and absolutely essential service. I do not believe the affairs of the War Department could have been conducted with anything like the same degree of success if these men had not come to the rescue of the Government. I refer particularly, of course, to the advisory commission and its many subcommittees.

Neither would it be fair to unreservedly criticize the many activities conducted by officers of our Army. I shall refer to some of them in a critical way, but I want to say that in dealing with matters with which they are familiar, and which their military training has qualified them to conduct, the officers of the Regular Army have performed their duties well. I have no doubt a more thorough investigation of many other bureaus of the Army would demonstrate the same thing.

Neither do I wish to unjustly or unreservedly criticize the head of the War Department. He has had to deal with a multitude of questions during his incumbency, the disposal of many of which heartily meet my approval. It would require too much time to enumerate the favorable comments I might make. The Secretary has done that effectively in his speech made to the committee on January 23, 1918. No investigation would have been undertaken if there had not been criticism, and it was to find out whether such criticisms were justified and whether corrections could be made to better the service that led the committee to undertake the investigation. If I were to criticize the Secretary of War personally, it would be that he has undertaken to do too many things himself, some of which, at least, might have been attended to by subordinates, and that he has been too open to access to people who might have had their needs provided for through some subordinate officer, leaving him too little time to deliberate over the many larger problems coming before his department. If I were to make a further criticism, it would relate to his temperamental relationship to war. Doubtless he himself would admit that he is a pacifist by nature. For example, he is even now opposed to universal military training, one of the benefits we ought to get out of

the great sacrifices we are making; and I can not divorce myself from the conclusion, based on his own testimony, that he has been inclined to plan for the prosecution of the war—and this condition has to some degree permeated the department—on the basis that we are 3,000 miles from the front instead of hastening preparation with all the vigor we would exercise if our borders were the battle front.

ORDNANCE BUREAU.

During its investigations the committee has examined officers of the Ordnance Bureau, officers and civilians connected with the Quartermaster's Bureau, the office of the Surgeon General, the Aviation Service, and some other less important branches of the military service. I think it proper to call to the attention of the Senate a few of the salient features of the results of this examination. The Bureau of Ordnance for the last 16 years has had at its head one of the ablest officers in the Army. Speaking personally, I have had a great admiration for Gen. Crozier. He was promoted to the rank of brigadier general and placed at the head of the Ordnance Bureau because of his generally recognized fitness, and in most respects he has borne out the prophecy of his early career. It is not his fault that much earlier action was not taken to provide a larger amount of artillery than we now have. It is true that even if the recommendations he has so many times made had been adopted we would still have been in a weaker position than we should, but his record shows that he has frequently urged appropriations for the Ordnance Bureau very much larger than his immediate superiors in the department or Congress have been willing to grant. The truth is, as he states himself, the fault is with the country, which has not always been correctly informed and has been inclined to listen to the arguments of those statesmen who have been, during the past 25 years, figuring how much highway or some other local improvement could be constructed from the appropriation to build a battleship or furnish the War Department with suitable artillery. It can not be denied that the failure of the many attempts to properly prepare the country for war when the sentiment of the country was not sufficiently favorable to do so is now costing us an expenditure of billions of dollars which might have been saved if a systematic, thoughtfully carried out program had been followed and our action based to some degree on the military preparations of other Governments, for the money expended in normal times would have provided a much larger return. Now exorbitant prices must be paid for everything required to provide for the present emergency.

Having said this much in justification of Gen. Crozier's position—and I might say more—I feel that it is necessary to call to the attention of the Senate some of the conditions for which he is partially responsible. At the beginning of the war the Government owned about 600,000 Springfield rifles and about 180,000 Krag rifles, for which latter there was no suitable ammunition; in fact, such Krag ammunition as we had was very old and probably dangerous. The Springfield rifle is of the highest type, and, speaking roughly, it is probably fair to say there is no better rifle in the world, although it has not the longest range; but I do not think the range of the rifles used in the present war has any material influence on results. The question which immediately developed, however, was with reference to an additional supply of rifles sufficient to meet our needs. I think those responsible may properly be criticized for their conclusion in this matter.

The War Department found it necessary to adopt one of two courses—either continue the manufacture of the Springfield type or take advantage of the facilities for manufacturing rifles developed in this country as a result of the European war and adopt the rifle used by Great Britain, or some modification of it. The ammunition used by the British is not like our Springfield ammunition, and that is also true of the French ammunition. It was finally decided to manufacture the Lee-Enfield rifle, the one being made in the United States for Great Britain, but changing it so that our ammunition could be used. Before the necessary changes could be made two months had passed, and supplying our Army with rifles has been delayed by at least that time. I think I will show that the delay has been much longer than two months. It is true that it is absolutely essential that an army should use but one kind of small-arm ammunition, but the question naturally arises whether it would not have been better to have manufactured the Lee-Enfield British type for service abroad and use the Springfield rifles we had on hand for training purposes at our camps. If this had been done, we would have supplied our Army with rifles in a much shorter time.

Small arms are manufactured in two Government arsenals, and by running them in two shifts of 10 hours a day they have a combined maximum capacity of about twelve hundred rifles

per day. I wish to recall to the Senate that on August 29, 1916—the national defense act was passed in June—an appropriation was made for the manufacture of rifles and pistols, which justified running to their full capacity both of our armories. The one at Rock Island, Ill., had been closed down, and the other at Springfield, Mass., was manufacturing only about 75 rifles a day. After the passage of this appropriation bill, an order was given to start up these foundries, but so ineffectively was it carried out that the Rock Island Arsenal, which had been closed down, did not turn out a single rifle until June 23, 1917, or almost a year after the national defense act was passed and 10 months after the appropriation was made for that purpose. In the meantime there had been a slight increase in the output of the Springfield Arsenal, but when we declared war the total output from the latter arsenal was comparatively small.

British rifles had been manufactured in this country at Eddystone, Pa.; Ilion, N. Y.; and New Haven, Conn.; and as soon as the change in type could be made these foundries commenced turning out the Lee-Enfield rifle, so modified that our ammunition could be used. While manufacturing for the British Government these foundries had attained a combined capacity of 6,000 rifles a day. Two months before we declared war they had commenced reducing the number of their employees in proportion to the completion of the work they then had in hand, and as it required something over two months to entirely complete their British contracts, they did not succeed in turning out anything like their full capacity of the new type rifles until very recently. If they had been immediately employed to turn out the British rifle at the rate of 6,000 a day from the time we declared war, we would now have practically 1,800,000 rifles of that type, which, with the 600,000 Springfields on hand for drill and target purposes in this country, would have been amply sufficient to arm all of our forces with the required number of rifles. There were some questions relating to our ammunition, which were arguments in favor of making the change, but all of these arguments in favor of the change did not commence to overcome the advantage of immediately providing the largest supply of rifles possible—a rifle which has served England satisfactorily during three years of actual warfare.

I have discussed this matter in considerable detail, because it illustrates the point I wish to make relative to the management of the Ordnance Bureau. Its head had been engaged in technical matters all his life. He had constantly sought—justifiably so in ordinary times—for the best the market could produce, and in this case he was unwilling to modify that standard of perfection even though a modification would have greatly hastened the production of a satisfactory arm and one which would have answered all our purposes.

In order that the Senate may be fully informed upon this subject, I shall give the number of rifles which have been produced since our declaration of war up to and including December 31, 1917:

Manufactured at the Springfield Armory-----	87, 324, or	350 per day.
Manufactured at the Rock Island Arsenal (from June 23, 1917, when the first delivery was made)-----	17, 060, or	115 per day.
Manufactured by the Eddystone Co.-----	128, 124, or	500 per day.
Manufactured by the Winchester Co.-----	78, 538, or	300 per day.
Manufactured by the Remington Arms Co.-----	34, 414, or	100 per day.
Total output-----	345, 460, or	1, 365 per day.

During that time, if we had continued the manufacture of the British rifle, we could have manufactured at least 6,000 a day, a total of about 1,500,000, or more than four times as many as were actually produced, all of which shows that not only was two months lost in making changes necessary to permit the use of American ammunition, but it has taken many months to reach a quantity production equal to the capacity of these plants when we engaged in war.

The result of delays incident to preparation immediately before the war and in commencing our activities after the declaration of war in matters relating to machine guns, light artillery, and middle heavies is even more deplorable than that relating to small arms. The national-defense act of June, 1916, provided for a five-year program in the manufacture of ordnance, and included an appropriation of \$12,000,000 for machine guns, but it was not until December 14 that 4,000 Vickers guns, tripods, and spare parts were ordered, and not until April, 1917, that 1,300 Lewis guns were ordered. I do not intend to discuss the long-drawn-out controversy about the Lewis gun. Possibly Gen. Crozier is right in his claim that the gun did not function satisfactorily until after our declaration of war, but it had been used during the previous two years by the English to good advantage, and it was very easy to obtain evidence that the gun was giving satisfaction. There is a very considerable plant in the United States at Utica, N. Y., engaged in the manu-

facture of these guns, and I think that plant should have been enlarged without delay and as many guns as possible turned out at once, even if a better gun would be provided later on. Incidentally, we have lost a great deal of time in changing this plant, which was manufacturing guns for British ammunition, to manufacture a gun to use American ammunition. After many trials and investigations it was decided to manufacture Lewis guns for aircraft purposes, and orders were given for these guns late in the fall of last year, but no Lewis guns are even now being manufactured for ground service.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. President, will the Senator suffer an interruption just at that point?

Mr. WEEKS. I shall be very glad to.

Mr. WADSWORTH. It so happens that three days ago I visited the Savage Arms plant at Utica, and I spent three hours in going through it. That plant is now turning out 100 Lewis machine guns per day, an average rate of 3,000 per month. That production might have been started earlier in the summer.

Mr. WEEKS. That illustrates very clearly, Mr. President, the point that I am trying to make. We delayed giving orders for our equipment and failed to take advantage of all the facilities available to furnish it.

It was finally decided to manufacture for ground service what is known as the Browning gun, an untried weapon in actual service, but a gun which promises well in the tests that have been made. None of these rifles, however, can be delivered until March of this year, and those of the heavier Browning type not until May of 1918. It is absolutely essential that infantry regiments in these days have a very considerable number of machine-gun companies, and our troops will be handicapped more or less by this failure to act promptly in providing some kind of machine gun. I will put in the Record at this point a table showing the number of machine guns we had on hand at the beginning of the war—a pitiful showing:

Two hundred and eighty-two Marlin automatic machine guns, caliber .30, model of 1904.

One hundred and forty-eight Colt machine guns, caliber .30.

Three hundred and sixty-three Lewis machine guns, caliber .503.

Six hundred and sixty-six Benét-Mercier machine rifles, model of 1909.

Although we have had a very good 3-inch gun in the United States it was decided to adopt the French 75-mm. gun. I will put in the record at this time a table showing the number of guns and carriages we had on hand at the beginning of the war, including the 4.7 howitzers—another pitiful showing:

3-inch guns and carriages	528
4.7-inch guns and carriages	64
6-inch howitzers and carriages	8
3.8-inch howitzers and carriages	28
4.7-inch howitzers and carriages	108
3.8-inch guns and carriages	8
2.95-inch mountain guns and carriages	80

I want to particularly call attention to the delays incident to undertaking this work. I have already called attention to the time when the order was given to manufacture the Vickers and Lewis guns. The orders for other heavier artillery were not given until some time subsequent. Gen. Crozier testified that he was delayed somewhat by lack of appropriations, which were made in June, 1917, but he also testified that no attempt was made to use any part of the hundred millions of dollars of the emergency fund given the President until August, 1917, or perhaps in the month of September, when \$35,000,000 was placed at the disposal of the Ordnance Bureau. That enabled making the contracts before the appropriation bill of October, 1917, was passed.

The natural query coming to one's mind after examining all this testimony in detail is why there should have been any material delay after the declaration of war in making contracts to carry out the program authorized in the national defense act? It will be remembered that this was provided in five parts. Preparations had to be made for placing the activities for the first part, and they had been placed, so that by multiplying that by four it would not seem that it would have taken any particular time to take the next step; and yet months passed—precious months, as has been demonstrated by the unpreparedness of our troops.

During the examination the chairman of the committee asked this question:

And yet between the appropriations of 1916 and June, 1917, practically nothing was done toward construction. I am still not satisfied with the explanation you made about the delay.

Gen. CROZIER. Senator, what I shall have to say to you, then, is that I am not satisfied either, and I was not satisfied at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was responsible?

Gen. CROZIER. The Secretary of War.

The CHAIRMAN. Somebody is responsible, and I want to find out who.

Gen. CROZIER. The Secretary of War has to be responsible. That is to say, the program of treatment of the subject of machine guns, coming finally to the test of May, 1917, was a program which was adopted

by the War Department; it was prescribed by the Secretary of War, who took a personal interest in the subject, and was not the program of the Ordnance Department.

I need not dwell longer on this subject than to refer to the dates when orders were given for the manufacture of the different classes of artillery with which our Army is to be provided, and I wish to insert in my remarks a list of the contracts and the dates on which these contracts were made.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SUTHERLAND in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

List of principal items purchased by Field Artillery section since declaration of war.

P. O.	Firm.	Material.	Quantity.	Date.
26	Bethlehem Steel Co.	75-mm. gun carriage	4	May 12, 1917
13	do.	do.	340	May 18, 1917
17	do.	do.	268	May 21, 1917
12	New York Air Brake Co.	do.	400	June 8, 1917
154	France	do.	48	July 2, 1917
134	do.	do.	572	July 9, 1917
267	Willis-Overland Co.	do.	2,927	Dec. 1, 1917
280	France	do.	448	Nov. 28, 1917
105	Rock Island Arsenal	3-inch carriage limber	106	Apr. 9, 1917
14	Bethlehem Steel Co.	do.	435	May 18, 1917
2	A. C. & F. Co.	do.	661	June 6, 1917
220	do.	do.	380	Aug. 22, 1917
18	Bethlehem Steel Co.	do.	268	May 21, 1917
154	France	do.	48	July 2, 1917
134	do.	do.	572	July 9, 1917
380	do.	do.	448	Nov. 28, 1917
342	A. C. & F. Co.	do.	2,093	Nov. 5, 1917
0	do.	75-mm. gun caisson	3,348	June 5, 1917
218	do.	do.	2,400	Aug. 24, 1917
15	Bethlehem Steel Co.	do.	900	May 18, 1917
154	France	do.	48	July 2, 1917
134	do.	do.	572	July 9, 1917
343	A. C. & F. Co.	do.	14,608	Nov. 5, 1917
7	do.	75-mm. caisson limber	3,348	June 6, 1917
219	do.	do.	2,400	Aug. 23, 1917
16	Bethlehem Steel Co.	75-mm. caisson limber	900	May 18, 1917
154	France	do.	48	July 2, 1917
134	do.	do.	572	July 9, 1917
348	A. C. & F. Co.	do.	14,368	Nov. 5, 1917
3	do.	75-mm. battery wagon	333	June 5, 1917
224	do.	do.	200	Aug. 28, 1917
344	do.	do.	1,338	Nov. 5, 1917
34	do.	75-mm. forge limber	333	Nov. 5, 1917
223	do.	do.	200	Aug. 25, 1917
345	do.	do.	1,338	Nov. 5, 1917
36	do.	75-mm. store wagon	333	June 5, 1917
222	do.	do.	200	Aug. 24, 1917
346	do.	do.	1,122	Nov. 5, 1917
35	do.	75-mm. store limber	333	June 5, 1917
221	do.	do.	200	Aug. 24, 1917
347	do.	do.	1,122	Nov. 5, 1917
434	Maxwell Motor Co.	75-mm. 2-horse battery reel	1,640	Nov. 28, 1917
125	Walter Scott	4.7-inch gun carriage	250	July 12, 1917
1	Rock Island Arsenal	do.	183	July 23, 1917
409	Studebaker Corporation	do.	500	Dec. 8, 1917
10	A. C. & F. Co.	4.7-inch carriage limber	453	June 5, 1917
787	Maxwell Motor Co.	do.	479	Nov. 28, 1917
8	A. C. & F. Co.	4.7-inch gun caissons	1,848	June 5, 1917
402	Ford Motor Co.	do.	901	Dec. 5, 1917
155	French Government	155-mm. howitzer carriage	24	July 2, 1917
135	do.	do.	235	July 9, 1917
313	Crescent Bradley Co.	do.	900	Oct. 29, 1917
311	Mosler Safe Co.	do.	1,221	Nov. 1, 1917
327	French Government	do.	181	Nov. 14, 1917
306	Standard Steel Car Co.	do.	250	Nov. 21, 1917
155	French Government	155-mm. howitzer carriage limber	24	July 2, 1917
135	do.	do.	235	July 9, 1917
327	do.	do.	184	Nov. 14, 1917
433	Maxwell Motor Co.	do.	2,448	Nov. 28, 1917
155	French Government	155-mm. howitzer caisson	24	July 2, 1917
135	do.	do.	235	July 9, 1917
402	Ford Motor Co.	do.	8,937	Dec. 5, 1917
240	French Government	155-mm. gun carriage	48	Aug. 9, 1917
310	Minnesota Steel & Machinery Co.	do.	1,388	Dec. 2, 1917
327	French Government (by cable)	do.	72	Nov. 14, 1917
60	Midvale Steel Co.	8-inch howitzer carriage	80	May 14, 1917
239	Watertown Arsenal	9.5-inch howitzer carriage	250	Sept. 1, 1917
231	Standard Steel Car Co.	do.	964	Nov. 15, 1917
309	J. G. Brill Co.	6-horse reel and cart	1,100	Oct. 27, 1917
385	do.	do.	1,295	Dec. 15, 1917

Mr. WEEKS. As a further comment of delays which have taken place, about 5,000 of the 75-mm. guns and carriages have been ordered. Small orders were placed throughout the summer, but the main order to the Willis-Overland Co. for 2,927, was not made until December 1, 1917. The same thing is generally true of other guns and gun parts. For instance, the largest order for 3-inch carriage limbers was given to the American Car & Foundry Co. on November 5, 1917. Nearly three-fourths of the 75-mm. gun caissons were provided for in an order on the same date, November 5, 1917, and so on down through the list. Instead of being made in May and June, or possibly in July,

these contracts were very largely made in November, many of them as late as December. It seems to me that a realization of the necessity to have acted promptly would have produced a very different result.

It is true that testimony has been submitted to show that we have made arrangements with France for artillery of various calibers for the year 1918, and it is represented that this arrangement was suggested by the French Government. Whether or not this is so, on account of the delays to which I have briefly referred we could not have provided any considerable amount of artillery for ourselves before the end of this year. But even under these circumstances it seems to me to be very doubtful wisdom to have to depend on France, where there must be an active demand for the employment of every mechanic in providing the requirements in that country. We have a much larger supply of labor than either England or France, especially skilled labor, and it should not have been necessary for us to depend on those countries for this assistance, or, at least, to nothing like the extent we find it necessary.

One of the most acute and dangerous situations developed by the committee's investigation relates to providing a suitable supply of powder.

I want to say, Mr. President, that in all cases where officials of the department or officers of the Army appeared before the committee they were advised that if there were anything of a confidential character in their testimony which should not be included in the public record it should be reserved for executive session. As far as it is possible for me to do so I have limited the citations I shall make to the public record, because it would be manifestly unwise to discuss a confidential matter on the floor of the Senate. I say that at this time because the powder situation is one that can not be discussed in great detail, and I have left out all figures in my reference to it.

Powder can not be readily obtained in England, France, or Italy; indeed, those countries have been, and are at present, drawing on the United States for their supplies. It would not be justifiable, in my opinion, for me to give detailed figures relating to this subject, but I can say without impropriety that about half of the capacity to manufacture in the United States is under contract to our allies, and our total capacity is not more than half our probable needs for the year 1918. Yet no definite step was taken to provide this additional capacity until the month of December, when construction of one unit of an additional supply was undertaken, and within 10 days the construction of another unit was also undertaken. However, if both of these units were in full operation and we had full use of the present capacity, we would still probably be providing for less powder than we will need this year. Of course, the correctness of this statement depends somewhat on the number of troops we have in action.

I can not state too strongly my impression based on the testimony submitted to the committee that there has been gross neglect in providing this absolute requirement, a neglect which would be almost fatal to our war plans if they were not also hampered by the shipping situation.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Michigan?

Mr. WEEKS. I do.

Mr. TOWNSEND. May I ask whether Congress had provided the money necessary for securing the amount of powder that we needed?

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. President, I do not recall in detail the appropriations; but the Senator from Michigan will remember that we provided in the spring of 1917, before the declaration of war, an appropriation of \$100,000,000 for emergency purposes, and, substantially speaking, that appropriation was not expended; so that the money was available for such purposes as the construction of powder plants, purchase of ordnance, or any similar use.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Wyoming?

Mr. WEEKS. I do.

Mr. WARREN. I assume that the Senator means the \$100,000,000 which was given to the President?

Mr. WEEKS. I am speaking of that now. I do not remember about the detailed appropriation for powder in the appropriation bill.

Mr. WARREN. The \$100,000,000 was to be controlled by the President?

Mr. WEEKS. Absolutely; and there is nothing on record to show that any request was made for a part of this fund for that purpose.

Mr. TOWNSEND. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Michigan?

Mr. WEEKS. I do; yes.

Mr. TOWNSEND. I was a member of the Appropriations Committee at the time. My memory is that the appropriations asked for by the department for powder and other Army supplies were always granted.

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. President, it would have been the height of folly to have failed to grant a request of the department for funds to provide powder. I can not imagine that any Senator would interpose an objection of any kind to such a request.

It must be remembered that powder plants can not be constructed in a few months. It requires many months, and we can not expect supplies from the plants now under construction until the campaign of this year has been well advanced, and then only a moderate quantity; indeed, these plants will not be able to operate to their full capacity this calendar year.

A similar conclusion is justified in the failure to provide chlorine, toluol, and other absolutely necessary materials. The testimony, however, is much too confidential to discuss on the floor of the Senate.

QUARTERMASTER BUREAU.

The examination made by the committee of the Quartermaster Bureau developed that much excellent work had been done, but many failures, which might have been avoided, were made. The head of that bureau has labored under the disadvantage of not being a trained quartermaster, but a commissary, with which service he had been connected until the amalgamation of the Paymaster, Quartermaster, and Commissary Departments a few years ago. In the particular line in which he has been trained too much praise can not be given him. I think it fair to say that there is no substantial complaint against the food furnished the Army; indeed, I have not heard or seen a complaint which could not be directly charged to some local condition, and the rationing of our men has, on the whole, been a tremendous success. Gen. Sharpe is entitled to the credit for this result.

The purchasing of supplies, however, has not in all respects been handled satisfactorily, and would have been distinctly otherwise, in my opinion, if it had not been for the assistance rendered by the Committee on Supplies; but that assistance involved complications—differences between the Quartermaster's Bureau and the Committee on Supplies—and in many cases a failure to obtain good results. It ought to be said, however, that there has been an enormous enlargement in the number of officers connected with both the Ordnance and Quartermaster's Bureaus, and that, necessarily, it took time to secure suitable men and train them for their duties. But the same delay in getting under way and in giving contracts is found in the Quartermaster Department that I have instanced in connection with the activities of the Ordnance Bureau. For example—and I will only give one instance, because it is typical—it was, of course, known as soon as war was declared that overcoats for the entire number of men enlisted or drafted would be required before the cold weather, and yet contracts for but 152,000 overcoats were made in April, but 50,000 in May, and, in addition to that, about a million and a half between the 1st of June and the 1st of September. The deliveries of these overcoats, however, were put at such dates that they could not possibly have been received in time to even furnish a million men with overcoats before cold weather. For example, 1,632 were to be delivered in May, 15,700 in June, 80,000 in July, 150,000 in August, 350,000 in September, 340,000 in October, 170,000 in November, and 250,000 in December, or a total of 1,357,332, or less overcoats than we had men in the service on the 1st of January of this year. This indicates that some of our men, either those under arms or those in the noncombatant forces, could not possibly have been supplied with overcoats in time to prevent the suffering which has undoubtedly resulted from this neglect.

Senators should recall that men doing duty at night require overcoats during the month of September in almost all sections of the country. It is not safe to say that even if these overcoats had been supplied before the 1st of December there would not have been suffering on account of failure to furnish them earlier.

This illustration is not unlike others which may be instanced; in fact, technicalities of one kind or another prevented our using all the facilities we had at hand. Great clothing centers were not employed in the slightest degree in manufacturing clothing for the Army. Not a contract was let in Rochester, N. Y., or in Newark, N. J., which are among the most important clothing centers in the United States. I do not find that any contract of any considerable amount was let to a manufacturer of clothing west of the Allegheny Mountains. There were some small purchases to make up our requirements made in a few

western cities, but there were not more than 50,000 overcoats purchased from these sources. If there had been a planning board to give consideration to the letting of these contracts, they would have been distributed throughout the country, especially in those places where other work was not being done, and where labor could easily be obtained and properly housed.

The experience of the American Uniform Co., of New York, is not unlike that of many other manufacturers. This concern, which had manufactured 500,000 uniforms for the British Army within a period of 60 days, and had ample capital and suitable facilities for doing the work, was refused contracts on account of technicalities which seem almost absurd when we consider that our men, as a result of such neglect, failed to receive warm clothing before the cold weather came on. In their endeavors to obtain a contract, which was finally refused on the ground of insufficient capital, although they had one of the best lists of stockholders, containing many men of very high financial rating, and a capital of \$750,000, they were hampered in every way. To give an example of the situation, I quote what took place at the quartermaster's office in New York. The representative of the company received this information in reply to interrogatories by the manager of the uniform company. The quartermaster said:

The uniform company must own the shops. I asked him if this meant to own the building in which the shops were located. He said no, but that a lease from the landlord of the building would be required. I asked him whether this would not be satisfied by taking a lease from the present tenant, and he said that he would look on this with disfavor. I then asked him if the uniform company must own the machinery in the shop. He said yes. I pointed out that in some cases special machinery was leased. He said that in such cases a lease direct from the licensing company would be required. I asked him whether there was any objection to leasing the machinery from the present owner of the shop, and he said that he would look on this with disfavor.

In other words, instead of stretching a point to get a large manufacturer interested in making uniforms, every possible obstacle was placed in the way of the company receiving a contract. Whether there was personal animosity or other similar reason I am not able to say; but it is pretty nearly a disgraceful development that every attempt was not made to get our men warmly clad before the winter weather.

This uniform question brings out the most unsavory development which has taken place since the investigation commenced.

I feel that inasmuch as there has been so much comment in the press regarding this matter, I should bring it to the attention of the Senate. It is known as the Base Sorting Plant arrangement. In its inception undoubtedly the method used was wise, because the Government was furnishing the cloth from which the uniforms were to be made, and there was a natural desire that the clippings belonging to the Government should be used for governmental purposes; but in connection with carrying out this arrangement—and perhaps he was its promoter—there appeared on the scene one Samuel Kaplan, of New York, who soon became connected with the committee on supplies and within a very short time—not much more than a week, according to the evidence—obtained a contract for the sorting of these rags at 6 cents a pound, the contract being let to the Base Sorting Co., of New York, a company organized for this purpose with a capital of \$50,000, of which \$10,000 was paid in. One of the three active men in the Base Sorting Co. was a brother of Kaplan. Other rag dealers soon became active and insistent that a suitable arrangement had not been made, and the result was a modification of the contract so that only a half a cent a pound profit should be paid to the Base Sorting Plant. Later on, the agitation being continued and those connected with the company evidently becoming frightened, they offered to do the sorting for nothing; and in December, as a result of an investigation made by the Equipment Bureau, the Secretary of War canceled the contract altogether.

At the time this contract was made there was another contract let, which presumably has also been canceled—

Mr. HARDING. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Ohio?

Mr. WEEKS. I yield.

Mr. HARDING. If it will not interrupt the Senator, I will ask him if he has noted in the press the dismissal from service in the Army of the officer who interfered with the contract?

Mr. WEEKS. I read that in the morning paper. I was going to refer to it.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. WEEKS. I yield.

Mr. THOMAS. If the Senator will permit an interruption, I noticed that article myself this morning, and as the result

of it I have addressed a letter to the Secretary of War asking for particulars connected with the dismissal of Capt. Pereless, with a hope that I may be able to lay the information before the Senate to-morrow morning.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to his colleague?

Mr. WEEKS. I yield.

Mr. LODGE. Who gave the first contract at 6 cents a pound to Kaplan?

Mr. WEEKS. The committee on supplies. Kaplan, while not a member of that committee, was a member of the subcommittee of the committee on supplies.

Mr. LODGE. Who was at the head of the commission?

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. Eisenman. I should say that Mr. Rosenwald, of the Sears, Roebuck Co., a member of the advisory commission, is the chairman of the committee on supplies. Mr. Eisenman, of Cleveland, Ohio, is the vice chairman of the committee on supplies and had this particular matter in charge.

Mr. GALLINGER. Will the Senator permit me?

Mr. WEEKS. I yield.

Mr. GALLINGER. Will the Senator state how long the contract ran at which 6 cents a pound was paid?

Mr. WEEKS. It was an indefinite contract, as I remember, but contained the usual provision made in Army contracts permitting its cancellation.

Mr. GALLINGER. The Senator does not quite understand me. How long a time did this arrangement continue before it was changed from 6 cents a pound to half a cent a pound?

Mr. WEEKS. It continued two or three months, as I recall.

Mr. GALLINGER. Could the Senator state approximately how large the profit received was?

Mr. WEEKS. I shall do so, because I want the Senate to know the facts.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Nebraska?

Mr. WEEKS. I yield.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. If the Senator would like to insert it in the RECORD, I have here the data relating to that contract in a compact form.

Mr. WEEKS. I will ask unanimous consent to insert the data in the RECORD.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I can read it in this connection.

Mr. WEEKS. Very well.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. July 26 Mr. Eisenman sent to the Quartermaster's Department a letter from Kaplan giving plans for Government control of clippings.

August 9 Eisenman recommended raising the profit from one-half cent per pound to 1 cent per pound.

August 21 Eisenman was advised that a company had been formed, with Mr. Ira A. Kaplan as president.

August 22 the contract was signed.

September 13 Eisenman left contracts for sale of condemned clothing and blankets to Base Sorting Plant for execution with the Quartermaster General.

September 20 the contract was signed.

November 14 one of the dissatisfied rivals, Mr. Leuthner, called the attention of the Secretary of War to the fact that the contract was outrageous and would result in a profit of \$400,000 on clippings. The Quartermaster's Department immediately began to investigate.

December 3 Eisenman sent a proposed supplementary contract reducing the profit on clippings back to one-half cent per pound.

December 8 Eisenman forwarded offer from Base Sorting Plant from the same concern to cut off the other nominal one-half of 1 per cent profit.

December 19 the Quartermaster General canceled both contracts and gave the 30 days' notice to take over the plant. The testimony shows that contracts were duly entered into first at 5½ cents, then at 6½ cents, and then dropped from 6½ to 5½, from 5½ to 5, and finally when an investigation was had the contract was canceled by the War Department.

Mr. WEEKS. I was about to say when interrupted that at the time this contract was made there was another contract let which presumably has also been canceled, although the Military Committee could not seem to obtain the evidence that this had been done. This latter was a contract to take over all of the condemned material from the Army, including blankets, uniforms, overcoats, and so forth. This contract was made at 5 cents a pound. While the company was operating on the 6 cents a pound basis it made money at the rate of \$400,000 a year on the first contract. It was easily demonstrated that the work could be done for 1½ cents a pound. If the second contract had not, or has not, been canceled, the profits, according to the testimony of

Capt. Pereless, Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, would run into the millions of dollars.

I do not believe that any member of the committee on supplies, referring now to Mr. Rosenwald and Mr. Eisenman, knew what it cost to sort rags, although it would seem that they should have found out before making such a contract. Certainly the rag dealers knew, and the fact that a man connected with the committee on supplies, or a subcommittee, should have been instrumental in bringing about such a contract, his brother being one of the officers of the company given the contract, another brother being connected with two comparatively small woolen mills, the only mills manufacturing for the Government which have been commandeered, and having still another brother of draft age who suddenly left the country before the passage of the draft act and who has not returned, surrounds the whole enterprise and the name with a kind of cloud which leaves an extremely bad impression. I wish to absolve, however, the committee on supplies from any responsibility in this matter, except it does seem to me that before making such a contract the committee should have learned the real cost of doing such work and made a businesslike contract.

This also brings up an important question in regard to the manner of making purchases of Army supplies. In most cases, except in contracts for shoes, the contracts were not made as a result of competition. It was claimed that conditions were such that this could not be done, but, leaving out the contracts for shoes, the total contracts made by this bureau during the months beginning with the declaration of war and up to the 1st of January aggregated about \$700,000,000. It is worth noting that the Paymaster's Bureau of the Navy continued its policy of the past, and all contracts were made as a result of competition, the bureau having expended \$300,000,000 without any difficulty in supplying the requirements of the Navy by following that system. While I do not claim that excessive prices were paid—indeed, it would be almost impossible to determine whether or not they were—contracting without competition is contrary to law and to every business precedent governed by prudence. It also involves some serious situations. For instance, the blankets which were furnished to the Government ranged in prices from \$2.75 to \$6.50. If he wishes to, one may assume that in each case the Government got its money's worth; but it can be easily assumed also that excessive prices were paid for some of these blankets, and certainly those purchased at the lower prices were of pretty poor quality. For instance, Gen. Greble, the commandant of the National Guard encampment at Fort Worth, Tex., testified that although his men had three blankets apiece they suffered exceedingly with the cold, and it was necessary to put in an emergency order to buy puffs. Twenty-five thousand were purchased for his camp. In other words, in many instances there was no standard of quality fixed or businesslike method followed in making purchases.

I wish to comment on the blanket question in passing. According to the evidence we have purchased 19,000,000 blankets. Gen. Pershing says that a man in the trenches will require nine blankets a year. Therefore if we had a million men in the trenches we have already purchased blankets enough for two years. But if the men are in camp they do not need half as many blankets as they would in the trenches. As more than half of our men up to this time and for the larger part of this year will be in camp, it would seem that we have bought blankets enough to last our forces from two to four years. That may be a wise provision in looking ahead, but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that manufacturing capacity which might have been utilized for some other purpose has been used in manufacturing blankets and quite likely delayed other necessary production. That is another point in favor of a planning board, to look ahead and determine these questions before action is taken.

It should be said that some requirements of the Government were so much greater than facilities to furnish them that competitive buying would not have been desirable. This is particularly true of the purchase of duck. The capacity of the manufacturers of this material was thirty times less than the requirements of the Government, and it was necessary to go out and develop facilities for providing this cloth. I do not intend to criticize the failure to purchase duck by competition, or of any other article where the facilities for its supply is less than the requirements of the Government.

At the first examination of the Secretary of War I, and I think others, got the impression that the camps had been supplied with all the requirements needed by the troops which had not been transferred to Europe. Later on he modified this statement by saying that the rush requirements of the troops had been supplied; but to show the extent of the failure to promptly

supply troops under the program adopted by the War Department I wish to call attention to the testimony of Maj. Gen. Greble. Gen. Greble appeared before the committee December 28, 1917, and in some detail stated the failure to supply his camp at Fort Worth, Tex.

It must be remembered that this is a National Guard camp, that the National Guard was called into the service in July, and that, therefore, the testimony he gave represented conditions something like six months after his men had been mobilized. Gen. Greble, in answer to the inquiry whether his camp was properly equipped, gave this testimony:

The following is a list of present shortages expressed in percentage on the more important articles of equipment: Rifles, 59 per cent short; bayonets, 65 per cent short; pistols, 86 per cent short; cartridge belts, 59 per cent short; machine guns, none on hand (20 Colts shipped)—

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. What was the date?

Mr. WEEKS. December 28, 1917—

automatic rifles, 88 per cent short; 3-inch guns, 88 per cent short; 6-inch howitzers, none on hand; trench mortars, none on hand; 1-pounder cannon, none on hand; Artillery harness, 92 per cent short; horse equipment, 81 per cent short; Infantry equipment (this includes haversacks, first-aid pouches, and canteens), 78 per cent short; small-arms ammunition, 75 per cent short; Artillery ammunition, 90 per cent short.

In discussing the question of other equipment he furnished us the following information:

OFFICE OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER,
Camp Bowie, Fort Worth, Tex., December 23, 1917.

Memorandum to commanding general.

1. The following is my estimate of the amount of transportation required to properly equip this division that is to be furnished by the Quartermaster's Department:

Item.	Total required.	On hand.	Necessary to equip.
Wagons, escort.....	405	362	43
Rolling kitchens.....	116	116
Carts, ration.....	113	113
Carts, water.....	109	109
Motor cars.....	46	1	45
Motor trucks.....	245	245
Trucks, technical supply.....	12	12
Rolling kitchens, trail-mobile.....	10	10
Motorcycles with side cars.....	105	105
Bicycles.....	259	259
Spring wagons (for Artillery regiment).....	7	7
Water carts, trail-mobile (for sanitary trains).....	6	6

JOHN P. HASSON,
Major of Infantry, National Army,
Division Quartermaster.

If any Senator thinks that is an individual instance and should not be given too much importance, I call to the attention of the Senate a letter, dated as late as January 13, from the captain of a company at one of the western camps. I will read a portion of it. The writer says:

I have no canteens, no ammunition belts, no haversacks, no pack carriers, no bayonets for Enfields, no automatic rifles, no grenades, no rifle grenades, no pistols, no alidades, no sketching boards, no field glasses, no gas masks.

In other words, the statement, inadvertently, I think, which has given the country the impression that these camps were fully supplied is not correct. The camps are not supplied, and very largely so because of the reason I assigned earlier in my remarks—entirely unjustifiable delays in making contracts to provide these necessities.

I think that probably this condition is an exaggeration of the shortages at many of the National Guard camps; but if this is true of a National Guard camp, how much more acute was it likely to be at a National Army camp, where the men were mobilized two months later. They had no equipment as did the National Guard before being called into the service. An examination of the dates of orders given for much of this equipment, which would have been furnished promptly if contracts had been made immediately after the declaration of war, shows the extent we have been delayed in enabling our Army to fit itself for service abroad. Many of these articles should have been furnished in their entirety early in the fall, but there were cases like that of cartridge belts, a very simple article, contracts for which were not given until long after they should have been delivered.

AVIATION.

I have suggested that the committee examined developments in the Aviation Service. On the whole, the evidence shows that this development has been carried on intelligently and systematically. While the actual number of machines constructed does not compare favorably with impressions given the public, not, perhaps, by those responsible, but by others, it is represented that from now on production will be comparatively rapid. As far as any evidence submitted to the

committee shows, the motor constructed for these airplanes has met all requirements and tests. At present it would seem that if there is any failure in the development of the Aviation Service, it will be due to the supply of spruce, and I hardly think entirely satisfactory arrangements have yet been made for this purpose. I say this with a good deal of hesitation, however, because there is evidence that much less progress has been made than should have been. I want to add that we can never be sure a machine is going to work well because it does so in practical tests. There may be unsatisfactory developments in the Aviation Service which can not be foreseen at this time.

Quite likely the Military Committee will feel it incumbent on itself to follow up this particular investigation from time to time to be sure that everything is being done to provide this very important facility in waging war; in fact, from the strictly military standpoint, I believe it is the most important agency we are furnishing. I have great hopes that our supplementing the efforts of the allies in providing airplanes will have a very marked effect on the successful prosecution of the war.

MEDICAL BUREAU.

I have also referred to the examination of the Surgeon General's Office and regret that a clean bill of health can not be given this essential branch of our Military Establishment. It is one of the best illustrations that can be found to demonstrate the lack of careful planning ahead. If somebody had really been thinking about the requirements of this great emergency, it could not have been possible that the building of hospitals at the camps or cantonments would have been delayed, or, in fact, not undertaken as soon as any construction was commenced. Yet, the construction of hospitals for the National Guard divisions was not undertaken until the month of September, a considerable time after they had gone into camp, and many of them are not completed at this time. None of these hospitals have steam heat, some have no hot water, and a very considerable number have been for months lacking the commonest equipment necessary to hospital facilities. No sewerage systems in some of them, not even bedpans until very recently, and in more or less instances the rooms in which examinations of patients were made had no heat, although necessarily a man must be exposed for a considerable time during such examinations.

As I said in the beginning, I do not believe in placing any particular reliance on individual cases of neglect in such matters. Quite likely a considerable number of doctors have been taken into the service who were inexperienced and in some cases absolutely incompetent, but it is apparent that there are not enough doctors for our needs or sufficient nurses. If there were, it could not be possible that such a case as was recently brought to my attention in connection with the Walter Reed Hospital, in this city, could happen. At that hospital a man was placed in the measles-suspect ward on Sunday, removed Monday noon, and did not see a doctor again until Wednesday morning, although he was suffering acutely from a disease which should have been promptly treated.

As far as the National Guard camps are concerned, all the hospital arrangements have been delayed and neglected. Maj. Gen. Greble, commanding the Fort Worth, Tex., camp, reported to at least four officials of the War Department during the month of September that unless prompt action were taken there would be sickness and demoralization in his camp. Almost immediately afterwards he was sent to Europe, and did not return until November, but, notwithstanding his protests against these conditions, no action was taken to remedy them until the 15th of November. By that time the camp had become a vast hospital. Of the 25,000 men in this cantonment, 8,000 were at one time or another in the hospital during the month of November. The capacity of the hospital is 800 men, and at one time it had to accommodate eighteen hundred patients—a hospital with no sewerage system and lacking in pretty nearly every medical requirement. It is not surprising that there were 200 deaths within a short time at that camp and numbers of the men so inadequately treated that their recovery is a matter of weeks and months.

All of these instances are important illustrations of a failure to develop a definite plan before the men were ordered to the colors. While such failures are not by any means universal, they are of sufficient number to warrant their being brought to the attention of the public and to stimulate the officers of the War Department to correct them and prevent their recurrence; indeed, there can be no question that much of the sickness and many of the deaths at these cantonments were due to insufficient clothing and inadequate hospital facilities.

Now, I want to point out how far we have fallen behind other countries in this respect. Here is a quotation from the proceedings of the House of Commons. The undersecretary of state for war was asked about mortality, and the suggestion was made that an investigation be ordered of the condition of the troops at Salisbury Plain.

Mr. LODGE. What date was that?

Mr. WEEKS. The answer indicates that it was very recent. This is the answer of Mr. Tennant:

The annual ratio per 1,000 was for the Salisbury Plain district during the period of September 1 to the 31st of December, 325.4 admissions to the hospital; deaths, 1.88.

That would indicate a number of deaths not exceeding 5 per thousand per year. The number of deaths at our camps exceeds 8 per thousand per year, 5 is about the ratio for men who have been examined of the age of our drafted men, and Mr. Tennant adds:

Both those ratios are lower than those for peace time, and in those circumstances I can not see any necessity for the appointment of a committee to investigate.

TROOPS IN EUROPE.

Mr. President, the question has arisen about the number of troops we have in Europe. Of course, I am not going to say how many American troops there are in Europe, although I know, but the suggestion has been made by those in high authority that we have done very much better in this respect than we anticipated, based on plans made during the fall months. I want to say in reply to that—because I do not think it fair to give the public a wrong impression about what we are doing—that on the 1st day of October I had a conversation with the Secretary of War, who told me the number of troops we had in Europe or on the way there, what the plans of the department were, and what he believed the department could do in the future. The number of troops now in Europe is exactly 54 per cent of the number that would have been there on February 15, if those plans had been carried out. I do not say that in the way of criticism of the Secretary of War, but I do say it as an answer to the impression given the public that we have been accomplishing more in getting troops to the other side than was anticipated by the officials of the department. It is distinctly unwise to give the public such an impression. It is almost equally unwise to give the public the impression that we are doing less than we are, or hold up to criticism those things which should not be criticized; but, as far as possible, without exposing military secrets, the public should be given the truth in matters of that kind.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. JAMES] yesterday, in his forceful address, in speaking of the number of troops abroad, said that we had not 30,000 men over there but many, many times that number; that we had not a hundred thousand men over there but many, many times that number. "Many" means numerous; it does not mean twice that number but several times that amount. I can say to the Senator from Kentucky and to the Senate that the word "many" does not apply to his description in any respect. When he says "many," it entirely deludes the public and is so erroneous that it should be corrected.

Incidentally, Mr. President, I listened with a great deal of interest to the Senator from Kentucky. Many of the things which he stated are true, but they had been stated more definitely by the Secretary of War in his testimony before the committee. I am glad the Secretary of War and the Senator from Kentucky said them, because they pointed out the things the War Department has done, and the Secretary of War made some explanations for the things which had not been done. It is right that the public should know that, but no one denies that our draft law has worked well, that we repaired the German ships expeditiously, or several of the other propositions the Senator from Kentucky discussed at considerable length.

He also instanced the fact that the French and British commissioners had extolled our war preparations. Does any Senator think that the commissioners from our allied countries would make public criticisms of what we were doing? If they were going to say anything—and they may have felt it incumbent upon them to do so—necessarily what they would say to us would be flattering to our vanity or, at least, would incline that way.

There was one other point raised by the Senator from Kentucky to which I desire to refer for a moment—a delicate subject which should not be discussed in detail in public. He referred to the failure of the Root mission to Russia, not with any desire to reflect on the head of that mission or any member of it. I take it, but to indicate that even as competent a man as Mr. Root had failed to obtain results. Most of us do not know

about the details of our relations with foreign countries; we are not members of the Foreign Relations Committee; we can not know the facts; and we could not discuss them in public if we did; but in that particular case I want to suggest to the Senator from Kentucky, if he can do so, that he look at the files of the State Department and determine for himself whether everything was done that could have been done which would have enabled the mission headed by Mr. Root to have been successful. I think he will find that others than the members of the Root mission were responsible, at least to some degree, for the failure of the success of that mission.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. President, that is a very modest statement; but the Senator leaves it in a very indefinite situation. I was almost tempted to inquire whether he meant Senators to infer that the recommendations of that commission had not received proper attention at the hands of the executive department?

Mr. WEEKS. If the Senator from Michigan is curious on that subject—and I think every Senator should be—and will examine the records of the State Department, I think he will find that the recommendations of that mission were not carried out.

Mr. STONE. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. WEEKS. I yield.

Mr. STONE. I think it is rather an unfortunate statement to say that the State Department had not done its duty with respect to the Root mission. The Senator himself says that it raises a subject which can not be discussed on the floor of the Senate, and then makes a statement of fact which might be contradicted; and who knows who is right? The Senator ought not to bring a question before the Senate which he himself says it is improper to discuss on the floor of the Senate, and make an assertion of fact like that.

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. President, I did not bring the subject to the floor of the Senate. The subject was brought to the floor of the Senate by the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. JAMES] in his speech of yesterday.

Mr. STONE. The Senator brought this particular matter before the Senate.

Mr. WEEKS. I brought this particular matter to the attention of the Senate to indicate that the Root mission was not, in my judgment, entirely responsible for the failure which was instanced by the Senator from Kentucky; and I said, and I repeat, that, in my judgment, it is not proper for me to go into any further details.

Mr. STONE. Then it ought not to have been referred to.

Mr. LEWIS. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. WEEKS. With pleasure.

Mr. LEWIS. May I ask the Senator from Massachusetts has he some information on the point that, after recommendation was made by the Root mission on certain lines, they themselves, upon further investigation, qualified it and, out of their sense of conscientious duty, sent in other recommendations directly opposed to the one which the Senator says was not complied with?

Mr. WEEKS. No; I have not.

Mr. LEWIS. May I ask the Senator, if he gets an opportunity to do so, to investigate whether or not there were not two reports—one from the head of the mission, Mr. Root, and then another by Mr. Russell—in which there was such a divergence of views that they finally decided that the whole matter should be submitted to the department for subsequent action, and that there was never submitted, and does not now exist, a concrete recommendation of any kind?

Mr. WEEKS. I shall be very glad to leave this whole question to the consideration of the proper Senate committee, and I hope its members will consider it.

SHOES.

It is not necessary to instance every failure on the part of the War Department to act promptly to indicate that there have been many such failures, but this investigation is the only way to so forcibly bring them to the attention of the Secretary of War that such conditions will not continue; in fact, the committee could not know many of the things which have been developed by the investigation. Take, for example, the question of fitting Army shoes. There is very little doubt that the shoe now being furnished the Government is a good one. They have been contracted for in a businesslike way, and there is no criticism on that score, but the sizes of shoes manufactured as a result of the specifications sent the shoemakers are substantially the sizes which have been the standard since the Civil

War. Some minor changes have been made, but, practically speaking, nothing has been done to make these sizes suitable to present requirements. Yet there has been the greatest difficulty to even get this matter considered by the War Department.

Shoemakers and others interested in this subject have devoted time and energy to the question of properly fitting soldiers with shoes, and as long ago as October, 1916, an examination was made of the soldiers at El Paso, Tex. This investigation developed that out of 30,359 men examined 21,535 were found to be fitted with shoes one-half to three and a half sizes too short. This evidence was brought to the attention of the department, but nothing was done. In August, 1917, as a result of tests made at South Framingham, Mass., 81.7 per cent of the men measured were found to be wearing shoes from one-half to three and a half sizes too short. If this is true—and it has not been denied by any officer of the War Department—it means that more than a million of the men we have in uniform are wearing shoes improperly fitted and too small for them. There is no question about the desirability of properly fitting our men with shoes if we expect the highest possible efficiency.

Since August, 1917, various attempts to get this matter adjusted have failed, or partially so, and I am informed that at this time tests are being made under the direction of the War Department. But let us consider the result of this failure. Since the declaration of war we have ordered 21,000,000 pairs of shoes, basing the orders on specifications which resulted in an error in 80 per cent of the sizes purchased, or, if not, there had been neglect on the part of the officers responsible for fitting the men to that extent. During these tests the fact was developed that at one encampment there were 7,000 pairs of shoes of sizes too small for any of the men on duty there.

Mr. POMERENE. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Ohio?

Mr. WEEKS. Yes.

Mr. POMERENE. Did I understand the Senator to state correctly that there was an error in 80 per cent of the shoes?

Mr. WEEKS. That is the testimony before the committee.

Mr. POMERENE. What is the nature of that error?

Mr. WEEKS. The shoes are too short.

Mr. POMERENE. That is, that only 20 per cent of the shoes that have been ordered can be worn by our soldiers?

Mr. WEEKS. No; I do not mean that, but I mean that, as the men are fitted, 80 per cent of the men are wearing shoes that are too short, as demonstrated by the result of special tests. A final test is now being made by the War Department.

The people of the country may reasonably expect that our soldiers shall be correctly fitted with shoes, and that any system which permits such a serious failure to properly fit them should be at once eliminated.

The Surgeon General agrees that this condition should be corrected and the Quartermaster General agrees that it should be done. There is no dissent on the part of anyone, yet for months, certainly for 15 months, attempts have been made to correct this situation, and nothing whatever has been done except to issue an order—not one providing an accurate standard for fitting the men—which very slightly modified one or two sizes. A change in this condition may not have been brought about by a munitions minister; indeed, it could and should have been brought about by the officers of the department, but how are such changes to be made unless investigations demonstrate the necessity and, as a result of such investigations, the Secretary of War insists that those responsible take proper action?

This is one of the details which has come to the attention of the Secretary of War. He has passed it down the line, and while both the Surgeon General and the Quartermaster General agreed to the accuracy of the situation, nobody has followed it up and made the changes which should be made.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. President, I was going to ask the Senator to relate to the Senate, as an illustration of how simply the whole thing could have been cured, the incident of the Marine Corps. When the attention of the Marine Corps was brought to a somewhat similar situation, and a device was presented to them to make it practically impossible to put a shoe on a soldier's foot which did not fit him, the Marine Corps adopted it in 10 days.

Mr. WEEKS. To those who criticize the activities of the Military Committee and question the value of the investigation I give this instance, and others of importance could be added, to show how valuable and necessary it is to develop an outside pressure which will result in internal action.

Mr. President, I want to add a word relating to that subject which I should not ordinarily do. Day before yesterday a great metropolitan journal took occasion to say that the reason three

Senators, including myself, were pushing these investigations was because of our failure to get contracts for our constituents. In my case it instanced this particular activity. My activity has consisted in writing two letters, one to the Quartermaster General and one to the Secretary of War. The man who brought the matter to me was Mr. Bliss, the president of the Regal Shoe Co., a man of the highest character, who is not doing any business for the Government, has not done any, has not sought any, and has told the Government that he does not wish to do it, but that he would do it if necessary. In these investigations, which were undertaken by Mr. Bliss months before the declaration of war, he has brought out many of these facts; and in trying to correct them he has developed a little device the purchase of which for the whole Army would probably cost four or five hundred dollars. I have no doubt Mr. Bliss would be glad to give them to the War Department, because he is a responsible man, financially and otherwise.

It may be necessary to attempt to assassinate reputations in order to prevent investigations of things that need investigating. As far as I am concerned, I care nothing particularly about this charge against me, but I bring it to the attention of the Senate to show the straits to which somebody is put, and that certainly the "galled jade is wincing" in finding it necessary to occupy three columns of the first page of a great metropolitan journal with such stuff as that to which I have referred.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Michigan?

Mr. WEEKS. I do.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. It may not be inappropriate to say that they are wasting their fire on the Senator from Massachusetts, who is as far beyond their criticisms and above the criticisms of the average caustic critic as any man in this Chamber.

COAL SUPPLY.

Mr. WEEKS. Mr. President, no better illustration of the benefits which might accrue from a war cabinet or planning board, whatever it may be called, can be found than the coal situation in the United States. It is a particularly pertinent illustration, because the condition is one confronting us to-day. Six or eight months ago it was apparent to the close observer that this condition would develop, and I wish to apply the illustration directly to New England. About seven months ago members of the Massachusetts committee on public safety and myself devoted much time in trying to bring to the attention of the authorities in Washington the fact that New England, whose industries are running at a greater speed than ever before, would probably require five or six million tons of coal in addition to the normal supply. Nothing was being done to supply this requirement. On the other hand, the Secretary of the Navy was withdrawing tugs and other coal-transportation facilities for naval uses. He had a perfect right to do so; in fact, it was probably his duty. Our naval representative in Europe was calling on him for certain classes of tonnage, and it was his duty to supply those needs. He commandeered vessels wherever he could find them, not with an intent to injure any industries—in fact, he avoided doing so as far as it was possible—but it is not the business of the Secretary of the Navy to look after the New England industrial situation. It is his business to operate his department, and he did what any man in his place would have done in all probability. He commandeered shipping which in normal times was used in transporting from one to two million tons of coal to New England, so that instead of increasing the coal-carrying capacity it was deliberately decreased, and everyone knew it.

We could not get the Shipping Board to correct this situation. Those in charge recognized its existence, but no practical step was taken to substitute other shipping for that taken by the Navy Department. In the final analysis, the advisory commission concluded that if the shortage of coal developed as was anticipated it would be necessary to divert railroad transportation facilities sufficiently to supply the need. We all know how this possibility has failed, and to-day there are cities in New England with only two or three days' coal supply on hand. Mills largely engaged in manufacturing for the Government are being closed down, and this is in addition to the industrial concerns closed down by the ill-judged and ill-timed order of the Fuel Administrator.

Let me demonstrate two or three examples of the utter folly of this order:

Plant 1. The coal consumed by this plant for the five days from January 11 to 15, inclusive, was 457,265 pounds. The coal consumed during the five days the plant was shut down—January 18 to 22, inclusive—was 300,050 pounds, a saving of 157,215 pounds. The requirements for the shut-down days

were to keep the plant heated, pipes from freezing, and prevent destruction of material in process of construction or otherwise. In other words, this plant was able to save about 15 tons of coal a day, which at \$7 a ton would be \$105 a day. In that particular plant the loss in wages to the employees was about \$7,000 a day, and the loss in production, without figuring any profit, was in excess of that amount. This plant had sufficient coal on hand to keep its employees engaged and to give them full compensation for their services.

Plant 2. This concern employs 1,800 hands and shows the following result for the four-day shutdown: Coal saved, 325 tons, which is about 66 per cent of the normal consumption, a saving in dollars of about \$2,275. More than one-half of the capacity of this plant was manufacturing supplies for the Government. The loss in production aggregated over \$100,000, and the loss in wages to employees to over \$15,000.

Plant 3. This is a very large manufacturing industry employing 8,000 hands. It had coal on hand sufficient to continue its operations until April 1. By shutting down there was a saving of 76 tons of coal a day, or about \$532. It was necessary to burn 56 tons of coal a day to keep the plant warm and prevent the spoiling of stock in process. The actual loss to the company for the days shut down was about \$12,000, without figuring any profits. The employees lost about \$15,000 a day in wages, and, as I have said, much of the output of this plant is subject to hurry orders from the Government and some parts of it is manufacturing wearing apparel immediately needed by men at the camps.

I do not think it necessary to add more illustrations of the result of the situation which has developed, of the failure to prepare for it, or the absolute unbusinesslike way it has been handled in the immediate past. But what would have been done if we had had a war cabinet or planning board? It would have taken up the consideration of the coal situation last summer, learned the actual production, the actual requirements of the various sections of the country, the actual available transportation facilities, and would have provided for the situation in such a way that the present crisis would absolutely have been prevented. But there was no one to do this. The President did not have the time or the information to warrant his doing so, the heads of the various bureaus and departments were looking after their own special affairs, and there was such a lack of coordination in our governmental activities that this situation did not receive proper consideration. I undertake to say that if this matter had been handled systematically and as a result of careful planning we would not have the present coal crisis, much of the suffering resulting from this condition would have been prevented, tens of millions of dollars would have been saved, and there would not have been the delay in supplying the needs of our soldiers apparent on every hand as a result of the closing-down order.

WOOL.

Another illustration of the lack of cooperative and concentrated effort, and quite as apparent an example as the coal situation, is that relating to wool. It is important that this product be controlled by the Government to insure a suitable supply of wool for the clothing for our soldiers. It will be a difficult problem to obtain this wool supply at reasonable prices unless the Government takes such action. We produce something less than 300,000,000 pounds of wool a year in the United States and use more than three times that amount, our additional supply largely coming from South America and Australia. The wool supply of the world is not increasing but the population of the world is doing so, and even in normal times the demand for wool is such that the price is gradually increasing. One of the perfectly apparent certainties resulting from a declaration of war was that there would be an immediate increase in the price of wool, and that unless something were done to control the situation the price would become exorbitant. In order to give the Government control of the situation as far as they were able to do so, the Boston wool dealers—and Boston is the largest wool center in the United States—the day after the declaration of war offered the Government their entire holdings at the going price, or the price the day war was declared. It has been suggested that this would have allowed the wool dealers a profit. Undoubtedly it would, but the profit had been earned, and their offer indicates that they did not wish to take advantage of any necessity of their own Government. It was a highly patriotic step taken by one of the best associations in the United States.

This offer was not accepted, and the investigations do not disclose in detail just what happened to it. Various people had heard of it, but nobody seemed to be willing to take the responsibility of saying the offer was declined. Later, in the month of July, the Boston wool dealers again offered the Government

one-half of the supply they had on hand, presumably the balance being contracted for by those manufacturing for the Government. In the month of September the Wool Growers' Association offered the Government its entire supply at going prices. The only definite testimony as to what became of these offers came from the Secretary of War. He stated that he had referred the question of purchasing wool from the growers' association to the raw-material division of the War Industries Board, but did not hear anything more about it. What statement could be a greater indictment of the handling of an important element in the prosecution of the war than this reference to the wool situation?

It has been said on good authority that the loss to the Government in not taking advantage of the April offer, the July offer, the growers' offer, and purchasing the imported wool available at that time would aggregate \$150,000,000. It is difficult to determine whether this amount is relatively accurate, but certainly the loss in not taking advantage of the April offer of the Boston wool dealers was as much as \$15,000,000, for at that time they had on hand 59,000,000 pounds of wool of all kinds.

I refer to this particular subject not so much to show what has not been done, but to enable me to express the opinion that the wool question should be given immediate consideration. In the extreme Southwest the shearing has already commenced, and in the ordinary course of conducting that business, if it is not already the case, the wool will drift into the hands of dealers, and it may be impossible to control the situation unless concerted action is taken. The Government should control the entire wool supply, using what it needs for its own purposes and turning the balance over to private consumption. Whatever may be the difference of opinion as to the merits of all-wool clothing and clothing containing a certain percentage of shoddy, there will be universal agreement that if there is to be any depreciation in the quality of cloth it should not apply to the clothing of the men doing our fighting. We civilians should wear the clothing of lesser warmth and value, and it is my judgment that this question can not be adequately controlled if action is not taken by the Government at this time. Of course, I am not referring to the failure of last year, nor will the action I urge correct it. That failure would not have been possible if we had had a planning board or war cabinet to consider such questions and determine suitable governmental action.

HOUSING.

Another illustration in favor of the war-cabinet bill. Stability of labor is the first necessity in providing for rapid construction. The concentration of the work being done for the Government is one of the alarming features of the present situation. It is reported that 86 per cent of the war activities of the Government are concentrated in a section east of Pittsburgh, bounded on the north by Massachusetts and on the south by Virginia. This necessitates a large additional force of trained mechanics in that particular region, and in order to get these mechanics they must be provided with the best living conditions possible—schools, churches, places of recreation, and housing as well. Some of the largest activities are being carried on in sections which can not possibly provide suitable accommodations for the additional labor required. The result is that men come to these places, work a short time, or until they get enough money to take them back to their homes, preferring the lower wages in the sections where they have always lived to undergoing the hardships forced upon them in the localities where their services are so greatly needed.

Shortly after the beginning of the war the housing shortage in certain sections of the country developed to such an extent that it became an obstacle to industrial production, and as far back as last June this subject was discussed. Farseeing men could not help recognizing the inevitable result of the conditions surrounding our war industries. The Committee on Emergency Construction attempted to handle it, the Council of National Defense held hearings, a housing committee was appointed and presented a report, but all of these actions were advisory. These committees had no power to act, and their efforts, therefore, were fruitless.

In the meantime the Shipping Board has actually undertaken housing in a few places, but it was not until the 14th of January of this year, when all housing matters were placed under the jurisdiction of an Advisory Council of Labor with Mr. John Lind at the head, that the first real constructive step was taken. The practical way to handle this question is through centralized control, preferably by one man, who should be given full power in the administration of any appropriation made for this purpose.

Three of the points where the housing difficulties are greatest are Quincy, Mass.; Hog Island, near Philadelphia; and Norfolk,

Va. At the Fore River Shipbuilding Co., which is located at Quincy, Mass., the usual number of employees is about 3,000. There have been employed there within the past year as many as 11,000, and that number of men is required to continue the work of the Fore River Co. at its maximum capacity. However, it has been impossible, on account of the limited housing facilities, to keep the men there, and I am told that at the present time there are 3,000 less men employed than when the number was at the maximum. I have had an opportunity to witness the results of this situation—overcrowded transportation facilities on every hand, dangerous crowding in some instances, and conditions existing which can not be considered humanely decent in many respects. There are instances where numbers of men are living in one room, or in very restricted quarters, and the work at Fore River and Squantum, where a new plant is being constructed, must necessarily lose a considerable part of its efficiency, and the best results can not be obtained unless additional housing facilities are provided.

The Hog Island situation is another example of the same condition, only it is an entirely new development. The transportation facilities to Hog Island are such that it is absolutely essential to have housing constructed there in order to carry on the work expeditiously. As far as I have been able to learn, no effort has been made to develop the transportation facilities, and no steps of a practical nature have been undertaken to construct the housing necessary if we are going to secure the labor required at the largest shipbuilding plant being constructed in the United States.

The situation at Norfolk is none the less acute. There is ample testimony to show that the work there—and there is a vast amount of work being done in that neighborhood—can not be carried on with anything like the best results unless this question is settled at an early date. All the instances I have suggested relative to this subject simply bear out the fact that if somebody with power to act had been looking ahead and investigating the placing of contracts, undoubtedly contracts would have been distributed over a wider area, relieving the congestion and concentration of these activities, and lessening the acuteness of the housing situation. But whether or not this would have been done, those who were planning for providing the Government's requirements would not have had their attention distracted from this important element in the situation, and six months ago we would have had a definite plan suggested by the War Cabinet, submitted to the President, approved by him, and in active operation.

The testimony from all sides on this subject is the same. Before the Senate Commerce Committee on the 10th of January, Mr. Homer L. Ferguson, president of the Newport News Shipbuilding Co., one of the ablest constructors in the United States, stated: "I have been trying for nine months to get housing at Newport News and have talked to governmental officials until I am sick of the subject."

I also have a communication from Mr. Otto E. Sovereign, of the Aladdin Co., of Bay City, Mich. He states that his company has given 10 years' practical experience to this subject and yet have been unable to get any attention to their representations in Washington. The reason they have been unable to get any attention—and these are but two instances of any amount of testimony that can be submitted on the subject—is because there has not been anybody here with power to act.

Mr. JONES of Washington. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield to the Senator from Washington?

Mr. WEEKS. I do.

Mr. JONES of Washington. I want to state to the Senator that I think the very next day, or at any rate within two days, after Mr. Ferguson testified before the Commerce Committee definite arrangements were made through the Shipping Board to undertake housing operations at Newport News; so that they had authority, but apparently they had not been able to get them to exercise it until the matter was brought up in the committee.

PRIORITY ORDERS.

Mr. WEEKS. Senator KELLOGG, in his speech on the railroad bill yesterday, spoke of priority orders, and what he said illustrates very well the lack of a responsible head in connection with any particular activity. He stated, if I understood him correctly, that there were five bureaus in the War Department, one in the Navy Department, one in the Shipping Board, one in the Fuel Department, and one in the Food Department giving priority orders. In other words, nine different kinds of priorities which had to be adjusted by railroad managers. Of course, in a sense, that would be physically impossible, and it created a confusion and delay which greatly impaired the efficiency of the service. If there had been one head controlling priority

orders to act as a clearing house for the requirements of the different bureaus, all of this could have been avoided.

ORGANIZATION.

When we turn to the question of organization, the investigation made by the Committee on Military Affairs has, to my mind, completely demonstrated the fact that it was impossible to expand our Military Establishment to a great war force without developing weaknesses in the methods followed or providing for intermediate steps preparatory to perfecting the organization. England, to a lesser degree France, and other nations not prepared for war found it necessary to follow a similar course. The War Department could not have accomplished what it has during the last 10 months if it had not had the assistance of the advisory commission and its subordinate committees; but all of these activities at best were but makeshift and simply pointed the way to the organization which should be made. In the final analysis, the greatest requirement in the war administration is a perfect organization. Each department has to too great an extent been run as a distinct unit, and, in many respects, entirely without any reference whatever to the requirements or activities of other branches of the Government. This has produced confusion, increases in the expense of maintenance, and entirely unnecessary delays.

When the Secretary of War was before the Military Committee he was asked if there were things which could be done by the War Department to stimulate the service so that it would be able to do more effective work. He replied that he did not know of anything he could suggest, for whenever the soundness of a change was demonstrated to him he acted at once. That sounds wise and efficient, but it is the difference between waiting until you meet a problem which may require months to prepare for and having a deliberating body looking months ahead, finding that problem, and preparing a definite plan for its solution when it develops. Many activities can not be provided for in a day, week, or month. It requires a long time to erect plants, make necessary additions to plants, or design and construct machinery, and unless we provide a planning board to consider these important questions there will inevitably be delays and failures.

The changes recently made in the organization of the War Department will improve the efficiency of that service. There is no doubt about this fact, and I am glad to put myself on record to that effect. The machinery proposed, however, which was so graphically described and shown on the charts used by the Senator from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] during his address in the Senate a week ago, has a fatal weakness. There is no real head in the case of the munition proposition or a general planning board provided. The branches of the tree, speaking of the purchaser of munitions, seem to be all right, but the trunk is not there. And if this situation were understood by the country as well as it is by those who have been examining the War Department there would be an insistent demand that now, when we have the opportunity, we create an organization as nearly perfect as possible.

I believe the Military Committee has had no other desire in criticizing the failures in the War Department brought about by inefficiency and procrastination than to correct them by inaugurating a practical organization of the war administration on a basis coordinating and concentrating every agency of the Government, making efficient and effective the scores of activities of the various departments, bureaus, boards, and commissions. Of course, there will be individual failures in such an organization, but this organization would be just as necessary to efficiency if every person connected with the Government were a genius. Real efficiency is impossible unless all of these undertakings are carried on as a result of a coherent plan devised and controlled by a central agency.

The President can not be this central agency except after examination and thorough investigation. He must necessarily be devoting his energies to the larger problems of our international relationship. The Secretaries of the departments can not be this agency. It should require every moment of their time, every ounce of their decision, and all their capacity to properly administer the affairs of the branches of the Government over which they preside. Take, for example, the case of the Secretary of War. I think his door has been wide open to everyone who had any business with him. He has to attend meetings of the various boards with which he is connected, and it is physically impossible for him to devote the time necessary to working out definite plans for solving the great number of problems arising in connection with our prosecution of the war. The records of the Council of National Defense and of the advisory commission show that they hold weekly or fortnightly meetings at which many of these problems are considered. Sometimes the urgency of departmental work prevents the attendance of the heads of the various departments at important meetings

of these committees. We are told that Cabinet meetings are infrequently held and are usually of short duration, and after going through the entire list of boards and commissions it is apparent that there is no central body to carefully consider all the requirements of the Government or prepare any concrete plan of action.

Moreover, in addition to the Cabinet, the Council of National Defense and the Advisory Board, and so forth, and so forth, and so forth, we have at least four new creations of importance—Fuel, Food, Shipping, and Transportation Commissions. The heads of these commissions do not meet the Secretaries of the departments except upon comparatively rare occasions at meetings of what is known as the superwar council, a new creation and one without any power. The meetings of this council are, in effect, simply discussions and produce no practical results.

I have said that the failure to centralize these activities has produced extravagance. It is hardly necessary to go into details to demonstrate the correctness of this assertion. All of the testimony before the committee bears out the statement; indeed, how could it be otherwise even under the revised plan of the Secretary of War? Under this plan we will be purchasing supplies for the War Department through at least five different agencies. In addition to that, purchases are being made for the allies, for the Shipping Board, for the railroads, and for the Navy. In the plan of the Secretary there is coordination, as far as the War Department is concerned, up to a certain point, however much one might deprecate the fact that a colonel of Infantry has been put at the head of this activity, to whom four major generals are subordinate. Col. McRoberts, formerly vice president of the National City Bank, of New York, is purchasing agent for another bureau; and just recently another man has been appointed to assist in purchasing supplies for the War Department, in all probability the best-fitted man in the United States for such a task. I refer to Mr. E. R. Stettinius, of the firm of Morgan & Co., of New York.

When Morgan & Co. undertook purchases in this country for Great Britain in the beginning of 1915, what did it do? Naturally, it adopted the course any good business firm would follow. Not having in the firm or connected with it an entirely suitable man for such service, it looked about and found a man who seemed to promise to fill the requirement. This man was Mr. Stettinius. It developed that he was the right man in the right place. He did the work well, so well that he not only gave entire satisfaction to the British Government but was made a member of the firm of Morgan & Co. If he had failed, another man would have been found in the shortest possible order. That is the course followed by a business firm. What does the War Department do under these circumstances? It wants to accomplish exactly the same result as the British Government, although its purchases will not perhaps be larger than those of England during 1916, for it is interesting to note that during the years 1915, 1916, and 1917, Mr. Stettinius purchased \$4,000,000,000 of supplies for the English Government. The department creates an organization such as I have described, looks about and adds to it Mr. Stettinius, not as its head, for which position he has demonstrated his capacity, but uses him under the title of surveyor general of supplies. Even the Secretary of War can not tell just what this means. The testimony indicates that he is subordinate to Col. Peirce; and yet, he is not only the adviser of the colonel but of the Secretary as well. He is a kind of court of last resort in an advisory capacity, but he has no authority whatever. In other words, apparently the very man required for the situation has been obtained, but that man can not accomplish results. He is in an impossible position, and the administration is throwing away an opportunity to make an effective organization and the one personality that would be sure to make the organization effective.

In our conduct of the war the President occupies in this country a position similar to that occupied by Mr. Lloyd-George in Great Britain. He must necessarily be the clearing house and the final authority in every action taken. He is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. His constitutional authority makes him Commander in Chief of all our military forces, and while it has been suggested that the proposed war-cabinet bill is unconstitutional, I believe every lawyer will agree that any constitutional authority conferred on the President can not be lessened or added to by an act of Congress. As a matter of fact, however, the President does not fill the position occupied by Mr. Lloyd-George in Great Britain. Mr. George presides over the war cabinet, and although he does not give his entire time to that service he is present at its meetings every day of the week and frequently presides at meetings several times a day, for the majority of the members of the British War Council have no portfolios and devote all their time to the consideration of plans

for furthering the prosecution of the war. The authority of the war council extends to all departments of the Government, to the armies in the field, the fleet, and to every form of industry; and in this way in planning for the army or navy the industrial requirements of the nation are given proper consideration.

I do not mean to suggest that the war council directs the operations of the Army or the Navy or that the proposed war cabinet would do so in this country. It should have nothing whatever to do with matters relating to military or naval operations like the direction of the Army or the operations of the fleet. Those matters are essentially under the control and jurisdiction of the heads of those departments; but the overhead matters, like making plans and considering industrial questions, would come under the jurisdiction of the war cabinet, which would, in turn, report to the President and every act of which would be subject to his approval. No other body now in existence, or which can be organized, would be able to do this. The Council of National Defense can not, the Advisory Commission can not, and the War Industries Board can not.

Senators advocating these measures have been charged with partisanship, but the country should not fail to note that this investigation has been conducted for nearly two months, has given consideration to a great number of important subjects, and there has not been the slightest partisan bias in its deliberations. Not a question indicating partisanship was raised until the President deliberately injected politics into the situation by an attack upon the chairman of the committee and the committee itself, which the chairman represents, and by calling to the White House many Democratic party leaders, not for consultation purposes but to insist that a discussion of this question on the floor of the Senate be prevented if possible. This latter statement, of course, is based upon current gossip, but as far as I can learn it has never been denied.

Here is a vital question to consider. Have we come to such a pass that the action of the most important committee in Congress at this time is to be forbidden by the President of the United States as far as he is able to do so? He need not necessarily approve, and he has the power to disapprove, this legislation if it ever reaches him, but it is vital to free speech and independence of action of a coordinate branch of the Government that such a position as has been taken by the President be resisted by every Member of this body. Almost immediately after this interview at the White House opposition developed not only to the hearings of the committee but to the legislation proposed. There was a cleavage in the committee, and the very member who moved to report out the munitions bill became arrayed against any legislative action. I submit to the Members of the Senate opposed to this legislation whether they had seen any attempt at partisanship on the part of any member of the committee until it was injected into the activities of the committee by the President himself?

The majority in this Chamber may be forced into a refusal to adopt the committee's propositions. There is every evidence that the greatest effort is being made to bring this about, but I want to say that if action is prevented in such a way it is unwise even from the lowest standpoint these matters can be considered—that of strengthening one's political party. These measures may not be adopted now, but they are fundamentally right and should pass, although their aim may be partially accomplished by the twistings and turnings being made in the War Department, and which I presume will continue to be made, since the Military Committee commenced its investigation.

Let me call to your attention a partial list of changes which have been made in the organization during the last two months, most of which I believe have resulted from the investigation made by the Committee on Military Affairs:

1. A modification and practical elimination of the Advisory Commission.
2. Dissolution of Committee on Supplies.
3. The discontinuance of the operations of the Board to Control Labor Standards.
4. Change in the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and the reorganization of the bureau.
5. Change in the Chief of the Quartermaster Bureau and a reorganization of that bureau and its methods.
6. The appointment of a superwar council, which includes the members of the Council of National Defense and the heads of the Food, Transportation, Shipping, and Fuel Commissions.
7. The appointment of a council of war in the War Department.
8. Adoption of a plan for reorganizing the purchasing system of the War Department.
9. Under this plan the appointment of Col. McRoberts as the ordnance purchasing agent.

10. The creation of the position of surveyor general of supplies, and the appointment of Mr. Stettinius to that place.

11. The forwarding of additional clothing to furnish delinquencies in equipment of the camps. Orders for this action were sent by telegraph.

12. The appointment of a board to control shipping—Messrs. Franklin, Raymond, and Guthrie.

13. The appointment of the Chief of Staff to serve at the War Department instead of in Europe, as had been done.

14. And the press now states that the President is to recommend that the War Industries Board be given more definite powers.

There may be other changes, but the ones I have enumerated are sufficient to indicate that things have been moving in the War Department, and undoubtedly they have been stimulated by the activities of the Military Committee.

The committee could have added greatly to the evidence in favor of the legislation it proposes; in fact, I have been unable to find any approved business man connected with the activities of the Government who does not believe this legislation is essential to the proper conduct of the war. Among those who have given evidence are Mr. Willard, until recently the head of the War Industries Board, and who has been connected in an important way with the activities of the Government since a considerable time before the beginning of the war. The chairman of the committee asked Mr. Willard this question: "There may be no desire on the part of the Navy to cooperate with you in this. Suppose they withdrew from it at any time?" Mr. Willard replied:

Then it would not work, of course. Secretary Daniels and Secretary Baker have both said that they would cooperate. The weakness of the plan is that if they did not cooperate, or if a problem of some kind should develop which the departments as now organized did not seem to be able to deal with promptly and efficiently, then the President should have authority to say that this man who represented him at the head of the War Industries Board should have full authority to take that matter up and deal with it promptly. With that arrangement I do not see any reason why this will not work, but it is lacking now in that one definite thing.

Another efficient member of the War Industries Board, also associated with the activities of the Government since the Advisory Council was formed, is Mr. Bernard Baruch, of New York. Let me give you exactly what he says on the subject:

But I would have this: I would have a man at the head, and I would have the President authorized to give that man such authority at any time as the situation seemed to require so he could take over all or any part of it, but I do not think it would be wise for him to take over all of it.

Senator WADSWORTH. I see. Have you any observations to make of a general or particular character, with respect to the business organization herein laid out or which might be used?

Mr. BARUCH. As I understand it, it is an effort to lessen competition and to centralize purchasing and procurement, and in that I indorse it as a step in the right direction.

Senator WADSWORTH. Do you think it goes far enough?

Mr. BARUCH. No, sir.

Senator WADSWORTH. Would you care to say to the committee in what respect it does not go far enough, and enlarge upon that?

Mr. BARUCH. It may go far enough, as far as this department is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. As at present constituted?

Mr. BARUCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In what other respect do you think the general plan should go further?

Mr. BARUCH. I think that the purchases should be centralized in one agency, directly under the President, and not as a Cabinet officer.

Senator WADSWORTH. Not as a Cabinet officer?

Mr. BARUCH. I do not think that is necessary, because I look upon this as a war measure and one that should cease with the war.

One of the most important witnesses in favor of this legislation was Mr. Gifford, a director of the Committee on National Defense. No man has been more intimately associated with every class of business man or the work of the Government during the last 18 months than he. In his testimony relating to this subject he was asked this question by the chairman of the committee:

Do you think there should be a central head?

Mr. GIFFORD. Yes, sir; I do. I am now referring, however, wholly to the war industries situation and not to those other activities of the Council of National Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see the program mapped out by the Secretary of War for coordination?

Mr. GIFFORD. Yes, sir; I have seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything lacking about that to make it a perfect system?

Mr. GIFFORD. Nothing but the power to carry it into effect. The Council of National Defense has no power.

And he goes on to explain that in the plan suggested by the Secretary the one thing that is lacking is a central organization with power in addition to the plan proposed.

Mr. Vauclain, the President of the Baldwin Locomotive Works, has also been one of those who have been here during the last 18 months and has done sterling work for the Government. In connection with his appearance before the committee regarding

another phase of the investigation he was asked these questions by Senator WADSWORTH:

Senator WADSWORTH. To come back again to my proposition, so as to be clear about it, that question of confidence in the judgment of men who go out and negotiate for this material for artillery or powder or munitions—I do not want to misquote you at all, and correct me if I am wrong—your judgment is that things would work better and we would make our decisions quicker and get started quicker if those men who do the negotiating did not have to submit their proposals to the consideration of boards of three or four or five men?

Mr. VAUCLAIN. Certainly.

Senator WADSWORTH. You believe in single head executives?

Mr. VAUCLAIN. I do.

Senator WADSWORTH. You think there should be a man in charge, for instance, of what you are in charge of, and a man in charge of another thing and another thing, etc., without the interposition of consulting boards?

Mr. VAUCLAIN. Yes, sir.

Senator McKELLAR. And clothed to act by authority of law?

Mr. VAUCLAIN. I think he should be a regular officer of the Government.

Senator McKELLAR. A statutory officer.

Mr. VAUCLAIN. Yes, sir.

One of the members of the House mission to Europe, who gave very much consideration to the details of handling the war questions in Europe, wrote me, without solicitation, on the announcement of the introduction of these bills, as follows:

JANUARY 19, 1918.

HON. JOHN W. WEEKS,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: My recent trip to England and France, when I was a member of Col. House's mission; my observations here, where I am a member of the priorities committee; and a good deal of continuous thought about the matter make me entirely sure that this situation should be reorganized and that there should be in substance a war cabinet of, say, five men, who should have no executive function and whose whole job should be to determine the program, war and otherwise; that is to say, should determine the war program and how far it can go because of other needs.

It should work closely with the supreme war council on the other side, so that it would be the body which should determine what this country is to do. It should also inform the supreme war council of what this country could do, so that the demands formulated by the supreme war council would be possible of fulfillment.

There should also be a supply department, which should be executive, and preferably should deal with the entire question of military supply. It should not build ships, either mercantile or Navy, but should furnish the materials to the shipbuilding plants. It probably should not take over the operation of Navy ordnance plants or Army arsenals. They are only a drop in the bucket anyway.

I realize that there has been an enormous amount of discussion about this matter and that you have been in the thick of it. The thing that has struck me in most of the reports of the discussions that I have heard has been that the emphasis has been on the munitions department rather than on the war cabinet. I think that they are both important, but the war cabinet is the more important. An inefficient department of supply or departments of supply can do better if the demand is formulated and they are told what they have got to supply than the best supply department in the world can do if it does not know what it is called upon to supply.

The supply department, when it is created, should have simply a supply function. It should not have anything to do with the formulating of demand.

The service men can be of great value in the formulating of demand. It is a military question, and one which ultimately they must decide, although, possibly, they had better act as advisors of the members of the war cabinet. The supply end, which is a job of mobilizing industry, can better be done by civilians and as a civilian organization.

I hope you will excuse me for butting in, but I am afraid the influence is getting put on the least important of the two things which are being so much agitated to-day.

Yours, very truly,

Mr. Howard Coffin, originally a member of the Naval Board appointed by Secretary Daniels to consider important naval questions some time before the beginning of the war and later a member of the Advisory Commission, in addition to serving on the War Aircraft Board, testified in the strongest terms in favor of the director-of-munitions bill and the war-cabinet bill. I have not his testimony before me.

For many months the United States Chamber of Commerce has had a committee considering war questions, the membership of which includes: William Butterworth, president of Deer & Co., of Moline, Ill.; John H. Fahey, former president of the United States Chamber of Commerce of Boston; Harry A. Wheeler, former president of the United States Chamber of Commerce of Chicago; Homer L. Ferguson, president of the Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.; Charles Nagel, former Secretary of Commerce and Labor; Lewis E. Pierson, former president of the American Bankers' Association and chairman of the board of directors of the Irving National Bank, New York. This committee was organized on June 12, 1917, and has been substantially giving its time to war questions since that date.

The following extracts I shall give from its report will indicate the position the committee has taken on this subject. Mr. Catchings, its chairman, greatly impressed us with his clear statement as to the desirability of legislation of the kind proposed by the Military Committee. This war committee reported to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as follows:

When, on July 13, your committee stated in a war bulletin that there was need for a central agency to control the procuring of war materials and supplies, to formulate programs, to reach decisions, to

stop debate, and to take decisive action, your committee was but making public statement of views held by many officials of the Government and others in intimate contact with the situation.

Toward the end of July the need of centralized authority and responsibility in connection with the procuring of war supplies and materials was recognized in the appointment of the War Industries Board. Unfortunately, the statutory power and responsibility to make war purchases remained scattered in the various Government departments. This has made it necessary for the War Industries Board, in its efforts to secure coordination, to rely only upon the common desire and purpose of all Government officials.

In a bulletin issued on August 10 your committee pointed out that the War Industries Board had no authority to decide inevitable differences of opinion between independent activities or to formulate policies subordinating one war-time activity to another. Furthermore, the bulletin stated that, not being an official department of the Government engaged in procuring war materials and supplies, the War Industries Board was not in a position to plan and execute broad programs to meet the great industrial problems of the war.

"Resolved by the representatives of American business, met in war convention, That all war buying should be assembled under the control of one board or executive department; and be it further

"Resolved, That this war-supply board or department should be given full power to procure war supplies to the best advantage to the Government as to price, quality, and delivery, and in a way to maintain essential industrial life without disturbing social and economic conditions, including the power to fix prices not only to the Government but to the public on essential products and to distribute output in a manner to promote the national defense and the maintenance of our industrial structure; and be it further

"Resolved, That Congress be hereby requested to pass such statute as may be necessary to give the President of the United States all power necessary to concentrate in this manner the resources and the industrial energy of our country toward winning the war; and be it further

"Resolved, That the national chamber do its utmost to make effective the purposes of these resolutions."

1. It is clear that without our efforts and resources the war can not be won.

2. With the experience of both friend and foe to guide us, we continue to rely upon the executive organization inherited from the times of our peaceful isolation, reenforced only by the Food Administration, the Fuel Administration, the War Trade Board, and the committees and boards formed under the Council of National Defense, the principal one of which is the War Industries Board. There has been created no department of munitions or war supplies, war-supply board, or similar agency of whatever name, able to bring about centralized control or cooperation between the various Government activities engaged in procuring war materials and supplies.

3. We are forced to the conviction that disaster is inevitable unless prompt provision is made to centralize the control of the industrial energy and material resources of the country.

No attempt has been made to get associations or individuals to take any action in regard to the war cabinet or munitions bill; but this has been done by some organizations, and notably by the Merchants' Association of New York, which on February 2 passed resolutions favoring the passage of both bills. This is one of the largest and most representative business organizations in the United States. These resolutions not only point out what this association believes are the existing conditions but do not mince words in describing in detail the belief that both of these measures should be passed. Among other things, they say:

There is imperative need for a controlling head, directly under the President, to decide upon policies, subject to the President's approval; to prepare a general program; to define the part to be taken in such program by every subordinate department; to supervise, control, and coordinate all their operations; and, in general, to perform the functions of a general manager in a great business corporation.

And, speaking of the President's connection with this legislation, they say:

It is not proposed to deprive him in the slightest degree of any of his constitutional powers, but simply to place at his command an agency which can devote itself exclusively to a mastery of such details and to the supervisory work necessary for effective operation.

The association then points out seven deficiencies of the many it has noticed. They are as follows:

1. That there is conflict of jurisdiction between the War, Navy, Marine, Shipping, Fuel, and other departments.

2. That the President has so many matters of fundamental importance pressing upon him that he is physically incapable of supervising in detail the functions of these departments.

3. The fuel supply of the Nation has fallen short because no effective coordination with transportation facilities has been effected.

4. Building of ships has been held up for the same reason—lack of proper transportation and fuel transportation.

5. The labor supply for shipbuilding has been shortened by failure to provide necessary housing accommodations for workmen.

6. Factories which might have been employed upon essentials have been employed upon the production of munitions and supplies which can not possibly be used for a year to come.

7. The activities of these factories is urgently needed in the production of other material at once.

One of the notable features of the present situation is the virulence used in attacking those who favor this plan. They are referred to as plotters, mischievous meddlers, and even as servitors of the enemy. Every means of false suggestion has been used to discredit a sincere and loyal attempt to make a change which will materially increase the efficiency of our war administration.

Let us see a little more definitely what the war-cabinet bill really means. Its purpose is to authorize an agency, which we have never had and have not now, to prepare programs to carry on the war. In a little more detail, it will advise and formulate plans and policies, and under the direction of the President will procure their execution. It will coordinate and direct, under the control of the President, all the functions of government. It will consider and determine, subject to the President's approval, every difference that may arise between departments or agencies of the Government. This organization would be a clearing house which would consider every phase of a situation and report to the Commander in Chief, who would then exercise his powers as such over the activity involved.

It has been claimed that it would reduce the present Cabinet officers to the positions of clerks. There is no justification for this claim, because they would administer their departments exactly as in the past; but whenever there was a conflict of authority, or whatever differences might develop, the question would be considered and brought to the attention of the President for his action. The war cabinet would be the President's staff—a staff not unlike a military staff—looking after the matters relating to his command and reporting to him the results of its investigations.

It has been charged that Congress is meddling in the war and trying to curtail the authority of the President. The President will name these men; Congress will not do so, and there is no possibility that it will furnish a means for Congress to interfere with any activity over which it has no jurisdiction. Can it be possible that the President will be embarrassed by such a cabinet, as he has suggested he would be? It would seem as if he would be embarrassed to a greater extent by a perpetuation of the disjointed system which now exists, a system which has failed to produce ships, notwithstanding the shipping plans; which has failed to deliver sufficient fuel, notwithstanding the unbounded coal supply we have; which has been responsible for a failure to protect our soldiers against sickness and furnish them with suitable clothing. We are the inventors and leaders in aeroplanes, and yet we have no aeroplanes. We have the greatest steel works in the world, and yet we have few guns. We lead the whole world in automobile manufacture, and yet we are just commencing to obtain motor trucks; and the worst of all, the system we have had is responsible for camp hospitals not having heat, water, or sewerage.

Congress has resolved that every resource of the country shall be devoted to the successful prosecution of the war, and as far as possible this pledge has been fulfilled. Can anyone claim that it is not the duty of Congress to see that the resources it has provided are so expended that a consummation of the purposes for which they are given is insured? How are we to know that this is being done in a manner satisfactory to the Congress and the people of the country unless investigations are held and the details of the work of the administration scrutinized? Moreover, we owe everything to our men on the other side and to those on this side training to take their place at the front. They are to be plunged into the vortex of the most deadly military operations men have ever had to encounter. Every conceivable device to kill, maim, and torture is in operation on that great battle front. What excuse can we make to our soldiers if we are neglectful of their security, their comfort, and, in the final analysis, their lives? The loyal man in the United States is not he who complacently assumes that everything is as it should be, who is willing to accept general statements for detailed information, but on the contrary is the one who is ever alert to do and to see that there is done not our bit but our very best. We owe this to our fighting forces, our country, and to ourselves, and should not be diverted from that course by unreasoning or uninformed criticism from anyone, whatever his position may be.

RAILROAD CONTROL.

During the delivery of Mr. WEEKS's speech,

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will suspend for a moment. The hour of 2 o'clock having arrived, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated.

The SECRETARY. A bill (S. 3752) to provide for the operation of transportation systems while under Federal control, for the just compensation of their owners, and for other purposes.

After the conclusion of Mr. WEEKS's speech,

REORGANIZATION OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS.

Mr. KIRBY obtained the floor.

Mr. POMERENE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum is suggested. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Beckham	Johnson, S. Dak.	Overman	Smoot
Borah	Jones, Wash.	Page	Stirling
Calder	Kellogg	Pittman	Sutherland
Cummins	Kenyon	Polindexter	Swanson
Curtis	King	Pomerene	Thomas
Dillingham	Kirby	Ransdell	Thompson
Fletcher	Knox	Reed	Tillman
France	McCumber	Robinson	Townsend
Frelinghuysen	McNary	Shafroth	Trammell
Gallinger	Martin	Sheppard	Underwood
Gronna	Nelson	Shields	Vardaman
Harding	New	Smith, Ga.	Wadsworth
Henderson	Norris	Smith, Mich.	Williams
Johnson, Cal.	Nugent	Smith, S. C.	Wolcott

Mr. GRONNA. I wish to announce that the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. LA FOLLETTE] is absent, due to illness in his family. I ask that this announcement may stand for the day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WOLCOTT in the chair). Fifty-six Senators have answered to their names. There is a quorum present. The Senator from Arkansas will proceed.

Mr. KIRBY. Mr. President, I find it necessary, as a member of the Military Affairs Committee who was present during the investigations before that body, to reply to some of the unjust criticisms and assertions, assertions and criticisms not warranted by the disclosures made by the testimony before that committee. Especially is this true with reference to certain statements made by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HITCHCOCK], the Senator from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WEEKS].

I had intended this morning to limit my discussion to the provisions of the war-cabinet bill and the bill introduced by the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. OVERMAN] to improve the existing War Department machine, but I believe the condition requires that other statements shall be noticed, and briefly I am going to refer to them.

In the first place, the criticisms do not take into account the difficulties that had to be encountered, and the main purpose of most of the criticism, it seems to me, is to attack and embarrass the administration rather than to complain of the inefficiency of the War Department. I do not attempt to justify inefficiency anywhere on the part of any man. When we declared war we undertook the mightiest enterprise in the annals of time, to wage successful war 3,000 miles across the sea, with an Army that had not been raised to be transported in ships that had not been built, against an enemy that must be fought in the air, on the earth, under the earth, and under the sea, a powerful enemy that had whipped the other great nations of the Old World to a standstill.

No other nation in the history of the world, no nation upon the face of the earth now, no nation but ours was equal to such a task.

The things already done in its accomplishment have been so great as to stagger the belief of our own people and to challenge the wondering admiration of the allied nations.

The difficulties were indeed great. We had no battle field of choice, were without an army except an insignificant handful of trained men, and were not permitted to choose the field of operations for our Army, as had been done in wars heretofore. No; we must fight yonder in France on the battle line already fixed, almost stationary, where the allied forces and the enemy are entrenched, and we must first cross 3,000 miles of ocean in which lurk the deadly submarines that brought about the war.

We could not fight except on the sea, where no enemy battleships could be encountered, until we could get the consent of the other nations to land our Army upon their shores. It is easily perceived that the allied nations, in a death grapple with the enemy, successfully resisting his advance into their country, would not allow us at once to take an active part in their vast operations or turn over part of the battle line to us, inexperienced in this new method of warfare. So changed have become the conditions of fighting in this war that our own officers even, regardless of their rank and experience in the service, were absolutely without knowledge or experience of how the campaigns must be conducted and the warfare must be waged.

These were the difficulties that confronted us at the time we went into this war. Now, what has been done? When war was declared the small machine that had controlled our little Army, insignificant in numbers, and provided for its maintenance, began to expand and reach out to accomplish a task the like of which had never before been dreamed of. The great captains of industry and finance, the ablest merchants in the marts of trade, the most powerful leaders of American labor, the most resourceful men in the professions were all called in conference and responded instantly, voluntarily placing all

their ability and wisdom acquired from experience at the Nation's service. Surveys of the Nation's resources, industrial and financial; of its raw materials, manufacturing capacity, transportation facilities; surveys of the world's supply of products necessary to be used in arming, equipping, maintaining, and feeding our armies and those of the allied nations were made.

These volunteer and advisory agencies, in conjunction with the War Department, found new sources of supply of raw materials, developed new sources of manufacture, and mobilized the Nation's resources and powers.

What has been the result? In less than nine months an army of a million and a half men has been assembled, fed, clothed, housed, uniformed, and equipped, and several times more men than we had in our Regular Army when war was declared are already yonder in France, fully equipped, trained, on the battle front and capable, in the estimation of France, of successfully resisting and defeating the invading enemy and holding the battle line. That has been done up to now.

There has been criticism of some of these volunteer agencies. It is unwarranted and unjust in a large respect. It has been said that their procedure was necessarily unfair; that the Government had to expect a man who was interested in a particular line of manufacture or industry to serve here for the Government, frequently dealing with his own concern, and not give his own private industry the advantage. In other words, it was said if this man's personal interest conflicted with the public trust reposed in him he would necessarily not serve well two masters, and that the Government interest was more likely to suffer than that his own private interests should be permitted to do so. The familiar legal principle is invoked that a man should not be put in a position where his actions in the performance of the trust would conflict with or affect his individual and private interests. The law scrutinizes closely all such transactions, but allows them to stand when they appear to be fair.

It was unfortunate that able men who only understood the conditions and how to supply the munitions for the Government could not be found outside of the industries and manufactories which had to be dealt with in their procurement—unfortunate for the men, since it subjected them to criticism, regardless of the fairness of their transactions and their great benefit to the Government.

That has been the criticism against these volunteer organizations and boards; but no single particle of testimony has been brought out in the investigation which discloses any crooked transaction by any of these boards anywhere, and I challenge the Senator from Nebraska or the Senator from New York or the Senator from Massachusetts to point out the evidence, if such there is in existence. It is not there. It never has been there.

There was a supply committee, and it is said they have contracted with certain corporations and not with others. The supply committee had this sort of a condition confronting it: There were only 12 or 15 manufacturing institutions in the United States that had been taking Government contracts. The demand was so great and the supply was insignificant of material, both the raw material and manufactured products, that they found it necessary to suspend the public letting of contracts. Why? The public letting of contracts was intended, of course, to protect the Government by encouraging competition in bidding and preventing awarding of contracts at too high a price.

There could be no competition, however, under the condition existing—the law of supply and demand was eliminated when the demand was so great and there was no supply; it was deficient, inadequate, short—did not exist. It was in future to be manufactured. The law of supply and demand had been put aside, was gone, was not operating any more. Then what could be done? You could not have competitive bids for the immediate supply of materials and products not in existence, and for which the manufacturing capacity of the country was inadequate. No; these things had to be developed.

This committee, composed of men expert in the manufacture of things that had to be supplied, made a survey of the manufacturing capacity of the country, found it inadequate, encouraged the extension of some plants, the conversion of others, and the operation of all to maximum capacity for supplying the Government's needs. They standardized the fabrics, determined the amount required, and allocated it to all the different manufacturing concerns in quantities proportioned to their capacity. They engaged all that could be interested. They fixed the price that should be paid for the materials to be manufactured where possible and a reasonable price for the manufactured product,

and employed the services altogether of about 300 manufacturing plants where heretofore the Government had only used about 12.

What has been the result? The Army has been clothed, uniformed, and supplied with shoes, blankets, and tents, which could not otherwise have been done.

The further charge was that the committee had violated the law in refusing to advertise for bids. The law requiring the advertising for bids was properly suspended by an order duly made, and it was done in order that the supply might be increased, that the goods might be had, and that the Government should not be robbed by those who had the control of the deficient supply that was on hand. That was the reason which actuated the supply committee. Had they continued to issue the advertisements for bids, showing there was so great a demand for certain kinds of material, those who had the short supply there was on hand would have increased the price outrageously, to the Government's injury. That would have been done unquestionably. That has been the experience in all lands. The committee thought that was the best business ability that could be exercised, and they used it for the benefit of the Government.

The matter is strikingly illustrated in a cartoon by T. E. Powers I picked up the other day. It appeared in the *Arkansas Gazette*, and I noticed it also in the *Washington Times* of the same date. It shows strongly the point and the grasping greed the supply committee attempted to outwit in doing what it did. There are two sets of three pictures each in the cartoon. The first illustrates the Food Administrator talking to the consumer, saying "Now, fish is good food. You ought to eat fish and help win the war, that the Army may have meat." The fish dealer, standing under a sign, "Fish 6½ cents a pound," hears the conversation. The next morning the man says to his wife, "You need not bother about a roast to-day; I will get some fish. Fish is good food, and we can conserve the meat supply and help our Army and the armies of our allies." When he reaches the fish dealer's he finds fish marked \$9 a pound, and is shown a fish as big as his finger at four and a half dollars.

The next pictures show the Food Administrator telling the man to help win the war by eating corn bread, so that we shall have more flour and a better grade of food for our allies, as well as our own troops. The corn-meal seller, with a sign over his door, "8 cents per pound," hears the conversation. The next day the man says to his wife, "I will go down and get some of this corn meal. It is fine, and we can help the Government and conserve the food supply." When he reached the place where they sold corn meal there stood a great big dealer in the front door, under the sign changed to "Corn meal, 80 cents a pound." No wonder the would-be purchaser collapsed, fell dead.

That is a very clear illustration of the condition that had to be met, and that was met successfully, by the supply committee and these other committees by cutting out the advertisements for bids and the awarding of contracts.

Yes; but it is asked, Did not this man Eisenman, the chairman of the supply committee, permit a contract to be made with one Kaplan, who had a brother in the National Council of Defense, for a base sorting plant—a rag plant, if you please—where they were to collect all the rags that were cut from the cloth from which the uniforms were being manufactured in different cities, widely situated, in one particular place and sort and get them ready for sale? I understand that was done. What about this rag plant? The Government had never operated one before. Always heretofore all the clippings that had been cut from all the cloth that had been manufactured into overcoats and into uniforms and into soldiers' clothes had been given free of charge to and kept by the manufacturers of the uniforms. They never had been preserved. It never had been expected they could be of any benefit to the Government. But at this time, here was so much cloth that was being cut out into these clippings and into these rags that was not put into uniforms that this committee said, "We ought to have a base sorting plant; we ought to collect and save these rags." Why? Because this is valuable material. They can be cut up and worked into some of these fabrics that must be made, as "reworked wool," and it is worth 50 cents a pound as reworked wool to put into these different fabrics. Now, these different clothing manufacturers who made the uniforms and overcoats lived in 5 or 6 or 10 or 15 different cities, as New York, Chicago, Cleveland—they were far separated. Then they located this base sorting plant at New York, where the rags were collected. They called before this branch of the committee, before the plant was authorized, the people who were dealers in rags to ascertain what it would cost to collect and assort the rags.

From what they were able to learn they concluded about 6 cents a pound would be a price that would allow a reasonable, fair compensation for the service. The rags were worth, when assorted, anywhere from 30 to 40 to 60 cents a pound, to be used as "reworked wool."

Mr. SMOOT. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wolcott in the chair). Does the Senator from Arkansas yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. KIRBY. I yield.

Mr. SMOOT. Was there any evidence before the committee that it was worth 6 cents a pound to assort those rags?

Mr. KIRBY. Yes; they said—

Mr. SMOOT. I wish to say to the Senator that any man who said it was worth 6 cents a pound to assort rags knew nothing about what he was talking about. All they had to do was to write to any woolen mill in the United States and they would have found that not only the sorting of rags of one color is not worth more than 1 cent, but that to sort the white from the colored is worth not to exceed 1 cent and a quarter a pound.

I have had millions of pounds of such rags assorted, and I never paid more than a cent a pound for assorting rags. These rags were of one grade of cloth. It seems to me that anybody who would testify that it was worth 6 cents a pound to assort such rags ought to have his head fixed.

Mr. KIRBY. I regret exceedingly that they did not call the Senator from Utah in reference to this rag-sorting cost, because he seems to know about it.

Mr. SMOOT. If the committee had done so, I should have been able to have informed them.

Mr. KIRBY. I have said that I regret exceedingly that it was not done.

They stated that the testimony before them showed that the profit would not be great at that price, and the Government would have a saving, in any event, of the difference of between 6 cents agreed to be paid for collecting and sorting and 40 to 60 cents a pound, which the rags were worth for reworked wool. They had to be collected from the different places where the clothing was being manufactured. There was also a provision put in the contract that the profits, even, should be limited to not more than 1 cent per pound, and finally to not more than one-half a cent. The matter of price was subject to audit and adjustment by a provision in the contract, just like in all of the contracts of the Government. What was the result? There was an audit made; there was an adjustment made; and the profit was reduced to half a cent a pound. Finally the contract was canceled and nothing whatever—no profit at all—was paid.

That is the condition as it has actually developed. The Government has the Base Sorting Plant; the Government has saved all of the money that these collected rags were worth—from 40 to 60 cents a pound for reworked wool that heretofore had been given absolutely free of charge to the manufacturers of uniforms.

Mr. POMERENE. That was done; and as soon as it was discovered that excessive profits could be made the Government changed the system?

Mr. KIRBY. My attention has been called—and I thought I made that statement—to the fact that as soon as it was discovered or intimated that the profit would be excessive there was an audit and an adjustment of the amounts to one-half cent a pound, and finally the contract was canceled and nothing was paid. It is not shown by a particle of testimony that this man Eisenman or any man on his committee had a single particle of interest, financial or otherwise, in the operation of the Base Sorting Plant. It cost nothing to assort the rags therefore no profit was paid therefor, and the testimony has come to us just in this way. That is what has been done. It was shown also that the men on the Council of National Defense who were interested in the operation of this plant, or rather who had relatives interested in the plant, did not have anything to do with the letting of the contract for its operation nor with the establishment of the plant. Nobody has questioned that statement. The Government has not only not been injured, but greatly benefited by the establishment of the rag plant.

I want to say to Senators that the performance of this committee has been very great; it has been most efficient and has been without expense to the Government so far as the talent employed was concerned, and I want to put into the Record here to-day as a perpetual memorial to the vastly beneficial and unselfish service these patriotic men rendered the Government in our time of need the memorandum report of that committee made to the Secretary of War. I ask leave to include it, without reading, in my remarks as a part thereof.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The report referred to is as follows:

DECEMBER 29, 1917.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUBMITTING STATEMENT OF THE FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SUPPLIES OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The committee has been subdivided into the four following sections: Woolen goods, cotton goods, knit goods, and shoes and leather.

WOOLEN GOODS SECTION.

This section has devoted itself to the business of assisting the Quartermaster Department in purchasing woolen fabrics for Army use, having in mind three main objects:

1. Quantity: It became evident very early that enormous quantities of woolen cloth would be required. While at the outbreak of the war less than a dozen mills had been accustomed to bidding on Government contracts, we have secured the cooperation of over 300 mills, comprising nearly all the larger establishments and most of the smaller ones that were adapted to manufacture Government fabrics.

We have investigated the productive capacity and equipment of all the woolen mills in the country. It is safe to say that not more than 10 per cent of the mills adapted to such work are not now engaged in the manufacture of fabrics suitable for military use.

Additional purchases in very large amounts, many of them on very short notice, have been made for a number of foreign governments, and in no case have these been allowed to interfere with our own requirements.

We have purchased over 19,000,000 blankets, over 20,000,000 yards of overcoating, and over 30,000,000 yards each of shirting flannel and suiting, involving an expenditure of over \$345,000,000.

2. Quality: With the assistance of the cooperative committees of the two associations of woolen manufacturers specifications have been made with the view of maintaining the quality of the Government fabrics and increasing the sources of available supply. While many emergency purchases were made of fabrics not strictly according to specifications, due to urgent and immediate calls from various departments, we have now thoroughly standardized the fabrics which are being manufactured by the different mills.

3. Price: From April to the present time prices of raw materials have advanced from 30 to 40 per cent, supplies from 25 to 100 per cent, and labor at least 20 per cent. In spite of this advance in the cost of manufacturing this committee has been able to obtain all the fabrics required at prices less than 10 per cent over those prevailing in April, while for the past four months it has paid a fixed and uniform price for each of the standard fabrics.

General: It has been necessary to go into a wide field of operation in placing these huge contracts. We have secured for American manufacturers the release of large quantities of foreign wools, the exportation of which the British authorities were reluctant to permit. We have also obtained the consent of the British Government to the release of nearly 78,000,000 pounds of Australian wool for military uses, at a saving of over \$25,000,000. We have arranged for the securing of much necessary machinery and many supplies needed in the manufacture of this tremendous yardage. We have written hundreds of letters of inquiry and advice to many different manufacturers, have consulted with them personally on manufacturing problems, and have endeavored with the loyal and valuable cooperation of the woolen industry to place its resources at the services of the country.

A careful survey of the situation leads us to believe that we have greatly increased the production, standardized the quality, and saved many millions of dollars in the purchase of woolen fabrics.

THE BASE SORTING PLANT.

There is attached hereto a copy of a certified report, marked "Exhibit A," from Messrs. Loomis, Sufferin & Fernald, of New York City, on the Base Sorting Plant.

The men selected for the task of arranging the business of collecting together the rags resultant from the cutting of Government woolen goods were selected because of their fitness and for the same reason that other men have been selected to perform the necessary functions in carrying to a successful conclusion our part in the war. Up to some four of five months ago the Government contractors who were making clothing for the Government from materials furnished to them by the Government, retained as a gratuity all of the rags resulting from the cutting of goods. These, in turn, were sold by the manufacturers of clothing to the many rag dealers in the trade at prices that before the war ranged from 25 cents to 28 cents a pound—up to 40 cents a pound and above since the war. In order to stabilize the price on all woolen materials it became necessary in the refinement of the job to stabilize the price of all the fundamentals that went into the manufacture of the goods. Thus it became necessary to stabilize the price of wool substitutes and shoddies, these for the most part being made from rags and clippings remaining from the goods that were cut for Government uniforms. Since the Government now owned all of the remnants and rags resulting from the manufacture of uniforms, it became necessary to establish a medium whereby these rags could be concentrated or brought together in one spot. Uniforms for the Government are made in Boston, New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco, St. Louis, and many other points. The gentlemen comprising the base sorting plant were asked to perform this function for the Government because of their technical knowledge of the business, so that the redistribution of these rags to the cloth manufacturers could be made in the best and most intelligent manner. A maximum price was thus established upon these cuttings and sold by the Government to the cloth and blanket manufacturers at a uniform price, approximately 10 cents a pound below the market. The resulting saving to the cloth and blanket manufacturers was deducted from the price of the goods sold to the Government, thus giving the Government, first, the advantage of millions of dollars in the savings of the clippings, and, second, in the resulting savings from the price per yard on cloth and blankets the Government purchased from those manufacturers. The saving thus far in these operations has been almost a million dollars, and the plan contemplates and will save to the Government many millions of dollars more in the future.

It has also eliminated any incentive for clothing manufacturers to use extravagantly the Government cloths, and this saving will be a very large item.

It has stabilized the price of reworked wools, checking a rise of 60 per cent from April last and reducing this figure to 45 per cent, holding it at this point since July last and to this day. This also has been a very large saving to the Government.

It has also prevented the profiteering in these reworked wools by those engaged in that industry.

The base sorting plant is run by three of the most competent men in the industry and without any compensation whatsoever and without any profit. All accrued profits from the very organization of this plant belong to the Government without any charge for services of these men and without profit to anybody but the Government.

The Base Sorting Plant is now and has been since its inception under the absolute supervision and control of the depot quartermaster at New York City and the War Department.

THE USE OF RECLAIMED AND REWORKED WOOL.

Reclaimed and reworked wool has been used in conjunction with virgin wool in the manufacture of 30-ounce melton and 3-pound blankets, and has resulted, on orders placed since May 1, in a saving of over \$31,000,000 by the Government. It has conserved wool to the extent of at least 70,000,000 pounds. It has saved the Government a calculable amount of over \$24,000,000 and an incalculable amount due to the lessening of the demand for raw wool to the extent of 25 per cent of this country's wool clip. In addition, the benefits derived in consequence of the comparatively earlier delivery of cloth and blankets because of the use of reclaimed and reworked wool can not be expressed in terms of dollars and cents.

The opinion of the Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce, to wit: "The importance of new wool fiber as distinguished from reworked wool and mixtures in fabrics has been greatly exaggerated" is very interesting to note.

As a matter of fact, mixtures prepared in accordance with current United States Army specification for blankets and 30-ounce O. D. melton are superior in heat retentive qualities to similar cloth produced from the best grades of wool now available—i. e., quarter-blood wools. The reason for this superiority is found in the greater felting quality of reworked wool, resulting in a more complete filling of the interstices which exist in all cloth.

COTTON GOODS.

Since May this section has studied the markets and needs of all the Government departments for cotton cloth, bandage cloths, blue and brown denims, duck of all kinds and weights, pajama cloths, hospital gauze, domets, flannellettes, and various other fabrics. It has listed all available duck machinery and has made recommendations covering over 250,000,000 yards of goods; has opened up new sources of supply for duck from tire fabric makers, carpet makers, and cotton mills not ordinarily on fabrics for which there was such urgent need.

It has stimulated production, advised as to technical procedure, acted as the advisor of the priorities committee on all textile matters, has equitably allocated huge quantities of paulin duck over the duck trade, secured for the Government prices running uniformly below—and often far below—the market, coordinated in so far as possible cotton goods purchases made by the different Government departments, and now in addition to the above is, at the instance of the War Industries Board, deciding as to the distribution of certain grades of duck, on which there is a shortage, to the civilian trade.

It is also handling all waterproofing contracts for the Quartermaster Corps.

KNIT-GOODS SECTION.

The quantities of gloves, underwear, and other knit goods needed by the Army was largely in excess of the machine capacity of the country. As a result it has been necessary to open up new sources of supply and to greatly increase the output of present mills in order to meet the requirements. In addition the specifications have in many instances been changed, so that to-day the goods ordered are of a much better and warmer quality.

To give a clear idea of the vast quantities bought, and particularly of the short space of time in which the purchases were accomplished, a table of purchases to date of the principal articles, together with the amounts purchased to October 6, 1917, follows:

	Purchased to Oct. 6, 1917.	Purchased to Dec. 28, 1917.
Drawers, winter.....	13,369,813	25,150,332
Undershirts, winter.....	10,872,692	21,084,053
Gloves, woolen.....	4,600,697	11,349,664
Stockings, wool, light weight.....	11,621,534	31,754,373
Stockings, wool, heavy.....	7,922,088	21,130,088
Toques.....		2,825,000

In addition to the above, large quantities of cotton drawers, undershirts, and stockings have been purchased.

SHOES AND LEATHER.

It has been our effort to assist the Government in the expert knowledge necessary to make purchases in the most efficient manner. This necessitated the cooperation of shoe manufacturers, tanners, and all those producing the essential supplies in order to secure quantity and quality at a fair price, necessitated the standardizing and redrafting of specifications, and further needed the incorporation of a new type of shoe more adequate for present-day war requirements.

In recommending the purchases of approximately 21,000,000 pairs of leather shoes, we call attention to the following:

a. Our plan of a combination of competitive bidding for part and a fixed price for part has made a saving to the Government of \$1,632,000 over the plan of strictly competitive bidding for the entire amount.

b. In order to eliminate speculation on the purchase of materials, options were obtained on leather and supplies and guaranteed to the manufacturers at a fixed low price. This policy has permitted a net saving of approximately \$4,000,000.

c. Original specifications called for calf, veal, or kip. We recommended a change to side leather, which was adopted, thereby increasing wearing service and resulting in a saving to the government of \$806,000.

d. Believing an army shoe made with a drill lining was unsuitable for war requirements, we recommended a new model unlined shoe, which was adopted, and which has been more serviceable in every respect at a reduction in cost, thereby permitting a saving of \$496,000.

e. Total savings from the above suggestions approximated \$6,934,690. Realizing the importance of prompt delivery, the following figures are of interest:

	Receipts.	Estimated requirements.
Received to—	Pairs.	Pairs.
Sept. 1, 1917.....	2,833,653	1,751,000
Oct. 1, 1917.....	4,314,725	2,792,000
Nov. 1, 1917.....	6,915,834	4,101,000
Dec. 1, 1917.....	8,896,939	4,826,000
Expected—		
Jan. 1, 1918.....	10,611,783	5,581,000
Feb. 1, 1918.....	11,756,989	6,373,000
Mar. 1, 1918.....	14,259,989	7,195,000
Apr. 1, 1918.....	16,795,989	
May 1, 1918.....	19,341,989	
June 1, 1918.....	20,842,989	

RUBBER BOOTS AND ARCTICS.

In the recommending of purchases of rubber footwear we have taken advantage of the total daily productive capacity of the country, and have recommended purchases of the best quality produced at exceptionally low prices for delivery in accordance with our needs in quantities as follows:

Four-buckle arctics.....	2,476,000
Hip rubber boots.....	1,500,000
Short rubber boots.....	735,000

MATERIAL FOR THE REPAIRING OF BOOTS AND SHOES.

Having in mind the repair of leather and rubber footwear in this country and in France we have recommended large purchases of the necessary materials for the deliveries needed at very low competitive prices and have done so after most careful consideration and investigation. In this connection we have put under specification, have recommended, and will complete recommendations within a few days, for approximately 10,000,000 pairs of leather tap soles, 7,000,000 pairs of heel lifts, and 6,000,000 pairs of top lifts, and all other necessary materials in similar proportions.

CANVAS LEGGINGS.

After making a most careful investigation of existing conditions we have recommended and are about to recommend purchases of approximately 11,000,000 pairs of canvas leggings, having optioned the materials and allotted same to successful bidders in quantities in accordance with the size of their contracts.

LEATHER GAUNTLETS.

In a similar manner we have recommended and are about to recommend the purchases of approximately 2,500,000 pairs of gauntlets.

PURCHASES FOR ALLIED NATIONS.

Pursuing the same general policy we have outlined purchases for Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Russia on the following articles, totaling approximately \$40,000,000: Leather shoes, four-buckle arctics, hip rubber boots, short rubber boots, and materials for the repair of leather shoes.

In outlining these allied purchases we did not allow materials or deliveries of the finished product to in any way interfere with the needs of our own Government.

Recommendations according to the above approximate \$190,000,000. These have been made only after most careful investigation and exhaustive study.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Cots: Purchases were authorized and made of 2,107,056 cots, of which 1,132,056 were canvas Army cots; 975,000 all-steel cots. The committee was instrumental in effecting the substitution of the superior and more economical all-steel cot.

Aviators' clothing: We were requested by the Signal Corps early in September to assist them in the clothing requirements for aviators, and make recommendations as to where their requirements could best be taken care of, both as to price and deliveries.

All official requests for such information have been taken care of to date, and all contracts completed with the exception of recommendations made December 20. The amount of contracts, placed and completed, amount, in round figures, to half a million dollars.

STATISTICS AND PRODUCTION.

This department was instituted in May, 1917, soon after the committee was authorized by the Secretary of War to assist the Quartermaster Corps in the purchase of certain items of clothing and equipment. The first work of this department was the collection from all available sources of the data necessary to the work of the committee on all contracts existing on May 1 on the items in which the committee was interested, together with the recording and summarizing of the same data on all contracts placed after May 1 on the recommendation of the committee.

Early in June the system of recording data was in full operation and the work of installing a production or "follow-up" system was commenced. At the same time the department started a system of charts, presenting graphically the relation between estimated requirements, contracts placed, etc.

The necessary forms and blanks for the follow-up work were started in July, and all contractors were at once notified to report to the committee on forms supplied them for the purpose, first, of deliveries made to date on each contract and thereafter weekly on the weekly shipments made on each contract.

The information thus obtained was tabulated and has been used as a basis for all follow-up work intending to increase deliveries and by the various purchasing divisions of the committee in determining the size of new contracts, etc. Weekly reports were also obtained from the various quartermaster depots which were used as a check on the reports of the different contractors.

By August 1 the foundations of our present system were established, and since that time the system has been expanded as additional articles have been added to the list on which the committee was asked to advise.

Our work may now be divided into three main divisions, with the following principal subdivisions:

1. Contracts:
 - (a) Authorizations from Quartermaster General.
 - (b) Contracts placed.

2. Production:

- (a) Weekly report of each contract.
- (b) Status of each contractor.
- (c) Delinquencies and speeding up of production.

3. Statistics:

- (a) Weekly report of work of committee.
- (b) Charts.

How the work of this department has been increased can be shown by the following comparisons:

Original number of articles handled by the committee-----	19
Present number of articles handled by the committee-----	142
Number of contracts placed before May 1, 1917-----	625
Number of contracts placed between May 1 and Dec. 22, 1917 (approximately)-----	4,650

The money value of these purchases totals approximately \$800,000,000, and the cost of the adjudication of this immense volume of business has been less than \$20,000.

Every effort is used, with the assistance of the various members of the committee, to prevent delinquencies and to hasten production. Any shortage of deliveries must be adequately and immediately explained, and overproduction is urged through letters, telegrams, and personal interviews. The total number of letters sent and received to date has been approximately 80,000 and of telegrams approximately 10,000.

From all the various reports received we are able to tell at any time what has been accomplished by this committee, and our present status is shown by the attached weekly report.

GENERAL.

It has been necessary for this committee to give some preference orders to manufacturers under section 120 of the act of June 3, 1916, in order to insure priority to Government contracts.

A number of lawsuits and contemplated legal actions arising between civilian contractors and manufacturers and calculated to throttle the effectual delivery of merchandise to the Government have been amicably adjusted.

More than 100 manufacturers, leaders in their respective lines, in conferences with several hundred others, have assisted in the careful study of quartermaster specifications, resulting in skilled revision and modernization. The elimination of middlemen has been largely accomplished.

Satisfactory results have been achieved in assisting the Finance Bureau of the Quartermaster Department in expediting payment to contractors. We have in many instances taken advantage of cash discounts never before contemplated in Government purchases.

We have cooperated with the various agencies functioning on the settlement of labor difficulties.

We have zealously attempted to assist those doing business with the Government by consistently directing all inquiries, which have been voluminous.

The efforts of this committee have been helpful in securing fuel, machinery, raw materials, railroad and express facilities for those Government contractors entitled to assistance.

Mr. KIRBY. Mr. President, this committee, as has been heretofore said, dealt in about \$800,000,000 worth of goods in about four months, in about 4,500 separate transactions, averaging about 200 orders a working day, of \$4,000,000 in amount; wrote about 80,000 communications and sent 10,000 telegrams. It did this in the short period of time in which it was operating. The great men who were on this Council of National Defense and who had nothing to do with the activities of this particular supplies committee—Mr. Willard, the president of this great railroad company, and Mr. Gifford, who was acting as the director of the Council of National Defense; Mr. Catchings, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and some of the other men who are in that class, who were in constant touch with the conditions—said that, with the help and assistance of these volunteer agencies, we were able to go forward twice as fast, to accomplish twice as much, as would otherwise have been done, and at only one-half the expense to the Government that must have resulted otherwise. That is what these other men who are in touch with this condition thought about it.

Well, it is said that some of the blankets are not as good as they ought to be. The blankets have been manufactured and bought according to specifications made by the department and furnished to this particular agency for guidance. The blankets which were not the best were doubtless bought because of the emergency created by the unusual winter and because the best other blankets had not been properly distributed. All of this cloth was manufactured and delivered, however, in time for it to have been manufactured into uniforms, allowing seven weeks for the manufacture of uniforms, in time to have reached the soldiers before the winter came on.

The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WEEKS] said that some American clothing company was not treated fairly in the allocation of these contracts for the manufacture of cloth into uniforms. This particular company which he complains about not being fairly treated did not have any plant that it could convince the Government of its ability to manufacture; it did not own the plant; it did not own the building; it was more of a broker going out to secure these contracts and to sublet or farm them out. They were sort of sweatshop manufacturers who were going to work in that way.

The Government said, "No; we do not allow these contracts to go to any manufacturer who does not comply with the sanitation and health laws of the State where his manufactory is situated." That was the reason that some of these fellows did

not get contracts. That, however, did not delay the manufacture. The uniforms were manufactured in time to have gotten to all the cantonments when needed if they had been properly distributed and winter had not arrived in unusual severity and a month early. But the voluntary organization had nothing to do with the manufacture of the uniforms. That is the condition along that line.

Would it have been done better if we had had the war cabinet which Senators are talking about here to-day? What difference would it have made under the circumstances? There is no possible inference or reason to be drawn from these occurrences that would call for the support of a war-cabinet bill, which takes the conduct of the war out of the hands of the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and puts it into a cabinet that is proposed by the Congress, and whose authority is absolutely defined and fixed in the bill.

Mr. KING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Arkansas yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. KIRBY. Yes.

Mr. KING. I should like to ask the Senator from Arkansas whether there was the slightest evidence before the committee that any member of this great organization of which he is speaking used his high position for private gain or for the advancement of the interest of any particular person or corporation with whom he was remotely, directly, or indirectly connected?

Mr. KIRBY. There was not one particle of evidence to justify that sort of inference.

Mr. KING. Or could any such conclusion be drawn from any of the evidence before the committee?

Mr. KIRBY. Not further than an inference that might arise from the fact that this man Kaplan, who was in charge of operating the Base Sorting Plant, or who inaugurated it, was of kin to a member of the Council of National Defense, who was not even on the supplies committee, and the fact that there was more paid, or rather agreed to be paid, than, as afterwards developed, the service was worth.

Before I forget it, I desire to say that the only complaint made by responsible men or manufacturers before our committee about the manufacture of cloth and fixing the price was made by some gentlemen who had great capacity for manufacturing, who manufactured fine woolens and fine cloths for the making of officers' uniforms in the allied and other armies overseas. They did not say that the price fixed by the committee for the manufacture of cloth was too high, but they said the price fixed by it was so low that they could not make a profit at all on it in their mills, which they used for the manufacture of this other cloth; that they could not afford to manufacture it at the price. That was the chief criticism by anybody who was in a position to know about it. But the committee was able at the prices fixed to get all the needed cloth manufactured.

Mr. KING. May I ask the Senator from Arkansas another question?

Mr. KIRBY. Certainly.

Mr. KING. Was there any evidence before the committee which tended to show that any of the articles constituting this \$800,000,000 expenditure, to which the Senator referred, cost the Government more than they would have cost if a different method of handling the business had been adopted or if these civilian employees or the men who volunteered their services had not been giving their services, and the work had been discharged solely by the department or the officers of the Government? Would the articles purchased have been obtained cheaper than the cost that the Government was compelled to pay?

Mr. KIRBY. There was no testimony that would indicate that such was the fact; there was not a particle of testimony to that effect. There was this sort of a proposition: It was stated that the Navy was able to procure its supplies, and was able to procure its fabrics and uniforms by advertising for bids, and it was asked why the Army had not been able to do the same thing by competitive bidding. Then it straightway developed that no good could have resulted to the Government from competitive bidding when there was no supply of the things to be purchased on hand; when the supply had to be manufactured, and new sources of supply found and developed. The Navy, in the last analysis, has done well, admirably, but that fact has been unfairly used throughout this investigation in disparagement of the War Department and its agencies. Daniel Willard, when he testified, was asked, "Do you not think that the War Department would have done better if it had an organization like the Navy," replied, "The Navy is a small machine in comparison with the War Depart-

ment." It was then insisted that the work might have been done just as well or better; that the Navy was about one-third or one-fourth as large as the War Establishment, but Mr. Willard said, "It does not appear that way. I am told the War Department is eight or nine times as large now. * * * As it comes through the clearance committee, the Navy Department there, we will say, is 10 or 15 per cent, and the Army is all the rest of it."

When Mr. Baruch was asked the same question, what did he say? He said:

"Yes; the Navy has done well, but the Navy is a small, compact organization, which was already in the market; and it was allowed to go out and dip into the stores of manufactured supplies without consulting the convenience or the necessities of the other departments."

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Arkansas yield to the Senator from South Dakota?

Mr. KIRBY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I desire to ask the Senator from Arkansas if it is not his belief that Members of Congress would bring about greater efficiency, get along faster, bring about better results, serve the Congress and the Government better and the soldiers better, if they would take these specific complaints directly to the War Department and demand an immediate investigation and report on them, rather than bring them onto the floor of the two Houses of Congress at this critical time?

Mr. KIRBY. I think there is no doubt but that it could be better done in that way.

Mr. WILLIAMS. But then they would not have a chance to make a speech.

Mr. KIRBY. Yes; that would not furnish a man an opportunity to make a speech.

I regard it, Mr. President, as most unfortunate that the Committee on Military Affairs, of which four members have spoken here and one in New York, did not reduce to writing its findings from the testimony given and the disclosures made. I insisted that that be done. It was not done. If it had been done, the statement could never have been made by the Senator from Nebraska that "by the 20th of January the committee, with practical unanimity, decided that drastic action was required, and thought, instead of bringing the testimony before the Senate and denouncing the particular officials who were inefficient or incompetent, that it ought to bring in a bill that would provide a remedy and relieve the conditions." There was no such unanimity of opinion in that committee, and I deny the statement. It could not have been made if my suggestion had been followed out. I have insisted that that sort of a report ought to be made instead of bringing all these things out on the floor of the Senate and laying them before the people, each man insisting that the committee's investigation disclosed a certain condition, when everybody else on the committee is disagreeing to the statement so made.

I want to mention the matter of rifles, about which complaint has been made. The Senator from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] said that there was a lack of foresight, a lack of vision, in not making rifles back yonder in 1916; that one of the Government arsenals was absolutely idle; that smoke no longer ascended from its chimneys; that operations there had been abandoned; and that the other factory was not run to full capacity in 1916. The War Department was blamed for this inactivity, for this lack of foresight, for this lack of vision and lack of preparation for a war that was to come in April of the next year. Lack of preparation in 1916! When we were fighting out and winning a political campaign upon the issue that we had been kept out of war and that there was no necessity for the country going into war! They are blaming the War Department for not having anticipated that sort of a condition when there was no appropriation made for carrying out any sort of a program, if it had been instituted. The appropriation for small arms for that year, I understand, was only \$250,000; at any rate, it was about one-tenth of what it had been several years prior thereto. Is there any lack of wisdom or lack of foresight under the circumstances? Yet the department is criticized severely because of that.

They talk about the shoes that were manufactured. They do not contend that the right kind of shoes have not been manufactured; they do not say that the shoes have not been manufactured as the War Department specifications provided they should be manufactured, but they say 80 per cent of the shoes manufactured are too small for the soldiers who are to wear them. I do not believe that. If all the experts in the world should come here telling me that 80 per cent of the soldiers of this Army of 1,500,000 are wearing shoes two or three sizes too

short for them I would say it is not true; it is contrary to human experience; it is contrary to the physical facts and not to be believed. A soldier can not wear shoes two sizes too short for him; he can not march in them; he can not get around in them; and he can not fight in them. That is said to be a great shortcoming in the War Department that might have been remedied by a war cabinet. How? How would it have been remedied by a war cabinet?

A coal shortage has developed and that is charged to the administration of the Secretary of War, although he had nothing to do with it, I understand, so far as the activities of the department were concerned. It is but a criticism of the administration for not having foreseen the conditions. It is a criticism of the administration for not having been able to forecast the weather for the last year, and to ascertain long in advance that there would be such a spell of winter weather as has not occurred in this country for years, that would block transportation, and would keep the coal supply on hand from being distributed to the consumers who were in need of it. All that is charged up to the War Department; and it is said it might have been remedied had we had a war cabinet.

Mr. KING. Mr. President, will the Senator permit me another question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Arkansas yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. KIRBY. Certainly.

Mr. KING. One of the most frequent criticisms urged against the policy which has been pursued by the War Department is found in this, that, instead of letting all contracts to the lowest bidder, the contracts have been given for cost plus a given per cent, ranging from 10 per cent down, in no case more than \$250,000 profit to be allowed on any one contract. I desire to ask the Senator whether the investigation shows that, as the result of that character of contracts, the Government has suffered any disadvantage, or whether, if competitive bidding had been resorted to, the results which have been desired could have been so successfully, so efficiently, or so cheaply consummated?

Mr. KIRBY. Mr. President, in answering that I will say that we had before us the facts in connection with the whole development of cantonment building. The testimony does not disclose that the Government has been fleeced or robbed because of extortionate prices charged for the work done. The testimony does disclose that there was no possibility on earth of having these cantonments built by competitive bidding. There are no concerns in the United States that could have undertaken and completed so great a task or project in the time that it had to be done with the capital it had on hand. It was a physical impossibility. Therefore, the Government said, "We will pay you so much cost plus so much per cent if the expenditure reaches a certain amount, cost plus so much per cent if the expenditure reaches a certain other amount, and cost plus so much per cent if the expenditure reaches a certain other amount, but in no event, regardless of cost, shall you ever have more than \$250,000 because of any single improvement." The testimony disclosed that the overhead expenses of these great construction concerns are from 2 to 3 per cent—that is the estimate of overhead expense—to enable them to get ready, go on the ground, and manufacture the particular articles or undertake the particular construction work. The percentage of profit that has been paid to the construction companies for the erection of these cantonments, taking them all into consideration, does not amount to more than 2½ or 3 per cent on the entire contract price. They could have been constructed under different conditions at far less expense to the Government, but they all had to be constructed at the same time and within about four months, and it could not have been done by any other method than the one pursued. That was what the evidence before the committee disclosed.

It has also been said that, if we had had a more efficient medical department, we would have had the hospitals sooner completed. There was no order issued to hold up or delay the construction of hospitals. The contracts were all let together, and it was intended that all the buildings should be constructed along together. The contractors built certain sections and certain portions of these cantonments to the exclusion of certain others. It may be that they had to build the hospitals with more care; I do not know as to that; but some of them were not completed at the time the men were expected to be mobilizing. These cantonments had to be finished in two or three months, and they were finished in that time. That has been accomplished. Could a war cabinet have done better? My own personal judgment now is, since I have seen the whole picture, that probably we did not need any cantonments. Having seen all there was to see of the conditions as they have been brought out concerning these things in our country and the billeting of

our soldiers in France, it is probable that if we had said, say, to a small town above Little Rock in my State, "You have one company; get up two; you have enough room there to house two companies and take care of them;" and then we had said to another town, "You take four"; to another, "You take five"; and then, as these men were trained, gradually bring them together in one place or send them on to France and have them finish their training there. It might have been that we could have saved money in that way. Our soldiers are not in cantonments and camps in France to-day; they are billeted out among the people. They sleep in a loft here; they sleep in a barn or storeroom there; they sleep wherever they can properly and safely be taken care of; but our hospitals in France are the best in the world. We had to construct the hospitals which have been erected over there, and that is the kind we have there at the front. There has been some delay in the construction of hospitals at the cantonments in this country. They may not have been constructed as early as they could have been if something else had been neglected, but the death rate per thousand, even in the cantonments, is less than it is in civil life.

Mr. POMERENE. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Arkansas yield to the Senator from Ohio?

Mr. KIRBY. I yield.

Mr. POMERENE. If I may make a suggestion, I have heard some criticism on the floor of the Senate with reference to the hospital conditions in the South. The cantonments were placed in the South largely because, as I understand, it was thought that the climate was milder, and for that reason it was a more desirable place to locate the cantonments; but the South this year has been in the grip of winter just as the North has been, and some of the Senators who have criticized the Government for not having proper hospitals at the cantonments in the South last summer were complaining very bitterly because the cantonments were located in the South and because the soldiers were not left in the New England States and elsewhere for the purpose of training. I refer to this to indicate how very easy it is to find fault with the things which other people are doing.

Mr. KIRBY. Mr. President, the hospital condition in the cantonments is not bad; it has not been shown to be bad. There is a difference between the camps and the cantonments. It was not expected that a hospital would be placed at the National Guard camp in Texas of which Gen. Greble is in command. It was thought that the soldiers of the National Guard stationed there were reasonably well seasoned; that they would go down there and remain in their camp and that a tent hospital, a field hospital, would be all that would be necessary for the men in that camp under the conditions that usually exist in that section; but the weather, as the Senator from Ohio has said, has been unusually rigorous; the thermometer there has fallen below zero, a thing that I remember to have occurred but once before in my whole life up to now, and I live farther north than the camp in Texas.

As to the location of the cantonments and camps the Surgeon General swore that they were all well located except one; that there was no objection from a sanitary or hygienic standpoint to the location of any cantonment but one, and that that objection had been shortly removed. They were located under medical supervision and after consultation, not with the Surgeon General's office, but with the particular branch of the Army medical service of the department that located them.

They complain of the powder-manufacturing facilities not being adequate and say that we will not be able to manufacture all the powder that we probably will need; that we are not making all the poison gas that is expected to be used in our explosive shells "over there," and they say that it is because we do not have a war cabinet. They do not say that we have not enough powder; no man has dared to stand on this floor and say that the disclosures before the committee reveal the fact that we have not all the powder we can use or that we will use for this whole year. It is true we have had to buy some of our shells in France, and they talk about "poor, bleeding France." Do you know that the testimony as it comes to us about that proposition shows this, and nothing more? France said to us, "We have mobilized and centralized our industries for the manufacture of munitions until we will have to demobilize them unless the employees are furnished more to do, unless we can supply you with explosives. We have more than we can possibly use; our manufactories are already organized and operating to a great maximum capacity and output, and unless you let us manufacture your shells and ammunition of a particular kind we are going to be in distress, because we must slow down, and our workmen will be out of employment; there will be nothing for them to do." That is the reason for purchasing from France, to improve conditions for France as well as

to supply our needs in the shortest time in the most practical and businesslike way. The same reason holds also for procuring our big guns and certain types of machine guns that Gen. Pershing decided were best adapted for our own use in battle. We bought those guns from our allies, who had them to spare, because they were the kind we needed and we could get them when we needed them, delivered where they were to be used. They could not be manufactured by us here in time, anyway, and the fact that they have not been is no criticism of the efficiency of the War Department. If we could have manufactured them all on time, it had been better in any event because of the shortage of shipping to buy where no ships were needed for delivery.

As to supplying chlorine and gas, about which complaint is made, we have already made arrangements until October 1 for our supply of explosives and poison gas; they are coming along, and are being supplied, and we have made arrangements to construct—and their construction is actually under way now—plants to take care of the condition from then on. What more could have been done by a war cabinet? The Nebraska Senator criticized unsparingly all activity in any way responsible for the condition for producing supplies and munitions that are absolutely indispensable and having them delivered at the ports for shipment when there were not sufficient ships provided to carry such supplies without delay. He insisted that all the energies of the Government should have been directed rather to the construction of shipping and not the preparation of the supplies and munitions which had had to wait for the ships. That certainly is a peculiar view, supported by neither reason, sense, nor sound judgment. It had been a beautiful spectacle indeed to have constructed the ships to the exclusion of the manufacture of the supplies, absolutely necessary for the support of our own and the allied armies, which had to be carried whether we had constructed ships or not. It was the intention, of course, and every energy of the Government that could be brought into activity for the purpose was started for the completion of both projects. Had it been done otherwise it might have resulted only in having newly constructed ships lying idly at the wharf waiting the manufacture of supply cargoes. Such view also leaves altogether out of consideration the prospect that we should be able to procure ships enough from our allies and by purchase from neutral nations to carry such munitions that had to be supplied.

Mr. President, I can not recall all of the little criticisms which have been made. I did not expect to reply to any of them; I did not know the testimony before the committee was going to be used and distorted in the particular way in which it has been made use of. I have tried, however, to reply to everything that I thought ought to be mentioned that has not been correctly reflected before the Senate according to the testimony and disclosures brought out in the investigation of the committee.

Now, let us see about the war cabinet. What is the expert opinion of the necessity for it? The Secretary of War says, "I think that with this organization as it is now completed"—and there are over 15,000 men in this organization; there is that much talent being employed—"I think with this organization as it is now completed, from the experience of the past improvements can be made that will enable it to perform the service better than any other organization that can be effected at this time." The War Industries Board, which is criticized, has at the top the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretaries of other departments, and men connected with various industries, and in each particular line there is one man who is at the head and who has supreme authority all down through that particular branch, with the President over all. Those men are all on the War Industries Board. The Secretary of War thought that by adjustment and conference and agreement it could handle all the problems that will come before this board to be dealt with. Why? Because the members have all the authority; there is this man in his field, and that man in his field, and another man in his field; we have it all there—the entire field—and all the improvement that could be suggested by Willard; that could be suggested by Baruch; that could be suggested by Gifford; that could be suggested by Catchings, the chairman of the United States Chamber of Commerce; that could be suggested by Coffin, of the Air Board—all the improvement that could be suggested was that the machine might be improved and made more nearly perfect if there was statutory authority vested in one man to perform certain particular functions of combination of agencies or activities.

Some one asked him—Willard—if he thought this man ought to be a member of the Cabinet. He said, "No." Some one asked if he thought he ought to be put over the Cabinet. He did not know whether he ought to be put over the Cabinet or not.

I will read you just what these men said.

Mr. Willard, in reply to the question about whether or not this man ought to be a Cabinet official, said:

I have never thought of it in that connection. I do not think he needs to be, certainly, and his only function would be to procure something that the other agencies had failed to procure in the most satisfactory way.

Senator WARREN. But his authority would be supreme in that particular thing in the procurement of that particular thing?

Mr. WILLARD. Yes; and I think he should be. As it is to-day, if anything is to be procured for the Government, it must be done by certain departments and can not be done anywhere else, not even by the President. There ought to be an agency that could deal quickly with that, and that agency should be a man reporting to the President—

That is what he thought about it—

Senator KIRBY. With supreme authority?

Mr. WILLARD. Yes; when called upon to act; but I would not turn it all over to him at once, you understand. I would not turn it over to him at all unless it developed that it was necessary. (R., 1825.)

That is what he thought about the operation of this war-making machine. He was here in the course of its construction and saw all these things being done, and he was on the advisory commission of the Council of National Defense, and all departments in the War Department reported to him any and all information that he asked for, that he might be kept in touch with everything. He discussed it with the other members of the advisory council, and that is what he said to our committee.

Mr. POMERENE. He was the chairman of the advisory commission?

Mr. KIRBY. Yes. Let us see what else he said:

I do not think there can be any objection to this particular plan.

That was the plan of the War Department, as outlined on the charts on the wall here when Senator WADSWORTH spoke. They asked him specifically about it as now organized and he said:

The objection that is made to the war ministry, as it is understood, is this: We have got a large plan working, with 15,000 men pretty well organized. We have put a lot of good strong civilians in there. Now, to go and change it all at once would make more or less confusion and it is not necessary if you arrange to take care of any defects that may develop in this plan—

The plan is there, the machine is there, it is in operation, and he does not think it ought to be changed except to have some authority that might remedy a defect if one developed—

It is not necessary now to do the thing that is in mind when you speak of a war minister because we have done away with the necessity in some way, but with this plan that we have we have got to put something in between to prevent competition in articles that are short and to develop supplies of raw material and finished products. A war industries board can do that, and if it has the standing that it would have if the head of the board reported to the President and had his authority from the President this plan I believe will work just as well, and I would prefer it to the arrangement of a minister of munitions. (R., 1826.)

That is what he said about it—

I think the organizations that have been formed are the organizations that he would use, because I think they have been made efficient. What duties he should take over I do not think you should prescribe in the first instance.

This statement is in line with the Overman bill.

What duties he should take over I do not think you should prescribe in the first instance.

He thought that you should not limit it by authority of statute here. The power should be elastic; it should be plenary; it should be in the hands of the Commander in Chief of the United States of American in the war, that he might use it only if necessary, and that it ought to be sufficient for any condition that may develop.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KIRBY. Certainly.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Does not the Senator know that that is exactly what the munitions bill does—leaves it entirely with the President, with plenary powers?

Mr. KIRBY. I am talking about the war-cabinet bill and the Overman bill now.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Was not the Senator quoting Mr. Willard?

Mr. KIRBY. I was.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Willard was talking about the munitions bill in his testimony.

Mr. KIRBY. I read just what Mr. Willard said, and it is from pages 1822, 1825, and 1826.

Mr. WADSWORTH. When Mr. Willard testified, no war-cabinet bill had been introduced. It was not under discussion. He was speaking of the director-of-munitions bill.

Mr. KIRBY. I am reading his testimony, and the Senate may put its own construction upon it.

I do not think you should say a man should be appointed with authority to do a lot of things. I think if you authorize the President—this has grown out of my experience on the board—if you authorize the President to say that a man at the head of war industries shall have

authority to do such things as the President may delegate to him from time to time, that will cover everything that is necessary, and he will only take over those activities that are necessary to be taken over. It is not necessary to take over all the purchasing.

This is with reference to the munitions suggestions here:

Perhaps only a small part of it will have to be taken over, but there will come important questions from time to time—perhaps the question of powder supply, possibly the question of nitrate supply, perhaps of forgings—some particularly important things may come up which may not be going along as it should under the existing organization, and in that instance let the President have authority to say that that matter shall be transferred to this individual. (R., 1822.)

He said he did not favor the creation of a civilian authority to take over those activities.

Mr. Baruch said:

It seems to be in the minds of many to destroy many of the splendid things that have been done, but in my opinion it would not be necessary, and I must concur with Mr. Willard and say that whereas there may be things, and there are things, to criticize, there has been a lot done.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think the committee feels that all of this system should be abolished.

Senator W.

Mr. BARUCH. As I said, a great many of these agencies are in the right direction, but they have not gone far enough, and they ought to go further, so as to have this definitely fixed in this individual acting under authority, because all of the authority should be given to the President; that is, a man who is responsible. (R., 1840.)

That was his view of it.

As a matter of fact, this agency would be established so when the war is over it drops away, and it leaves the Navy, which we are all proud of—they have no task compared with what the Army has, and it was an older organization and received more money, and there were a good many reasons why it should be where it is. It would, it seems to me, be wrong to let the Navy go out and take its supplies here and there. For instance, a question which you very seldom hear discussed, is the question of chemicals which enter not only into explosives and food, but into the very clothes and everything you have got on you. There is trouble there in competition. They require large quantities for ammunition, and the Navy needs ammunition, and they have got to go out and get their supplies. It should not be right that they could go out and dip in here and dip in there without respect to the other departments of the Government or the allies. These things stretch out into innumerable things, which must be centralized somewhere. (R. 1843-44.)

Now I want to read you what Mr. Gifford said and Mr. Catchings. This is from Mr. Gifford's testimony:

My view would be that if the President had the power to appoint a director on the War Industries Board, I would prefer one man, I would prefer a one-man board, where direct executive work could be done. Then, if it were made possible by Executive order, we will say, for the President to transfer from the War Department, the Navy Department, or the Shipping Board, any purchasing committee which it might develop should properly be centralized from these departments into this section, as the scheme works along, we would transfer such things as had to be centralized, such as steel, for instance. No one questions, for instance, that steel will have to be centralized. It will have to be centralized somewhere. We can not have it handled by the Army, the Shipping Board, the Navy, and our allies. If they could be transferred out of the various departments and put under direct war industries, you would have a workable organization that would not be so comprehensive and so detailed as to break down in its functioning, and yet you would obtain the object of taking care of

these vital needs, which I call the war industries. (R. 1864-5.)

Senator KIRBY. This top man would have to have sufficient information about the productive capacity and the supplying capacity to know all about the needs, as well as the power to do the thing after he knew.

Mr. GIFFORD. He is obviously the one man in the Government to know the whole productive capacity of the country. You can have 15 bureaus of the Government all learning about the total capacity of the country, but the thing must be dealt with as a unit. They must all look to Washington or some individual man or board.

Mr. Gifford was asked, "Do you not think the ministry of munitions in England is a desirable thing to copy here?" He said, "No; do not follow that as your ideal," and then he read into the record these criticisms of the munitions board in England:

This article says, on the subject of purchases for the Government, that the subject has received the attention of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of England, and a memorandum has been prepared which has been submitted to the various ministers:

"The council desires to record its opinion that such diversity of control, which permits competitive purchasing, does not make for economical and efficient national production. They are informed that orders for supplies are placed by the ministry of munitions, the Admiralty, the war office, and the air board, acting as the chief services, and that each of these has separate departments, which operate, frequently without consultation, in competition with each other."

He said, "I think we can do better than that," and they are bottoming this upon the war board or munitions board in England.

Now, I am going to read from Mr. Catchings's testimony and then quit.

Mr. Catchings, too, was in favor of an elastic central power that might be exercised when power was needed; that might be put in operation by the President and might stop on any particular line when the necessity no longer existed for its use.

He said:

I want to say in connection with a sudden change that it has never seemed to us at any time that a sudden change should be made, but that these various organizations should be taken over under another control. We certainly should regard it as most unfortunate if the splendid buying organizations that have been created, particularly such an organization as the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, should be disturbed; but in our judgment there is no reason why that bureau should not be responsible to a man who was responsible for the activities of other bureaus and buying departments, so that he could bring about a common connection and singleness of purpose between them.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you would not wipe out any of the organizations, but would leave to the central power—whatever you might call him—the authority to absorb, to utilize, and to eliminate as he saw fit.

Mr. CATCHINGS. It seems to us, sir, that it is quite unthinkable in this enormous enterprise, of such a vital nature and difficulty, to consider destroying what we have. You must use what you have and build up from it. You can not stop fighting the war while we create an organization. [R. 1901.]

Every man there whose experience was such as to bring him in contact with the organization of the war machine, and who had seen its development and its operation, who was capable of forming an opinion, said that was the only improvement he could suggest in the organization as it now existed. The Overman bill provides that the President shall appoint this man for the exercise of this elastic power; that he shall report directly to the President, and that he shall remedy any particular condition that seems to be wrong, using all other departments and agencies in all other departments where it is necessary to do so. That bill will remedy any possible defect that can be conceived to exist along that line.

Now as to the war-cabinet bill: If the President is capable of conducting this war as Commander in Chief of the Army of these United States, he ought to have granted to him all the power of the Nation that he thinks necessary to be used. We have said he is capable. The people have said so. The people of these United States implicitly believe so. This war-cabinet bill, as proposed, would take away from him the function of being Commander in Chief of the Army, and of carrying on the campaigns as he thinks they ought to be conducted. I say that the war cabinet proposed, with its fixed authority and its fixed jurisdiction and with the right to do the things that are proposed to be given it to do by the bill that has been introduced, would conflict with the operations of the departments of the Government by the President of the United States as Commander in Chief, and that it could not but result in confusion and injury to the conduct of any possible plan of conduct of the war. No wonder that the President has objected to this; and the necessity for it is not shown to exist. What could have been done that has not been done?

Mr. President, I have only discussed the matter along the line of criticism. I did not intend to do anything but discuss the two measures when I started out; but I believe, on the whole, that remarkable things have been accomplished by the agencies that have already been developed; that it was not possible to do these things without making a few mistakes, without a plan miscarrying here and there. Having seen the entire investigation, with my experience in the past in weighing testimony, with my experience in the past in deciding controversies and cases, I believe that there is no particular thing or things done or left undone that can be pointed out that should condemn this war machine as inefficient. I believe that all has been done, and reasonably well done, that was humanly possible under existing conditions since war was declared by these United States. If anything has not been done that ought to have been done, a war cabinet could not have remedied it, in my opinion; and I believe in future if there is necessity for improving this machine that the agencies provided by the Overman bill will do it without confusion, that they will do it without disorganization or interruption of a machine that has done all these things so well, and can do all things necessary to be done better in future for having done them in the past.

RAILROAD CONTROL.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3752) to provide for the operation of transportation systems while under Federal control, for the just compensation of their owners, and for other purposes.

RECESS.

Mr. SMITH of South Carolina. Mr. President, several Senators who intend to discuss the railroad bill have intimated that they desired to make such preparation. In view of the importance of the bill, the absence of a number of Senators, and the difficulty at this time of securing the attendance of a

sufficient number to give the matter the attention that it deserves, I move that the Senate take a recess until 11 o'clock to-morrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 3 o'clock and 15 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until to-morrow, Saturday, February 16, 1918, at 11 o'clock a. m.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

FRIDAY, February 15, 1918.

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Rev. William Couden, of Washington, D. C., offered the following prayer:

Our Father which art in Heaven, we thank Thee for the historic religious ideals that find freedom in our Nation and that are zealously serving our needs to-day; for Judaism, with its ancient glory of the law and the prophets; for Catholicism, with its organization and conservation; for Protestant Christianity, with its differences, its unities, and its openness. Unite us all under the flag for world justice, humanity, and kinship.

By the lips of Thy Son Thou hast said, "Many are called, but few are chosen." Let the myriads in our Nation hear and answer the call to political, industrial, financial, and domestic loyalty; and let the few chosen to plan and to lead, as the Members of this House be wise in counsel and true to their grave responsibilities. In the name of Jesus the Redeemer. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

Mr. GREGG, by unanimous consent, was given leave of absence for three days, on account of illness.

RESIGNATION FROM COMMITTEE.

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication:

HON. CHAMP CLARK,
Speaker House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I hereby tender my resignation as a member of the Committee on Accounts.

Sincerely, yours,

CHRISTOPHER D. SULLIVAN.

The resignation was accepted.

H. H. HOGAN.

Mr. MOON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to consider in the House the bill (S. 3689) authorizing the Postmaster General to cancel or readjust the screen-wagon contract of H. H. Hogan, of Kansas City, Mo.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent to consider the bill S. 3689.

Mr. COX. Let it be reported, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the bill.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That should the Postmaster General find as a fact that the screen-wagon contract of H. H. Hogan, of Kansas City, Mo., was entered into prior to the entrance of the United States into the war with Germany, and that the prices agreed to be paid in said contract are at the present time inequitable and unjust by reason of the increase in the cost of materials and labor employed in the performance of such contract, the Postmaster General is authorized, in his discretion, with the consent of the said H. H. Hogan and his bondsmen, to cancel the same or to readjust the terms of said contract in such manner as to relieve the contractor from the hardships being by him suffered on account of such increased costs and expenses.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I make the point that there is no quorum present.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois makes the point of no quorum, and the Chair will count. [After counting.] Sixty-seven Members present, not a quorum.

Mr. KITCHIN. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify the absentees, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following-named Members failed to answer to their names:

Anthony	Currie, Mich.	Fuller, Mass.	Humphreys
Austin	Curry, Cal.	Godwin, N. C.	Husted
Bacharach	Dallinger	Goodall	Hutchinson
Beakes	Darrow	Graham, Pa.	Ireland
Bland	Davidson	Gray, Ala.	Johnson, S. Dak.
Bowers	Drukker	Gray, N. J.	Jones, Va.
Britten	Dyer	Green, Iowa	Kahn
Campbell, Kans.	Eagan	Gregg	King
Capstick	Eagle	Hamilton, N. Y.	LaGuardia
Carter, Mass.	Ellsworth	Haugen	Littlepage
Clark, Fla.	Fairchild, B. L.	Heintz	Lunn
Coady	Fairchild, G. W.	Hollingsworth	McCormick
Cooper, Ohio	Flynn	Hood	McLaughlin, Pa.
Copley	Focht	Houston	Maher
Costello	Francis	Huddleston	Mann

Miller, Minn.	Purnell	Scott, Pa.	Vare
Moore, Ind.	Ragsdale	Scully	Venable
Neely	Robinson	Slemp	Voigt
Nelson	Rosenberg	Smith, T. F.	Ward
Nicholls, S. C.	Rucker	Sterling, Ill.	Webb
Nichols, Mich.	Sabath	Strong	Wilson, La.
Nolan	Sanders, Ind.	Tinkham	Wilson, Tex.
Platt	Sanders, La.	Van Dyke	Winslow
Price			

The SPEAKER. On this call 335 Members have answered to their names.

Mr. KITCHIN. Mr. Speaker, I move to dispense with further proceedings under the call.

The motion was agreed to.

The doors were opened.

SENATE BILL REFERRED.

Under clause 2, Rule XXIV, Senate bill of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and referred to its appropriate committee, as indicated below:

S. 3433. An act requiring the Government to furnish uniforms to officers of the Army or Navy, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

ELECTION TO COMMITTEE.

Mr. KITCHIN. Mr. Speaker, I nominate for election the gentleman from New Mexico, WILLIAM B. WALTON, as a member of the Committee on Irrigation.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from North Carolina nominates the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. WILLIAM B. WALTON, to be a member of the Committee on Irrigation.

The question was taken, and Mr. WALTON was elected.

H. H. HOGAN.

Mr. MOON. Mr. Speaker, I renew my request for the consideration of the bill S. 3689, authorizing the Postmaster General to cancel or readjust the screen-wagon contract of H. H. Hogan, at Kansas City, Mo.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. DOWELL. I object.

URGENT DEFICIENCY BILL.

Mr. SHERLEY. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 9867) making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, and prior fiscal years, on account of war expenses, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, with Mr. GARNER in the chair.

The Clerk reported the title of the bill.

Mr. SHERLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the first reading of the bill be dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. SHERLEY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, presenting, as chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the first bill from that committee since it fell to my lot to succeed the distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, I believe that I may be pardoned for saying just a very few words outside of the bill proper. There has been in this country from time to time, and especially recently, considerable agitation for what is generally spoken of as a budget system for the consideration of the financial affairs of the Nation. Unfortunately we have always been more or less under the tyranny of phrases, and, as a result of that loose thinking that sometimes seems to be a national characteristic, many people speak about a budget system without any realization of what is involved, and much criticism that is unintelligent is leveled at Congress, and much praise is given administrative suggestion because of the supposed failure of Congress to institute a budget system.

I shall not to-day take time to go elaborately into this subject. I hope at a future day to speak concerning it at length, but I do want to say a few words touching the recommendation that has been made by the President of the United States in favor of one appropriating committee of the House, and also touching the broad aspect of a budget. Personally I have always favored a concentration of appropriating power, but I do not consider that that represents in any degree an adequate remedy or anything more than a step toward a budget consideration, and I have not sought to press it at this time because of the tremendous tasks that are placed upon Congress and the Government in connection with the prosecution of this war. To undertake a reform of that magnitude, a reform that did not meet with the universal acquiescence of the House, would

have been simply to cripple and not help in the presentation of great financial bills. No man at this time desires to be chairman of the appropriating committee carrying the power to appropriate for all departments unless he could have behind him the support of the entire membership of the House. To have undertaken that reform, even though a majority of this Congress favored it, and then to have been faced with a minority that was opposed to and sullen because of such a change would have been to so cripple the efficiency of the committee having charge of appropriations as to have practically destroyed it; and realizing that, it would have been folly on the part of the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations now to urge that reform. But I am not willing that the absence of any action should be construed as a permanent acquiescence in the present system.

But even the putting of all power into the hands of the Committee on Appropriations or any other committee would of itself be of little value unless it was accompanied, first, by the presentation of estimates from the administrative branch of the Government in budget form, and second, the consideration by the Congress of those estimates in their totals, as well as in their separate details.

It is a simple fact that there is nothing required except an Executive order in order immediately to put into effect an administrative consideration of estimates from a budgetary standpoint. At present all estimates are made by the heads of the various departments, and they go to the various Cabinet officials, who in turn give them to the Secretary of the Treasury, who transmits them to Congress. He transmits them without any power to review them to change them, but simply as the messenger through which they reach Congress. Nothing is needed except the desire of a President—and this has been true always—to have consideration at his council chamber of those estimates as they come from the various departments in their relationship to each other, and the giving to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to act as a real financial head of the Government with power to supervise and control the estimates of the various departments. And until that reform is undertaken by the administrative end of the Government no real budgetary system can be put into effect. That fact should be borne in mind by those who are so free unintelligently to criticize the Congress of the United States. [Applause.]

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Certainly.

Mr. MADDEN. If the budget system were in effect to-day and this committee was called upon to report simply on the request of the department under the budget system, this bill would carry \$523,572,000 more than it does.

Mr. SHERLEY. Not necessarily. Congress would not have to vote all that was asked, simply because asked, as a result of a budgetary consideration by the administrative officers.

Mr. MONDELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. I do not want to be diverted into too long a talk on this question, because I have so much to present in connection with the bill. I yield briefly.

Mr. MONDELL. My recollection is that President Taft at one time made something of an effort along this line. I do not know whether he had a Cabinet consideration of estimates or a personal consideration by the President.

Mr. SHERLEY. Every President has had a certain consideration by the Cabinet and by himself of the estimates made by the different departments in their relation to each other, but there has never been a Secretary of the Treasury with the power to revise and control the estimates of other departments. I called attention, in a speech made a number of years ago during the administration of Mr. Taft, to the effort that was made by John Sherman as Secretary of the Treasury to obtain just that power and the opposition it met with from every other Cabinet official, an opposition which served to prevent the reform being adopted.

Mr. LENROOT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. LENROOT. The gentleman stated that he believed that it would not be wise to have the appropriations in the hands of one committee so long as there was an active minority opposed to it. I assume those views are limited to the duration of the war.

Mr. SHERLEY. Unquestionably. I did not mean to make it so broad as to say that because there was always somebody objecting that therefore it should not be done; but I did mean to say that at this time to undertake a reform of that magnitude without the general consent of everybody would be to simply confuse and not clarify the situation.

Mr. LENROOT. I thought that was what the gentleman had in mind.

Mr. SHERLEY. And as a practical man I tried to recognize that situation. The true idea of a budget is one that requires the consideration of expenditures in their relationship not simply to the merit of the activity proposed but also the relative merit of one activity as compared to another, and this consideration in its relationship to the fundamental one of the ability of the country properly to stand the taxation necessary to pay for the expenditures made. In other words, in peace times, after determining the desirability of expenditures, the amount of them that are to be made should be determined by the burden that they will place upon the Nation.

But in war times just the converse of that proposition becomes true as to the large expenditures, because in time of war you have to consider not what you properly can do, but what you must do. We make appropriations at this time of war not with regard to the burden that they will place upon the people of America, but we make them with regard to the requirements of prosecuting and winning the war and because that is superlative every other consideration must give way. So there is an entirely different relationship in regard to expenditures in war times than what they are in peace times, and the need for a budget in a peace-time sense does not exist in war time.

Now, there is another matter in connection with the budget that is very important for the Congress to consider whenever we get to a period where consideration can be given to other than war matters. No man trusts an agent that he can not control. Under our system of government the legislative branch does not control the administrative agents of the Government. We can deny them moneys, but except to a very limited sense we have nothing to do with the selection of the various agents who carry out the various policies. If a member of the Cabinet is carrying on work in an unsatisfactory way to the Government, Congress has no control over him, or rather has no control by which he can be removed and other of its choice selected. It can simply express its lack of confidence by refusing moneys, but the President alone can determine the personnel. Now, the result of that has always been, and probably always will be, to cause a certain amount of friction between the legislative and administrative ends of government, and as a result of that the legislative end has undertaken to prevent what it thought would be abuses of power by constant limitations and by classifications and enumerations, so that our supply bills have become so detailed that the committees dealing with them and the Congress dealing with them spend days and weeks and months in consideration of details that ought not to concern Congress at all, because just to the extent that the Congress is forced to give its time annually to little details—the number of clerks, the salaries they shall be paid, and the internal organization of this bureau and that bureau—just to that extent will it cease to have a voice in the great policies of the Government. And that is what has been happening for the past 40 years in America.

More and more Congress spends hours and days of debate touching clerks' salaries and less and less touching the great policies of the Nation. If this body, the responsible representative body in a true democracy, is to have the power it ought to have, it must have time to deal with the big things and not the need of dealing with the small things. Now, in order that that may happen we must have a reform in the methods of governmental bookkeeping. At present your governmental bookkeeping is for one purpose, and one purpose only, and that is to prevent embezzlement or misappropriation of funds, and it performs that service exceedingly well, but it performs no other. All of your appropriations are so made and your bookkeeping accounts so kept that they serve only in preventing Smith or Brown from spending money for some purpose other than that for which it was appropriated, but do not require or show economy of expenditure. There is no system by which the legislative body could take the expenditures of a previous period and from them determine whether they have been economically or wastefully expended; and as a result, in order to ascertain that, we go through a cross-examination of individuals that amounts at times to a severe grilling of them and frequently without obtaining any real result. When we find some abuse we come in and recommend a particular provision prohibiting the doing of something that we think brought on the abuse and we tie the hands, or try to tie the hands, of an incompetent administrative officer, and then wake up a few weeks afterwards and find we have also tied the hands of all the good administrative officers as well and that the bad administrative officer has usually found some method of circumventing the prohibition that we placed upon him. I remember a great speech made by Roosevelt some years ago in which this was the dominant thought, that you can not tie a man's hands and prevent him from doing harm without at the same time preventing him from doing good.

Now, our Government was built in the beginning upon the theory that all power would be abused and that the only remedy for the abuse of power was so to divide it as to prevent anyone from doing much harm, and, incidentally, we succeeded as well in preventing a great many people from doing much good, and if it was not for the practicability of the people of America in overriding mechanical obstacles that are constantly put in their way we would have more difficulty than we have. Now, if you will get a system so you can know whether an administrative officer is well or badly performing his functions, then the remedy will be not to curtail his power, but to cut off his head when he does not deliver. [Applause.] When he fails to show that he is an efficient officer let him go into the discard and let some man of capacity take his place. [Applause.] That is the tendency of all modern government everywhere except here on this floor and in national matters.

Mr. MADDEN. What suggestion has the gentleman to offer?

Mr. SHERLEY. The whole tendency of modern governmental thought is to put responsibility and power together, and then the people, knowing who is responsible, know how to remedy matters when things go wrong.

Mr. MADDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. What is the gentleman's remedy; how is the gentleman going to reach the question that he is talking about now; how is he going to get control over the executive branch of the Government through the Congress so as to compel them to be efficient, economical, and effective?

Mr. SHERLEY. Part of it can not be done without a great change in our organic law. Part of it can be done by one of the suggestions I have just made, and that is a system of bookkeeping that will enable committees to see what has been done in the previous year without going through the labor that we go through now. We have to examine into everything now in order to find out anything that may be wrong. A proper system of cost keeping, a modern system, whereby you find what it costs to perform a given activity would enable a committee reviewing the activities of the Government for any previous period to determine whether it had been economically done or not, and then when it found it had not been so performed, it could very easily deal with that particular situation, and it would not have to spend the time it now does in going into every detail. It could then appropriate moneys in lump sums very much larger than we have done in the past.

There has grown up an idea, that I shared here for many years, that it was the wise thing for Congress to appropriate money in great detail specifying and limiting power of administrative officers. It was the prevalent idea of the committee of which I am a member, and particularly the prevalent idea of the then distinguished clerk of that committee, Mr. Courts, and yet it is an idea that is fundamentally wrong, because it is bound to lead, as it is leading, to worse and worse confusion.

One result is that a good administrative officer has to ask for more money for each purpose than he would have to ask as a total for all purposes, because he is limited and tied, and has no leeway. So what I would like to see is a reform in the methods of keeping the accounts, whereby the committees could check up their activities and fix responsibility, and then we could appropriate money in large sums; and that part of the appropriation which is mechanical could be made each year as it is made in most governments, by a few lines of legislation, without a rewriting of so many clerks of Class A, B, C, and D, and free Congress from spending its time with little, insignificant things. We have reached a time and place in the world's affairs where the Congress of the United States must consider bigger matters than simply the pay of a particular clerk and a particular department.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KELLEY of Michigan. The gentleman was discussing in a way the responsibility of Cabinet officers to Congress. I had a letter the other day from a gentleman who is quite a student, and who suggested in his letter that a change ought to be made whereby Congress, by a vote of lack of confidence in a Cabinet officer, would automatically vacate that office. Would the gentleman think that such an arrangement as that, patterned somewhat after the English system, would be a remedy for what he suggests?

Mr. SHERLEY. Perhaps so, though it carries with it more changes than just what the suggestion indicates.

Mr. ROSE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. In just a moment. I would welcome giving Cabinet officers certain days on the floor of the House of Representatives, and I would do it for two reasons—not only to give

the Cabinet officer an opportunity to present his case in the open, but I would also do it because it would give to Congress an opportunity to explode a great many false reputations that have existed in America for a great many years past. [Applause.]

Mr. ROSE. I would like to ask the gentleman if by what he has just said he intended to convey the idea that he favors great appropriations rather than enumerating the causes for which the money is appropriated?

Mr. SHERLEY. No; I do not. I mean to say that when you have a system of bookkeeping by which you can tell when a man is not only disregarding the purpose for which moneys are given, but also when he has expended them unwisely and extravagantly, that then we can afford to appropriate in large sums with less specification, because every administrative officer will know that on his head rests the responsibility of having those moneys properly expended and that he can not hide or shirk that responsibility.

Mr. ROSE. In what manner then would you bring before the Congress the items making up the appropriations asked for?

Mr. SHERLEY. I would bring them as we are bringing some now, but by the reform we would not be doing it without Congress knowing anything about it half the time. Dozens and dozens of items are being carried in great lump sums, and have been carried in years past, because if we were to specify all of them we would simply do nothing else. Take ordnance, and you vote a thousand million dollars to ordnance officers to expend. Even in the old days you voted five to ten millions of dollars to them in three or four lines. Now, you had to trust those officials in the expenditure of those appropriations. And then you would turn around and specify to the last degree how many people those ordnance officers should have as clerks in their offices. You gave them the control over millions and millions, and said, "You are not worthy of being trusted to say whether you ought to have five or seven clerks in the administration of that fund." And if you can get folly worse than that, I have yet to see it. And you did it without any system of bookkeeping and report to Congress whereby you could tell how well or poorly the work was being done and only by examinations that a few committees occasionally made as to some expenditures did you learn some of the facts that ought to be plainly shown by periodical statements.

What has been the result? When the great war broke there happened just what I prophesied three years ago would happen, namely, a breakdown at the desk of these administrative officers, not because they were inefficient, not because the Government was not efficient in the sense that term is used ordinarily, but because Congress had refused for years to give a sufficient corps capable of expending quickly and dealing with a great matter such as was thrust upon it. And every man who wants to be honest must admit it. And yet there is always a tendency here to blame the other man for failures and never to look into our own hearts to see how far we are to blame for those things.

But I do not desire now to deal further with the subject of the budget. I hope to make to the House some time a speech at some length dealing with that alone. However, I did not want as chairman of the committee to present my first bill and totally ignore this very important subject.

I desire now to address myself to the bill. It is one of great magnitude. It is a bill that carries in the way of cash an authorization for more money than used to be expended in the entire running of the Government for a fiscal year. In other words, as a matter of deficiency, to make up the things that were overlooked or could not be anticipated, we are now appropriating more money than we formerly appropriated for the entire conduct of the Government for a year. And that is but an illustration of this great essential fact, that should be borne in the minds of all men in responsible place, that the most difficult thing that has come to a public man now, to-day, is to keep a proper perspective, to realize something of the magnitude of affairs in the great drama that is being played and of which he is a part.

I could stand on this floor for hours and speak nothing that was not literally true, and speak nothing that was not critical of the prosecution of this war; and yet my speech would be false. And I could stand here for a day and speak of nothing that was not complimentary and to the credit of the administration of this war, every word of it being true, and yet my speech would be false. And so it is very easy for gentlemen to find things that are wrong. It is very easy to enumerate what seems a great many things that are wrong and thereby conclude that everything is wrong, and yet the facts, the real facts, would not warrant it, because the only way to judge is to judge not of some, but all, to know not simply the truth,

but all the truth, if you are going to pass real judgment upon what has been done.

Now, perhaps at no place in this Government does there come in the course of time more information, scattered and from many directions, but still more information touching the prosecution of this war, than at the committee table of the Committee on Appropriations, because that committee last fall made all the war appropriations, and this year it has had to consider, as it always has considered, deficiencies; and in considering deficiencies, of necessity you have had to consider the various activities of the different departments. Men get impressions as the result of months of testimony and talk with many men. I have some impressions touching this war and touching the country's condition. There are so many men who have volunteered to play the rôle of critics and of panegyrists that it does not seem necessary for me to adopt either rôle, and I shall not attempt it to-day. But it may not be amiss if I should state what to my mind constitutes the great problem in the efficient prosecution of this war and on the doing of which will depend from now on how well or how badly we play our part. Three words describe three things involved, and they are all intimately linked together—ships, cars, storage.

The latter, people have not thought a great deal of, and yet it is one of the things that has served to accentuate the difficulties relative to the other two. If you have a superabundance of cargo space, and if you have a rail transportation system more than adequate, storage becomes a negligible proposition. But to the extent that either rail transportation or ocean transportation is deficient, to that extent does storage become of the first importance, because if it be deficient it simply serves to put an added burden upon rail and ocean transportation and to make even greater the deficiency in those two branches.

Now, that is what has occurred in large measure in connection with this war. This country has not had for the past 10 years or more an adequate transportation system—rail transportation system—and it was perfectly apparent to every thoughtful man—and if you will hunt through the files of debates here and of speeches elsewhere you will find that time and time again attention has been called to the fact—that whenever this country got into the full tide of prosperity and of economic development and of output the rail transportation would prove totally inadequate. Well, the rail transportation was not only called upon to deal with what might be called the output of ordinary good times, but it was required to deal with an expansion such as the country had never known. We had been expanding in manufacture here in America before we went into the war, and since to an extent never dreamed of before, and that in turn has made an output vastly greater—a tonnage output—than what existed shortly prior to that, when there had been a lessening of industrial activity in the country.

In connection with that absence of rail transportation facilities was an antiquated system of storage and of wharfage and port facilities. We never have had for many decades a great ocean carrying fleet, the reasons for which are manifold, and I will not now undertake to speak of them; but everyone was conscious of the fact that the country was sorely lacking in ships, and, of course, with the tremendous falling off of tonnage caused by the depredations of the U-boats the tonnage of the world has become inadequate, and of necessity that presented a problem of first importance.

Now, we had the railroads unequal to their burden; we had unequal storage facilities, and we had a lack of ships.

This was not any particular person's fault; certainly it was not any political party's fault that has been in power only the last few years. But as a result of it, railroad cars became warehouses and piers became warehouses; sheds and piers that were meant to be used for the loading and unloading of freight were used as warehouses for the storage of freight, and there began to pile up thousands and thousands of tons of freight at our eastern seaboard. The situation was made worse by virtue of several other matters. The industrial activity of this country, speaking by and large, is confined in one geographical section. In a big sense the East, the Northeast, and a little section of the Middle West represent the great manufacturing section of America, and as a result of it, it was natural that for an immediate, quick output you had to go into that section.

What has been the result? The result has been that you have placed in three or four States of the Union the great majority of the war orders of the Government. You have added congestion there and a burden there upon transportation that served to disrupt and interfere with transportation everywhere else. That involved your fuel problem. It brought a problem so acute that it was necessary to turn in and take drastic action relative to the use and transportation of coal.

I hold in my hand an outline map of the United States. Gentlemen will see a lot of dots at different places which indicate various contracts for war material that have been placed in America. What does it show? It shows that out of twenty-three hundred odd firms, holding about fifty-odd thousand important war contracts of the Government, a fourth are in New York State, half are in New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, and three-fourths are in seven States. Is it any wonder that you have a labor problem that is involving the best thought of America in order that these factories may continue their output without diminution?

Is it any wonder that you got a congestion of freight as a result of that? And yet that was not altogether a matter that could have been prevented.

Mr. HARDY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. HARDY. In the gentleman's opinion does not that same condition accentuate the housing problem that is now one of the important questions confronting the Government?

Mr. SHERLEY. Why, yes. That was part of what I meant by the labor problem.

Mr. HARDY. In other words, we ought to try to decentralize some of this Government industry?

Mr. SHERLEY. That is easier to say, perhaps, than to do.

Mr. WILSON of Illinois. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. WILSON of Illinois. Before the gentleman gets away from this subject of storage in railroad cars, has he any information as to the number of cars that are now held on sidetracks as warehouses?

Mr. SHERLEY. No; I have not. I was unable to go into that detail. I am afraid I have gone into so much detail now in the hearings that I am liable to make the mistake that I was accusing the Congress of making—thinking too much of little things and not enough of big ones.

Mr. WILSON of Illinois. Let me say, I have read somewhere that there were 700,000 cars held for storage purposes.

Mr. SHERLEY. I do not really know, and, of course, the number would change from day to day. My understanding is that there has recently been a very great relief of the situation, due to the drastic action that was taken in connection with fuel; and I know from a talk I had not later than this morning that the conditions at the seaboard are very greatly improved, and that steps are actually being taken which warrant the assertion that that situation, to the extent that it is solvable—because there are certain conditions which you can not change—is being solved.

Mr. SNYDER. I should like to say to the gentleman, however, that I have just come back from central New York, and the embargo conditions up there are exactly the same as they have been for the past five or six weeks. There has been practically no relief there.

Mr. SHERLEY. That may be; but again I suggest that you have to look at the whole picture and not at one part of it. You can take a dime and hold it close enough to your eye to shut out the entire horizon.

Mr. FOSS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FOSS. Does not the gentleman think a mistake has been made in shipping goods from the point of production down to the eastern seaboard before they were ready to put them on board the ships, thereby congesting a large amount of goods in the East here?

Mr. SHERLEY. In some measure that is true.

Mr. FOSS. Thereby necessitating the building of these warehouses.

Mr. SHERLEY. In a measure that is true. Yet it is only fair to say that some of the very manufacturing firms in the gentleman's country and elsewhere have been insisting that they be permitted to ship goods so as to get them out of their way so that they could go on producing others. It is so easy to stand here looking backward and say, "This, that, or the other thing should have been done"; but we all learn by experience. One of the real problems has been to coordinate production with transportation facilities, both by rail and by water, and in turn to coordinate transportation facilities with men—with men at the front.

The critic in one breath wants to know why you do not put more men across the water. He rarely knows how many men are there, or how many men are going, but the less he knows about either fact the more he cries out, "Why are they not going across the water?" And then in the next breath he wants to know why on earth you congest the freight at your ports of embarkation. The men who go

across the water determine the amount of freight that has to go to the coast and how fast it has to go there. These things are tied together in such a way that it is not easy to solve them. Now, there is in this bill an appropriation of \$100,000,000, with a contract authorization of \$50,000,000, for the purpose of acquiring storage facilities on the Atlantic coast and in the interior. Gen. Goethals, who is now in charge of the Quartermaster's Department, and is also an acting member of the staff in charge of storage, came before the committee with a proposition looking to the expenditure of that amount of money. He very frankly stated that he was not prepared to give to the committee all of the details of that proposal, but as a member of the New York Port and Harbor Development Commission he had become familiar particularly with conditions there, and he and other gentlemen were making studies of conditions generally, and he said it was perfectly apparent that that amount, and probably a greater amount of money, would be needed in order to create the proper storage facilities. I want to say in passing that some of this work is going on now, and that this remedy is not awaiting the passage of this bill, for which I am glad.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Is the storage problem acute on foreign shores?

Mr. SHERLEY. There is a problem there, but it is separate from what I am talking about now. I shall be glad to speak of it a little later.

The committee did not undertake to limit or to tie the expenditure of this amount of money. We were not in a position, and I do not think Congress is in a position, to determine where and how the storage facilities should be acquired; but we propose, in the voting of this money, that the administrative officers may have the means, and then upon them will rest the responsibility of supplying the country with proper storage facilities. The plan as stated by Gen. Goethals was only tentative, and therefore was subject to some revision; and I understand informally has received some revision. It looked to 30 days' storage capacity at the coast and six months' or less capacity in the interior. That is tied to a plan touching transportation of troops abroad, and I do not feel that I ought to undertake to enumerate in detail the amount of material and supplies that they should carry with them; but it is hoped and believed that this will result in giving us such storage facilities as will make unnecessary undue delays in transportation by rail or by boat. It requires but a moment's thought to realize that if in the loading of a vessel you take two or three days longer than you ought, or if in the unloading of it you take two or three days longer than you ought, you have to just that extent reduced the number of ships you have in over-seas transportation, and to any extent that you can accelerate the loading and unloading of ships, to that extent you have added to your tonnage, because you make more trips possible with the same ships.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Did the committee consider the wisdom or unwisdom of concentrating this storage business at one port along the coast of the United States?

Mr. SHERLEY. No; the committee did not. The committee did not believe—perhaps that is putting it too broad—but I do not believe I have sufficient capacity or the time to qualify me to pass upon that matter. The statement was made in the hearings that in a large measure six different ports would be developed for the use of the Government.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. There is a general impression that the concentration of the war business of the country at one port has been responsible for much of our transportation difficulties.

Mr. SHERLEY. That is true, and it is also true that that impression usually represents nothing but the selfishness of a locality not favored. There is an impression abroad that there is too much shipbuilding in Philadelphia. I do not share that belief, but that is the impression caused by the greed of other localities that would like the business; and it is that same sort or narrow viewpoint that makes men complain, without looking at the whole picture, because their locality does not happen to be the favored locality.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. There may be some natural advantages elsewhere, apart from other reasons. Why should other points, like Charleston, Savannah, Norfolk, Jacksonville, Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia be left out of consideration?

Mr. SHERLEY. In the first place, the gentleman has assumed a premise which I do not think exists, and, in the second place, if I was able to answer him I would know the whole problem, and I do not. I do not know what place ought to be used; I

have not the information and could not get it short of six months' study.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. It has been said here—the gentleman did not say it—that as much as \$25,000,000 might be spent in extending the storage facilities at one port.

Mr. SHERLEY. I would not be at all surprised, and I have no doubt it would be justified. If the gentleman will permit, I will read him the ports that are going to be used. I will say this, further, to him, that, whether he likes it or does not, you can not possibly take away the primacy of New York as a great port of embarkation. You can not do it, not simply because of the port, but you can not do it on account of the trade conditions and the rail conditions and a lot of other things that can not be changed overnight. It may be, and probably is, exceedingly unfortunate for war purposes that there grew up in America transportation methods and systems and ports and cities without relationship to war needs, but they have; and, these facts being so, we can not run away from them, and men who start to criticize ought to remember them in their criticisms.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman pardon me for one more question?

Mr. SHERLEY. Now, I do not mean my answer to apply personally to the gentleman from Pennsylvania—

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I understand that. I did raise the question of the wisdom of this concentration. It seemed to me a fair question whether it is wise, from a governmental viewpoint or from a military standpoint, to concentrate all shipping business at one place. The possibility of the enemy making an attack on that point adds to the seriousness of the question.

Mr. SHERLEY. I question whether that is a matter that the Committee on Appropriations could decide. I do not think it could come to a wise conclusion, for it has not the means. I read from the hearings, page 503, where Gen. Goethals says:

In the general scheme, as I have outlined it, we contemplate using Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Newport News as a part of the Norfolk scheme, and Charleston.

I am assuming that Gen. Goethals and the gentlemen associated with him, men distinguished for their achievements in private business life, have worked out a scheme that is proper and practicable. If they have not, we are that much to the worse; but I am satisfied that a better one can not be worked out by legislative enactment.

Mr. HARDY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. Does not that scheme involve practically the utter neglect of every port west of the Mississippi River and, in fact, west of Florida?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; I think it does, in a large measure.

Mr. HARDY. Would not that leave the transportation that ought naturally to come down the western section of the country for export, leave it unprovided for, and tend to congest—the very thing that the gentleman complains of?

Mr. SHERLEY. No; I think not; and for the very plain reason that if the gentleman will take a map and draw the distance from Galveston or New Orleans to France, then draw a line from Charleston, one from Baltimore, one from Philadelphia, one from Boston, I think he will get his answer, bearing in mind that the longer a ship takes to go across the sea the less number of trips it can make.

Mr. HARDY. But if you are so congested with freight in the eastern ports that you can not get the ships unloaded, you have destroyed your transportation.

Mr. SHERLEY. Of course, if you can not move it out of New York, you had better move it at New Orleans, but this \$150,000,000 is to make it more expeditious to move it to these various ports and to get it across the water.

Mr. SNYDER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. I will.

Mr. SNYDER. I was in New York the other day talking with quite a number of men on this very subject, and they said that there was a considerable quantity of munitions passing through New York that they would be glad to have passed through the port of Philadelphia.

Mr. SHERLEY. All I can say, and I do not want to seem discourteous—as I may seem to have been in my desire to be emphatic—I think this problem will be worked out by those who have the time and who have the information very much better than we can hope to work it out on the floor of Congress.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Before the gentleman leaves this subject of unloading ships, I want to say that he may recollect the statement of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MILLER], which came under his personal observation, that the unloading of a ship of steel goods at a port in France took 60 days.

Mr. SHERLEY. That is possible, and one of the reasons was that in the loading of that ship on this side it was loaded without any real knowledge of the problem of unloading it, or, even if the knowledge existed, without the facilities to get it loaded properly.

Mr. LONGWORTH. That ship could probably have made two complete trips in that time.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will permit me, I think that one of the problems that the War Department now has under serious consideration is the unloading of ships across the water, and that, too, is complicated by the fact that their port facilities are very limited.

Mr. SHERLEY. I am aware of that, and we are carrying moneys for that in this bill. Part of the moneys being provided for the Engineer Department are for the purpose of improving facilities abroad in the unloading of ships and in the transportation and movement to the front of the munitions that go there. That illustrates another proposition, that the same men who now as critics complain about the lack of port facilities in France are the same distinguished gentlemen who insisted upon putting fighting men on the front, and who interfered by their agitation with the orderly plan of developing facilities for handling troops before you put the troops there in great mass. You can not eat your cake and have it, too. You can not do certain things except at the expense of other things, and there has been much childish and unreasoning criticism by men who have insisted on a thing being done without realizing that when done it prevented something else of equal or greater importance. But that is to be expected because we are dealing with big matters that are beyond the ken of most of us, and mistakes necessarily are made, and mistakes are imagined when they are not made.

I want to pass now from this desultory statement, touching what I believe to be, as I have stated, the most important phase of our war problem, to a consideration of the details of the bill itself. The estimates as submitted to Congress amounted in the way of appropriations and authorizations to \$1,035,792,341.64. The total of the amount of appropriations and authorizations granted is \$528,572,259.18 less than that sum. The amount of direct appropriations is \$907,397,259.18 less than the amount of direct appropriations requested, and the amount of authorizations granted is \$378,825,000 more than the amount of authorizations requested. That means that we have very greatly cut the amount of money appropriated and we have considerably increased the amount of contract authorizations.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Kentucky has expired.

Mr. SHERLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for one hour more, in the hope that I shall not use it all.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I would like to ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may continue until he concludes his remarks.

Mr. SHERLEY. I hope to do that within one hour.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kentucky asks unanimous consent to proceed for one hour more. Is there objection? There was no objection.

Mr. SHERLEY. As I stated, we have increased the authorizations and decreased the cash, but we have decreased both authorizations and cash by more than \$500,000,000. It is proper that some general explanation should be given of so marked a cut as that. Let me say in advance that that cut, in the judgment of the committee, is made without in any sense impairing in the slightest degree the efficient prosecution of the war. No moneys anywhere were denied for any purpose that it was believed were necessary for the prosecution of the war, and no member of the committee permitted any belief or hope as to an early termination of the war to control him in voting, because, manifestly, no more fatal mistake could be made than to undertake to act upon the belief that the war might end at an earlier period than the facts may warrant.

Mr. MADDEN. How does the gentleman account for the wide difference of opinion between the executive heads of the Government and the committee on the matter of the amount of money needed?

Mr. SHERLEY. I am going to explain that in a moment. Two hundred and ninety million dollars of that cut is represented in a clothing estimate, which was not allowed for this reason. But little if any of that money will be needed prior to the 1st of July, and this bill is a deficiency bill to make provision for the needs of the various departments up to July 1.

Mr. MADDEN rose.

Mr. SHERLEY. In just a moment. I think I will anticipate the question. The Army and the Navy have a right to incur deficiencies to any amount necessary in connection with clothing and are ordering and have ordered all the clothing that is believed necessary. Therefore, the giving of this amount would have no value in speeding up in the slightest degree the matter

of clothing, and it was thought desirable that the actual amount that should be necessary to pay the clothing bill should be left to the consideration of the Committee on Military Affairs, that deals with it under our present system, in connection with the Army bill, or if by chance later on it is necessary to consider it as a deficiency, there will be of necessity another deficiency bill, when the Appropriations Committee could do so more accurately than now, so we just cut it out of this bill entirely. I now yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MADDEN. In view of the general information that is in the possession of everyone to the effect that most of the men in the cantonments have only one suit of clothes and only one pair of shoes, it would seem as if it would be very wise to allow the money so that they could pay for the shoes and the clothing they have to have in order to supply the needed clothing to the men who are already short.

Mr. SHERLEY. It would seem so, if either of the gentleman's statements was warranted by the situation, but they are not in my judgment. I do not think conditions are anything like what the gentleman states touching either shoes or clothing, but if they were the refusal of an appropriation of this money would not interfere one iota with the procurement of one shoe or one shoe lace or one coat or button on a coat, and if the gentleman will think for just a moment touching the power that exists in the Army and Navy to incur deficiencies for clothing purposes he will realize that my statement is true.

Mr. MADDEN. I realize that, if the gentleman will allow me, but at the same time they ought to be paid for the things they supply.

Mr. SHERLEY. They will be. Their bills will not come in until after July. I have not heard of any clothing manufacturer who was not being paid if his bill was properly presented and audited. There is plenty of cash in the Treasury available for that purpose now. Now, to go on with the items showing cuts. Armories and arsenals, there was a cut of two and a half million dollars, and that is due to the elimination of certain matters which on reconsideration by the department were not pressed at this time and do not represent any real denial of moneys for any needed facilities. Transportation of the Army was cut \$70,000,000, and it was cut that amount because of facts which were presented touching the probable transportation of men. It was not believed the amount was needed that was asked to the extent of \$70,000,000. That is necessarily an estimate. Nobody can estimate accurately, but it had to be based somewhat upon the transportation that had taken place during the past six months and on the estimate of the next six months. Obviously, the amount for transportation the first six months would not be needed in the second because of the cost the first six months of assembling of all of our present Army, but if more moneys are needed for that purpose it will be met as needed. There is some transportation that can be a matter of abuse, and it was thought wise that Congress should appropriate what seemed to be a sufficient amount without putting moneys at the disposal of the department beyond what was needed.

Mr. TILSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. I will.

Mr. TILSON. Does this transportation money apply to the moving of enlisted men between now and the 1st of July?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. TILSON. Is the gentleman taking into consideration the possibility of the next draft being earlier than the 1st of July?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes. That was part of the theory on which the whole item was based. Whether we have made a correct conclusion is difficult to say, but that item was presented, as I recall, by Col. Daly, of the War Department, and the cut that we made represents an agreed judgment of his and the committee, and if it be an error it is one that will be corrected without difficulty.

Mr. TILSON. As a matter of fact, I was trying to get at whether the gentleman had any information or whether it is possible at this time to tell whether the draft would be made the 1st of May or the 1st of July, and that might make a large difference in this item.

Mr. SHERLEY. My impression is, and I would not like to say it was more than an impression, that it contemplated that a draft would be made prior to July. Of course, not the calling in of all of these men but some portion of them. But that is just an impression, and I may be in error, because the gentleman will appreciate there is a lot of testimony that goes out of one's head.

Mr. TILSON. I am perfectly aware that it is not probably known by anybody whether that will be done at one time or another.

Mr. SHERLEY. Storage and shipping facilities. There is a cut there of \$35,000,000, and that was really due to a duplication

in large measure of estimates. I have spoken of the appropriation of \$100,000,000 with \$50,000,000 authorization to the Quartermaster General for this purpose. His estimate was made after some estimates had been made and submitted in detail for storage at various places, and the bigger scheme swallowed up the smaller, and this \$35,000,000 was deducted.

There were construction items under the quartermaster, \$85,000,000. Some of them represented real cuts where the committee did not believe that the amount was needed. For instance, I recall an item of \$2,000,000 for painting cantonments. The committee thought if provision was made for painting the outside of the cantonments and a certain amount of interior work it was all that was necessary, and we did not need to spend all the money that was asked for painting both inside and outside of these wooden buildings as a manner of preservation of them, particularly in view of the fact that nobody at this time was in a position to say for how long these cantonments would be used. There was an item of heating of garages for motor vehicles, \$3,000,000. The committee did not allow it because before this bill can become a law and long before these heating plants could be had, the weather itself will make unnecessary any heat for the garages. Now, this coming winter it may be necessary to heat some of these garages to prevent freezing both of water and gasoline in the tanks of many of these motors that are housed there and to enable men to work in them. But that was a matter which could go over. It was not so pressing as to be work that needs to be done now, as contemplated in a deficiency bill that provides only to July 1. There were some repairs at some camps which were cut, some items as to repair shops, where we did not think that a sufficient case was made to warrant the increase of facilities at those camps in that particular. There was a cut of a half a million in the operation of camp utilities. There was a request for an additional cantonment of \$8,185,000 and a cantonment for Ordnance personnel of \$4,460,000 that were eliminated because there was nobody at this time prepared to state where they were to be and when they were needed.

There was a cut touching refrigerator plants of \$5,000,000, because that is carried in the lump-sum appropriation touching storage facilities. There was for military posts and exchanges a cut of \$250,000; barracks and quarters, seacoast posts, a cut of \$2,209,000, which represents that much error in the presentation of the estimates, which were checked up and caught up by the gentleman presenting the estimates and the committee.

In the Medical Department there has been an allowance practically of everything that is asked.

The Army Medical Corps figured originally, I believe—or perhaps it might be more accurate to state that provision was originally made—for a 3 per cent capacity in hospitals at the various camps and cantonments—3 per cent of the total capacity of the camps and cantonments. The Surgeon General's Department seemed to believe that 5 per cent is now necessary in order to make assurance doubly sure against the sickness that might arise in connection with the training of men in these various camps and cantonments. They also estimated on the basis of 5 per cent capacity to take care of in this country the troops that might be overseas and facilities of 20 per cent capacity to take care overseas of the troops there. The Navy has a large program in the way of hospital facilities, and the Marine Public Health Service have another one. If it related to anything except the health and lives of the boys that are fighting for their country, this committee would have recommended, I have no doubt, considerable cuts in those estimates. It is not always that you find a highly skilled medical officer who also is a fine business man. And the problem confronting the committee in connection with these estimates was not an easy one. We solve it by allowing what was asked, because that solution was along the line of safety for the lives and health of the boys. And perhaps that is about as explanatory a statement as can be made touching the estimates submitted by the various medical departments of the Government.

Mr. TILSON. I wish to ask in regard to just one detail. Does the gentleman's bill carry anything for sewage for hospitals at the National Guard camps?

Mr. SHERLEY. My impression is that it does.

Mr. TILSON. My observation in those camps leads me to believe that that was the thing most needed of all, namely, the sewage disposition from the hospitals of National Guard camps.

Mr. SHERLEY. It carries everything that the medical men are able to think of.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Is it all contained in this medical department?

Mr. SHERLEY. There are some \$18,000,000 contained in the way of construction, repairs, and enlargements of hospitals for the Army. There is quite a considerable sum, several millions of dollars, in the way of enlargement of marine hospitals, under

the Public Health Service, and quite a sum in this regard for the Navy. There are the items that are carried under the head of barracks and quarters, and water, sewers, roads and streets, and things of that kind, that would also relate directly or indirectly to matters of sanitation. Then there are certain items touching sanitation of areas outside of camps under the Public Health Service.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I just observed that the items referred to were not in the medical department.

Mr. TOWNER. I notice in the item of water and sewers at military posts the appropriation is over \$13,000,000. I will ask the gentleman if that includes cantonments?

Mr. SHERLEY. It includes more than that. These are items that have been allowed. I say "allowed," but it does not very much matter whether the committee thought it ought to be allowed or not. The money has been spent and the thing done, and we are simply paying the bill. I am not saying that in criticism. It is already spent, and ought to have been done, because these things were things of first importance, but manifestly when it came to the committee as a proposition of money spent we had no option as to whether we would vote it or not.

There has been estimated here \$30,424,175 under the various heads of barracks and quarters, waters and sewers, regular supplies, roads, walks, wharves, and drainage, construction and repair of hospitals, at the 16 cantonments, and there had been under the similar heads a total of \$18,353,194 at the various 16 camps. Then there are a number of items under the same head that relate to work done at other places outside of these 16 cantonments and 16 camps.

Mr. TOWNER. Those are included in other items in the bill?

Mr. SHERLEY. No. "Barracks and quarters" is only carried once in the bill, and it represents money used for cantonments and camps, and also for other purposes. There was submitted to the committee, as the result of a suggestion made at the hearing last fall, a table that undertook to segregate and group these matters, and it is from that table that I have been endeavoring to read.

Perhaps there are some other cuts that ought to be enumerated as being of sufficient magnitude to deserve attention at this time.

In the Provost Marshal's office there was a cut of \$2,000,000. That \$2,000,000 was a cut because of a request of that amount to reimburse the President's fund, and that brings up a subject that it is well to speak of generally. The President very properly, as occasion arose from time to time in various departments, has advanced moneys to carry on necessary activities. As a very good illustration of that, the War-Risk Insurance Bureau was created by an act of Congress, passed a few days, or a week, maybe, before Congress adjourned. Of necessity no adequate provision could be made by Congress for taking care of that organization. It has grown and is growing, and will continue to grow, by leaps and bounds. It was necessary for the President to advance \$500,000 to be used for that bureau in the employment of clerks and procurement of space, and other purposes incident to the organization of the bureau.

So in the case of the Provost Marshal's office, \$2,000,000 was advanced; in other bureaus, lesser sums. In some instances, as in these two, requests were made for us to appropriate sums in order that that fund might be reimbursed. The committee concluded not to do that in any instance presented here, not in the slightest as a criticism of the President's use of the fund, for so far as it has come to the attention of the committee there has been no disposition on the part of the Executive to give funds indiscriminately and without thought; but because of a realization that of necessity the President could not watch all of the details, and that it was not intended that the \$100,000,000 fund should be a revolving fund, always to be kept at that amount, but was given for the purpose of meeting exigencies as they arose, and that if subsequently there came such a diminution of it as to make it desirable the President should be voted additional sums, Congress would unhesitatingly do it. This Congress and any Congress will always vote to the President of the United States the moneys necessary to meet situations such as this when the country is engaged in war; and, to the great credit of the country, it has never had a President that did not deserve that confidence at the hands of the legislative branch of the Government. [Applause.] But just as a matter of keeping track of things, in order to prevent departments undertaking to get from the President moneys and then spending them without getting the viewpoint of Congress at all, and then coming to Congress and asking that the money be given back by which it could reimburse the President, the committee thought it wise not to recommend such sums, and has not done so.

That explains that cut of \$2,000,000 in connection with the Provost Marshal's office.

In the Food and Fuel Administrations there was a cut of \$250,000. That is a joint fund, and while both Mr. Garfield

and Mr. Hoover expressed the belief and the desire that the fund should be separated and the two departments carried separately in the future, and while the committee believed that that is a proper thing to do, it did not feel like doing it in a deficiency bill when in a few weeks the matter will come up for a more minute examination in connection with the sundry civil bill. We cut the amount asked for because we believed that they did not need the full amount asked. It was not cut with the idea of restricting their activities, but certain estimates were made on the basis of an increased salary roll for a six months' period. This bill will not become a law until, at the best, about four months before the end of the period. Manifestly in many instances there should have been a cut of one-third in connection with salaries and expenses of that sort. In that way will be explained many of these cuts.

Now, there are a great number of other items that come from all the different departments of the Government. It is a time when the war, like charity, is made to cover a multitude of sins, and when a department, whether it has any relationship to the war or not, is glad to take war as an excuse for getting moneys for increasing its activities. So far as we could we tried to check those things, and where we thought moneys were being asked that were not necessary we cut them.

There were certain deficiencies that were perfectly patent. There is quite a deficiency here in regard to soldiers' homes, which was allowed in its entirety. It grew out of the increased cost of food and fuel. It did not require very much of argument to convince anybody who has to pay his own bills that it was costing the Government more money to pay its bills in regard to both food and fuel, and those matters became matters of mathematical calculation in large measure.

There was an estimate of \$6,000,000 to furnish seeds to the farmers of the country at cost. That was submitted to the committee and was cut \$2,000,000. It was cut \$2,000,000 because of a belief that with the \$2,500,000 which they have available, and which was voted them last fall, and with the \$4,000,000 which will be made available through the passage of this bill they would have as large a fund as was needed. That fund is a revolving fund. One of the questions that came up was how far they would be able to turn over the money. Manifestly they will begin buying right away the seed, and manifestly they will have to sell that seed very shortly, the time being shorter or longer according as the planting season is earlier in one section and later in another section. To a limited extent seeds sold where planting is very early will be sold early enough for the money obtained from those sales to be again used in the purchase of new seeds, and to that extent the fund can be made to go further than its total would indicate. Just how far that may be it is impossible to tell. But believing that there would be some of that, and believing that the estimates proposed were based on a belief a little more gloomy than the facts warranted, because there is always too much rain, or too little, and the weather is never quite right for farming, and things are always going wrong, and so it'll not always go quite as badly wrong as folks think [laughter], the committee felt warranted in making the reduction indicated.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. I will say to the gentleman that in October out in Michigan it rained 28 days out of 31.

Mr. SHERLEY. I have no doubt of that, and I have no doubt that the frost has killed all the fruit. It always does. [Laughter.]

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. I can say to the gentleman that it has killed a good deal of the wheat.

Mr. SHERLEY. I recognize that; and because it was a concrete situation we undertook to deal liberally with the department. There are sections where the selection and adaptation of certain kinds of wheat and cotton and sorghum are such as to make difficult the procurement of the proper kind of seed, and it is perfectly manifest that the Government must now go into this activity. I also believe it likely that the Government will not lose anything by this expenditure, and that the sales of these seeds shall be as the law contemplates they should be, at such price as to cover the cost of procurement and the actual distribution cost and overhead charge. I would not ordinarily like even this plan of State socialism, but facts are facts, and facts are stubborn things, and we are doing many things now in this war that I hope and believe none of us will be doing or wanting to do, unless it be my distinguished friend from New York [Mr. LONDON], in the days that will come after peace is declared.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. I am sure that the action of the committee in this regard will be appreciated very much by the farmers, who are trying under these circumstances to produce

sufficient crops to serve the needs of the country. But I would like to inquire whether it would be proper for the gentleman to state how the seed will be sold, so that the farmers can avail themselves of it. Will it be sold by the Secretary of Agriculture direct to the farmer or will it be placed in seed houses in the different States so that the purchases can be made through them?

Mr. SHERLEY. Well, we did not go into the question fully as to the method of distribution. We did make an inquiry which I think is interesting, and which I think the gentleman will enjoy reading, touching the method of acquiring information as to the amount of seed needed and the method of procurement of the right sort of seed for sale and distribution. I assume that the Agricultural Department will through its own agencies undertake to distribute this seed.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. SHERLEY. Certainly.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. I suppose it would be very much like the system developed about the distribution of nitrate of soda?

Mr. SHERLEY. I would assume that is true.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Yesterday I addressed a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture, asking about the matter the gentleman has referred to.

Mr. SHERLEY. I am sure you will get more accurate and fuller information from the Secretary than from me.

Mr. TEMPLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Certainly.

Mr. TEMPLE. Is it expected to get the bill through both Houses and signed in time for use of the seed in the spring-wheat planting?

Mr. SHERLEY. I hope to get it through the House by Saturday, and I hope it can be passed through the Senate within a week. There is \$2,500,000 now that the Secretary has, and, of course, it can be used for the immediate needs, pending these other moneys. Now, gentlemen, I have already taken more time than I expected to. I want to speak to the committee about one matter of great importance.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Certainly.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I want to ask a question about the policy of the committee. I observe that it has reduced the immediate appropriation, but granted quite liberal authorizations. Is not that unusual in a deficiency bill, to grant such authorizations?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; it would be; but this is not a usual deficiency bill. What I mean is that many of the deficiencies are of a different character. We are making contracts in large sums. For instance, the engineers wanted \$140,000,000. We gave them \$70,000,000 in cash and \$70,000,000 authorization, and we did it upon this theory, that while it was necessary for the Engineer Department to be in a position to incur obligations of the Government and let contracts for the procurement of locomotives, rails, and other facilities, amounting to a total of \$140,000,000, by no possibility could the bills be presented by July 1. In that connection I will say that the Engineer Department has unpledged a free balance of \$114,000,000—and we gave them \$70,000,000 more, making \$184,000,000 cash, which is more money than they can possibly need to pay bills between now and July 1, and other appropriations could be made afterwards without now tying the Treasury. It is an unfortunate thing to tie the Treasury by positive appropriations to any greater extent than necessary. That was the general policy the committee followed.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Then the authorizations are for contracts between now and July 1?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; while it is a continuing authorization, we were advised that they expected to enter into the contracts before July 1.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The same department asked the Military Committee for \$800,000,000 for the year beginning the 1st of July.

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; but the committee did not undertake to deal with matters that will probably come before the gentleman's committee touching the fiscal year 1919.

Mr. WHALEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. WHALEY. Is the nitrate of soda fund to be made a revolving fund?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; and the reason for that was developed from a statement contained in a letter from the Secretary of Agriculture, that while there was some uncertainty whether he would be able to get ships in order to get additional nitrates, still it was desirable that the fund should be a revolving fund during the war. The committee, realizing that that was true,

felt warranted in presenting legislation to that extent, and it is contained in the bill.

Now, gentlemen, one of the problems that confronted the committee, and which was the most difficult in many ways of solution, was the problem in connection with the building program for the District of Columbia. I said awhile ago that it was very much easier to look back and see mistakes than to look forward and see needs. I think one of the big mistakes that Congress made—and perhaps nobody was more responsible for that mistake than myself, unless it was the distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald—was that instead of building 1,000,000 square feet of space last year in Henry Park we ought to have built three or four million square feet. We probably would have been denied the request if we had come in with a suggestion of that kind, but that is what ought to have been done. We ought to have taken certain land then available and placed on it buildings to the extent of three or four million square feet of space, and as a result of that we would have had a building plan that would have been more uniform, more permanent, and more desirable than what has taken place and what is now going to take place.

Mr. MADDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Certainly.

Mr. MADDEN. Has the War Department, or whatever department has jurisdiction, lived within the estimate of the cost of \$2,000,000?

Mr. SHERLEY. Not entirely; there has been put into this building a sprinkler system in order to lessen, as far as practicable, the danger of fire.

Mr. MADDEN. They would not be able to get insurance unless they did.

Mr. SHERLEY. They do not have any insurance, but it is to lessen the fire danger. By virtue of that fact and some other minor things there have been expenses which will carry the cost of the building over \$2 a square foot, which was the estimate, to \$2.16 a square foot; and, so, to that extent they have not kept within their appropriation. But that is less than we can build wooden buildings for to-day. In the items we are carrying in the bill for wooden buildings we are figuring on a basis of \$2.25 a square foot.

Now, there is at present, occupied by various departments of the Government, 3,826,511 square feet of rented space, or, rather, there was on the 1st of January. This matter changes from day to day and it will keep a man busy to keep up with the changes, but the committee sent out a series of questions to every department and has compiled information as to that data touching rentals. For that space the Government is now paying \$1,764,019.40 annual rental. The space obtained lately is costing a dollar or more a square foot. Now, the estimate of space needed by the departments prior to July 1 is 2,109,761 square feet, and that means net.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. As to the value of buildings occupied by the Government, can the gentleman state about what percentage of the value of the building is paid in rentals?

Mr. SHERLEY. No; I can not state from my knowledge what that would be. We are paying now, I should say, what a president of a railroad many years ago described as "all the traffic will bear." It is so much higher in some instances that you do not like to think of the extortion.

But they have asked all that they could get, and are still prepared to do so. There is figured as additional space after July and up to the next July of 2,316,270 square feet. The committee has presented a proposal here that has one vice. It is inadequate, but again the committee tried to keep within what would seem to a good many people reasonable bounds. I say inadequate because if this war continues for more than this year, the expansion is going to be away beyond even what that table indicates.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. MADDEN. Of course, if these buildings are of a temporary character, or even if they be of a permanent character, they could be so laid out as to extend them without any additional expense in the cost per cubic foot, so that if you prepare for just what you know you need now and you lay your plans for additions that may meet the future needs you would be perfectly safe.

Mr. SHERLEY. I agree with the gentleman, if we do that, but unfortunately we think we do it when we do not. Right now the departments are being handicapped, seriously handicapped, for the lack of at least a million square feet of space, that ought to be available this moment, and that is understating the situation. But you know it is hard for men to expand in their minds

as fast as events expand for them, and we did not want to bring in here a proposal that looks too extravagant.

Mr. MADDEN. Sometimes what looks to be the most extravagant is the most economical.

Mr. SHERLEY. That is true.

Mr. MADDEN. Has the gentleman been able to obtain any information as to the length of time it will require to complete the character of buildings the committee recommend for construction?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; I am going into all that detail in a moment, which I hope will give the gentleman the information he desires. What we are proposing is that there shall be erected in Seaton Park—and Seaton Park is that part of the Mall that lies immediately to the east of Henry Park, and Henry Park is that part of the Mall where these buildings that were ordered built last year now are, at Sixth and D Streets—that at Seaton Park there shall be constructed one concrete building of 270,000 square feet, and when I speak of square feet I am speaking of gross, not including the walls, but gross in the sense of including halls and other space not used commonly as offices. It is inside wall floor space.

Besides this 270,000 square feet of concrete in Seaton Park, we propose also 370,000 square feet of wooden buildings, all to be three stories in height, the wooden buildings to be of the same style as the buildings now in Henry Park, and the concrete building to be reinforced concrete of a plain design, three stories high, and, of course, entirely fireproof. Then, just beyond the present Henry Park buildings to the west it is proposed to put up a wooden building of 300,000 square feet of space. That would make in that part of the Mall an addition of 940,000 square feet of floor space. The reason for putting one concrete building there was this: Those buildings in Henry Park are now largely used, not entirely, by the Ordnance people. Practically a third of those buildings are reserved for the use of the Navy, and they are to give that up under the new plan, which proposes building them a concrete building at Seventeenth and B Streets, to which I shall come in a few moments.

It is evident that the Ordnance people will eventually need all of the present space at Henry Park, and will need, in addition to that, considerable concrete space for the certain protection of their records, their drafting force, and drawings. I do not believe that there is any real fire risk in the sense of danger to human life in connection with those buildings. The policing of those buildings, the fire protection in the way of the sprinkler system and otherwise is such, together with the character of the building, which would enable, in case of emergency, the rapid emptying of them, even in case of fire, that there would be no great danger to the people stationed within them.

But there is a fire risk in connection with the records. The people could get out but the records would not get out, and there would be as much delay by virtue of the destruction of certain classes of drawings and records as could possibly come to us in the prosecution of the war. It is therefore highly important that we should have a concrete building there, and if it was not because of the time involved I should favor building only concrete buildings from now on. But the War Department needs immediately a great deal of space. They have stated that if we could supply very shortly some six or seven hundred thousand square feet of space, that that would take care of the acute phase of the situation until we get further relief from the concrete buildings that we are proposing, and so it was planned in this way.

It is proposed at Seventeenth and B Streets—and that is right across from the Pan American Union Building—to place two buildings, one for the Army and one for the Navy, running west toward the river, that shall have a total floor space of 1,775,000 square feet, 940,000 square feet to be for the use of the Navy and 835,000 square feet for the use of the Army. The Navy Building will be sufficient to take care of all of the Navy activities with its prospective expansion, save only that space now occupied in the Navy Annex and for which they have a lease of some years. It might even take care of that, if need be, and that lease might be transferred for the use of other departments. As a result of building these buildings they state that they are able and willing to stay in the present quarters, crowded though they are, and to immediately release for the use of the Army the approximately 300,000 square feet, gross area, down at Henry Park, and so the plan contemplates their release of that and the immediate use of it—it ought to be ready in a few days—by the Army. By this plan the Navy subsequently can, and will, release practically all of the space it now has in the Army and Navy Building for the use of the State Department, which is greatly in need of additional space. After completion of all the buildings here proposed there should be such release of rented space by the Navy and War Departments

as would enable other bureaus to be better accommodated, but we have made no certain provision for a number of these, and later adjustments will need to be made of available space. We have made no provision for Treasury needs, but an estimate has been submitted for taking over the Arlington Hotel site and erecting a 10-story building. It came in too late for our consideration, even should the committee desire to consider it.

The estimated cost of the concrete buildings is \$3 a square foot. The salvage when these buildings shall have been removed, as eventually they will be removed, will be practically nothing. In other words, what you get for your machinery, windows, sashes, electric fixtures, and other matters that are the subject of salvage will probably not be more than what it will cost for the removal of the concrete buildings.

The cost of the wooden buildings will be \$2.25, as best we can figure it. I hope it will be a little under that. As I stated a few moments ago, the Henry Park buildings are going to cost now, with the deficiencies added to them, \$2.16. The salvage on the wooden buildings will probably be about 25 cents, so as to make about \$2 net for the wooden buildings as against \$3 net for the concrete buildings. I think it is important that the committee should keep those figures in mind. The cost is as 2 to 3. Now, these figures were arrived at by consultations with the officer in charge of public buildings and grounds and consultations with the Superintendent of the Capitol, consultations with Gen. Goethals—though I ought to say, in justice to him, that his statement was simply a general statement as to cost without going into the details—and by consultation with the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy, and consultation with one of the officials of the Treasury Department in connection with public buildings. They represent what ought to be the outside cost. The Navy people have actually built concrete buildings at a square-foot cost of \$2.50—I mean, under modern conditions at present prices.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Did they do that by advertising for their materials according to law?

Mr. SHERLEY. I can not answer that, as to whether they did it in this instance or not in that way, but they did it for that figure. It is done largely by having the cheapest kind of construction and by having a plan that makes your ground floor practically rest upon the ground, not requiring the support for it that would be required for the other floors. If there has to be some stepping, owing to the grade, they estimate that the price would run, at the outside, to \$3.08, and anywhere between \$2.50 and \$3.08 is what is figured would be the cost, dependent upon the character of the ground, the amount of grading that would have to be done, the levels that the buildings were to attain, and matters of that sort. The committee took \$3 in order to be safe, and it is proposed that these two concrete buildings shall be built under the direction of the Navy Department. The Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy has probably had more experience in concrete buildings than any people outside of the Army engineers in connection with Panama, and river and harbor work, which is rather different work from this. It is believed that it will take from three to five months as the minimum and maximum to build the wooden buildings, and from four and a half or five months to seven months as minimum and maximum for building the concrete buildings. Of course the amount of building of concrete, if it was increased very much more, might delay quite a bit the finishing of all of the work, because the assembling of the sand and gravel and concrete and the steel for reinforcement, and all of those things, go to delay construction, as you gentlemen appreciate without my stating it.

Mr. MEEKER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. MEEKER. Is it possible for these concrete buildings to be so constructed that the department can be getting into them before their completion?

Mr. SHERLEY. Partly; but these buildings are going to be three-story buildings only in height. They are made three-story buildings for several reasons, but, among others, to hold down the cost, to prevent the need of elevators, and for quickness of completion. Now, it is possible that part of them may be done, or one building may be done sooner than the other, but I am giving you the outside figures touching the program.

Now, some of these buildings are being put on the Mall and some of them on the park area. I could stand here and give you 20 good reasons why you ought not to build on either the Mall or the park if I was hunting simply reasons to criticize a building program, and when I got through somebody might ask me what I would do in lieu of that, and I might have some difficulty in answering that. No one wants to see either the Mall or the parks of Washington disfigured. No one desires to do it for the sake of doing it; but no one with appreciation of

the needs of the Nation is going to stop to consider parks in connection with the prosecution of this war. So the committee has no apology to make for proposing to build upon these public areas. The Mall as we have known it is gone forever. I hope that some day will come a bigger and a better one. Some day there may come a scheme whereby we will bring the Mall into the life of the city instead of having it as it is now, and make Pennsylvania Avenue a street to be proud of, a street to rival Princess Street in Edinburgh, with a park on one side and beautiful buildings on the other. But the Mall at present is gone, and the old Mall, spacious in the days of the driving of horses, is to-day so narrow as to be nothing more than a green setting for a few public buildings that are in it; and the great park development of Washington is coming in the Potomac, and the connecting that with Rock Creek, and the drive-ways that will be measured in many miles instead of in squares.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. It occurs to me from the location of the buildings that the gentleman has mentioned that there will be a great congestion. Was that considered by the committee?

Mr. SHERLEY. I will come to that in a moment. It was considered. If there is any difficulty in connection with this matter that we have not considered, we are not conscious of it, because it was a very difficult problem.

Mr. MADDEN. And the gentleman had to consider transportation facilities in all this?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes. Of necessity that also had to be considered. That is one of the determining factors, the proximity to our Government activities, because there is no thing that breeds a waste of time more than scattered activities whereby the man in charge would have to spend half a day in traveling from one place to another. The buildings that will be put at Seventeenth and B Streets will be, by virtue of their bulk, really attractive-looking buildings. I think everybody was agreeably surprised at the appearance of those buildings in Henry Park. We had been told that they were going to be so ugly that when they proved not to be that ugly we were rather agreeably surprised.

Now, without adding to the cost there can be made ornamentations of the two faces, that on Seventeenth Street and that on B Street of the first building, and on one face of the second building on B Street, such as will take away from them any ugly appearance. The height is not sufficient to dwarf the Lincoln Memorial, and they do not go far enough back to do it. It took a good deal of nice planning to get buildings of sufficient area and yet so constructed that they would not go back too far toward the Lincoln Memorial or too far to the south to obstruct the vista that should be had of the Lincoln Memorial. The base of the Lincoln Memorial will be almost as high as the roof of these buildings, and in order that we might not again have the unreasoning hysteria touching smokestacks, a hysteria and propaganda of supersensitive art critics of the country which resulted in the inexcusable delay of a power plant that is much needed now, we propose to have the power plant of these buildings next to the brewery on the river, and if it can detract any from the beauty of the brewery we are not aware of the fact. I now yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I have always been very much struck with the fact that the most beautiful view back of the White House was toward Arlington, and I want to know whether any of these buildings have been placed so as to interrupt that view?

Mr. SHERLEY. They have not. One of the proposals that was made was to use the ellipse, that is the loop beyond the rear of the White House. That was rejected. Another proposal was to put the buildings in an L shape around the Monument, occupying some of the space that is now occupied by the swimming pool there. That was thought undesirable, and impracticable except at great expense in the construction because there used to be a great pond there, and it meant a lot of filling, and the spreading of your bases over a very much larger area.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. My recollection is that the Lincoln Memorial is nearly in line with the portico in the rear of the White House and Arlington.

Mr. SHERLEY. No.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. With the house at Arlington.

Mr. SHERLEY. No; it is not. Here is the White House. Here is the Ellipse. Here is the Washington Monument, and Arlington is off here [illustrating on map].

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. To the left of that?

Mr. SHERLEY. Here is the Lincoln Memorial.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. That is more in the direction of Arlington.

Mr. SHERLEY. Here is where these buildings will be put.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. I think it would interfere with that vista, and I wish the gentleman would look at it—

Mr. SHERLEY. I have several times.

Mr. PARKER of New Jersey. The gentleman does not think that the view from the rear of the White House toward Arlington is interrupted by these buildings?

Mr. SHERLEY. I am answering the gentleman that it is not, in my judgment. Existing buildings would interrupt the view if it be as the gentleman thinks. Here is the Pan American Building. This here is a new building, and this is a building under way, and there is another one under way here. Here is another building proposed. All of this area which ought to have been taken last year and on which should have been placed one great series of large buildings of concrete has been taken by various departments on account of the need and covered with wooden buildings. These proposed buildings could not of necessity interfere with the view of Arlington. That would not be interfered with, if it be not interfered with already by the buildings that are there.

Now, some one inquired, and it was a proper inquiry, in connection with transportation facilities. Well, it looks like no matter where we live or work we have to walk if we want to be on time. But assuming that the street car companies will have waked up to their obligations and deal with them adequately, the places selected do not present difficulties as great as would be had if they were put elsewhere. It is proposed now that one of the electric street car lines shall come down—it now comes down Pennsylvania Avenue and on G Street—it is proposed that it shall make a loop in here and strike Virginia Avenue, and then come on back and up again so that all of these buildings would be within two or three squares of that car line. They are now within a few squares of the Pennsylvania Avenue line and have only a couple more squares from the F Street line on Seventeenth and H.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Will the gentleman pardon just one more question?

Mr. SHERLEY. Certainly.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. And then I will subside. Was the housing proposition considered at the time that these buildings were located?

Mr. SHERLEY. The gentleman means the housing of employees?

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. The housing of employees.

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; that has been thought about.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Because there are now bills being considered requiring hundreds of millions of dollars for the housing of employees here and elsewhere.

Mr. SHERLEY. I have thought a great deal about it, and I think the committee has thought about it somewhat. I believe that it is going to be desirable to build on some areas between the Capitol and the Union Station some women's hotels of concrete, which can be built there from plans which I have seen, I believe, at a cost of \$500 a room, and each of these buildings contemplates about 1,500 rooms capacity, with the proper parlor floor, and perhaps a gymnasium or swimming pool included in it.

I think that it is essential that this Government should do something looking particularly to the housing of some of the women employees of the Government.

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. I am glad to get the gentleman's idea.

Mr. SHERLEY. I say "women employees," because the necessity of the situation that confronts them is more difficult than that which confronts men. Men who are worth their salt can usually find somewhere to sleep and take care of themselves, and if all the clerks, both women and men, would consider somewhat living over in the Southeast instead of everybody trying to congest up in the Northwest, they would help to solve a great deal of the problem in connection with the housing of employees. But something ought to be done in regard to the women employees, and I hope there may. We did not go into it to present any real plans to the House at this time. We have presented a plan—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Kentucky has expired.

Mr. SHERLEY. I ask unanimous consent for five minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kentucky asks unanimous consent for 10 minutes more. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. SHERLEY. We have not undertaken to bring out a plan for the housing of employees.

Now, I think I am warranted in asking this of the House: Even though this building plan does not represent just what the individual Member might have thought desirable, to bear in

mind that it is the result of a month of very hard, conscientious work. It represents the judgment of the committee, and when I say the judgment of the committee, I mean that. It represents not simply the judgment of the majority members, but equally of the minority members. It is the most practical thing we could work out.

These buildings ought to be, to the extent that they can be, built of concrete, for two reasons, both of them important. First, the absolute security to life and property; and, second, buildings sufficiently permanent, though not intended to be kept for all time, as will take care for a few years after the war closes of all of the needs of the departments; because we are never going back to the old condition that we knew in Washington. You will never go back to the old size of governmental activities. You will never see the Washington that you knew three or four years ago. There will go up in this city, from selfish interests, a great cry to immediately build great monumental buildings that will take considerable time, and in the meanwhile to tear down anything that they can tear down, in order to continue the very profitable business that was illustrated in a rent account of \$1,700,000 for 3,000,000 square feet of floor space, much of which is not office space at all, but really storage space.

The committee felt that it would be derelict in its duty if it did not present to the House a building program that had enough permanency to give the Government some little leeway and not hold it subject to the greed of men renting space to it. If we have erred, we have erred on the side of conservatism. We would rather not have had to go on the park areas at all. But if you take the areas that are full of buildings now and tear them down, laying aside the cost of acquiring the land, you will postpone by a month, two months, or three months the procurement of these buildings; and time is money now. Therefore the committee presents this in the hope that it may have the approval and indorsement of the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I would like to ask the gentleman a question concerning a subject in this bill on which he has not touched. I observe there is a deficiency appropriation for heavy cannon. If I recall correctly, we appropriated last year something like \$2,100,000,000?

Mr. SHERLEY. The gentleman is mistaken in his assumption. There is an item of \$676,000 under the head of "Field artillery," which he assumes is for heavy cannon. In point of fact, it is for mortars.

Mr. LONGWORTH. That is correct, but it is "For purchase, manufacture, and test of mountain, field, and siege cannon."

Mr. SHERLEY. That is just the generic term. You must permit a little camouflage even in the description of matters of this kind.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I wanted to ask the gentleman if he could state approximately the condition of the manufacture of cannon to-day?

Mr. SHERLEY. Well, I think I could. I would rather not.

Mr. LONGWORTH. The gentleman would prefer not to do so?

Mr. SHERLEY. I would prefer not to do so. In the first place, because it is difficult to trust one's memory, and, for a better reason, that I do not think it is desirable to go into the detail of it. I will say this to the gentleman, however, which I think will perhaps answer his question. I do not believe that there will need to be any slowing up of the activities of the war by virtue of an inability to get heavy field artillery. Now, I presume that is what the gentleman wanted to know?

Mr. LONGWORTH. Yes, incidentally; but it occurred to me, having appropriated \$2,100,000,000, the House ought to have some information, if the gentleman would think proper, as to the state of the development—how many guns are in process of manufacture and when it is expected that they will be delivered.

Mr. SHERLEY. I have within reach a detailed statement not only of that but of nearly every other activity. I do not feel warranted publicly in stating that. I will be glad to give the gentleman such information for his own use as I may have.

Mr. LONGWORTH. That will be perfectly satisfactory.

Mr. MADDEN. Members of the House ought to be able in some way to get the information.

Mr. SHERLEY. I think that is true, and I think most of the gentlemen can get the information who undertake to get it for their own use. But I am not willing to take the responsibility on this floor of making public details of that kind.

Mr. MADDEN. I am not asking the gentleman to do that.

Mr. SHERLEY. I know he is not. But I would be glad to give the gentleman personally any information I can at any time.

Mr. MADDEN. I will be delighted to have it. While I want to do everything I can to promote the success of the war, at the

same time I want to have some intelligent conception of why I am doing it.

Mr. SHERLEY. Well, I will answer the gentleman as to that phase of it now. He is not being asked to spend any money in connection with field artillery proper, and therefore a knowledge of that schedule is not necessary for a determination of his duty on this bill.

I thank the gentlemen of the committee for their generous consideration. [Applause.]

Mr. GILLET. Mr. Chairman, I am not a member of the subcommittee that framed this bill, but in the absence of some of the other members I did sit more or less with the committee, and the chairman very courteously consulted me about some of the items. I agree with my distinguished friend who preceded me in the opinion that it is a well-digested bill. The gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY] in his very elaborate and thorough speech voiced my sentiments, and I am in full accord with him. Although its size shocked us, or would have shocked us six months ago, yet we are getting accustomed to it, and it is a bill which I think we must all unite in supporting and passing.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILLET. Yes.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Speaking of the size of the bill, I read an interesting statement this morning concerning the cost of various wars. This bill is almost identically the amount of the cost of the war between Great Britain and South Africa, which lasted for two years.

Mr. GILLET. Now, Mr. Chairman, I take advantage of the liberty of general debate for a few minutes to call attention to an incident which happened last week on one of the very few days when I was not present. It was an extension of remarks by the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. FERRIS]. I am sorry to see that he is not present at this time, but I notified him this afternoon that I should make some comments upon it, and he has had every opportunity to be here.

The gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. FERRIS] asked unanimous consent to extend his remarks, and under that unanimous consent he published what I presume some of you have read, an editorial which was a glorification of the Democratic Party and denunciation of the Republican Party. The whole tenor and purpose of the editorial was to convey the impression that the recent investigations and disclosures and the criticisms of the War Department were a part of a Republican campaign preparatory to the next election.

Now I think that was a most unfair and improper use of the privileges of extension, because I think you gentlemen on that side will admit that during the whole of the last session, and during this session, we on this side of the House have studiously abstained from any action or from any debate which could be construed as criticism of the administration. I know for myself that has been the rule of action, and, as far as I know, on this side of the House it has also been the invariable rule of action.

I do not think that the gentleman from Oklahoma, or any other gentleman on that side of the House, would have spoken the words which are here inserted in the Record in that editorial; they would have been ashamed to. There is nothing at all improper in it as an editorial. It is one of that kind of partisan outbursts which all party organs indulge in at election time and which undoubtedly most of us in elections and on the stump indulge in—abuse of the other party and glorifying our own party, although perhaps this distorts the truth more than usual. But at this time and under these circumstances I think it was very unfair for the gentleman from Oklahoma to put it in the Record.

Mr. MADDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILLET. I will.

Mr. MADDEN. And it is particularly unfair in view of the fact that it gives it the franking privilege.

Mr. GILLET. Mr. Chairman, yes, I presume the reason the gentleman put it in the Record was that probably out in the wilds of Oklahoma there was some disturbance and worry about the criticisms of the administration which were being made, and the gentleman thought that by having something which he could frank and which would stir up partisan bitterness amongst his political supporters there he would divert their attention from the real facts and make them think this was a Republican political scheme. Whereas I am sure you gentlemen know that in this House nothing has happened upon which to base such a charge.

Mr. SLOAN. In the request for leave to extend, does the gentleman advise the House of the nature of the proposed extension?

Mr. GILLET. No; I think the gentleman's manner of securing his leave to print was as objectionable as what he printed.

A few days before he obtained his leave he rose in the House and made this request:

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, on what subject?

Mr. FERRIS. I want to print a short editorial on the war, peace, and against war.

Mr. Chairman, that "short" editorial, as he describes it, occupies over two of the wide columns of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD in small print! He calls that a short editorial, and I venture to say that 90 per cent of the editorials which are published in the country are far shorter than that. He obviously wished to minimize it. Then he speaks of its subject as "Peace and against war." I do not like to use the language which naturally comes to my mind in describing that statement, but I shall leave it to the House to read that editorial and see whether "Peace and against war" fairly describes it any more than the expression "short" describes the length of the editorial.

Mr. ROBBINS. On what day was that printed?

Mr. LONGWORTH. Monday, February 4, and is on page 1793.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask the gentleman if this editorial which appears in the Record appears as a result of that request?

Mr. GILLET. No; he did not print it then, because the gentleman objected; but a few days after that, at the end of the session, when as you know very few Members are here, after there had been a debate in which the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. FERRIS] had taken part, at the end of the session the gentleman from Oklahoma again rose and again requested to extend his remarks in the Record. This was on a different day, a few days later. Of course, the membership of the House presumes, as we know is always presumed, that when a man who has just made remarks rises and asks permission to extend that it is for the purpose of extending those particular remarks, and I have no doubt that when the gentleman rose and asked to extend his remarks in the Record everybody assumed that, and it may possibly have occurred to the gentleman himself that they would assume that. Nobody then objected, and the gentleman then printed this "short" editorial on "Peace and against war." As I say, I think the manner in which the gentleman inserted the matter in the Record is as objectionable as the matter itself.

Generally Members of the House trust each other, and as a rule the Members of the House do not take advantage of each other, but we all know that there are occasionally men who have to be watched. I never supposed the gentleman from Oklahoma, for whom I always have had great regard and respect, was in that class, and I am sorry and disappointed to find both what he has done and the manner in which he did it.

The minority has carefully ascertained from such partisan debate as is illustrated by this editorial, and we have in a measure departed from what is ordinarily the province of a minority. The normal province of a minority is to criticize. It is always good for the Government that there should be an alert, active minority, ready to criticize and watch what is being done by the majority. It conduces to good administration. But under the extraordinary circumstances of this session the minority was faced by two alternatives. Should we follow the ordinary course of a minority, should we criticize and oppose the majority and the administration, or under the very peculiar circumstances which now exist, appreciating that the prosecution of this war was the one thing that both majority and minority were bent upon, should we ignore the ordinary practice of the minority, although we did see frequent acts of the administration which we did not approve—should we openly criticize them or remain silent? I have thought it my duty under the present circumstances to depart from and abandon the ordinary conduct of a minority, and instead of criticizing lend my best efforts to the support and assistance not only to the majority of this House but to the administration, to hold up its hands, and to increase its strength and popularity as far as I could.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILLET. Yes.

Mr. LONGWORTH. In substantiation of the gentleman's argument, may I call his attention to the fact that on the conscription measure, which was more necessary than any other in the proper prosecution of this war, the draft law, the support the President received on this side of the House as compared with the support he received on the Democratic side was in the ratio of 3 to 1.

Mr. GILLET. Mr. Chairman, I have avoided even pointing out such facts as that here. I do not wish to raise any question

of partisanship, and I have not. I think on the Democratic side of the House, as well as on ours, there has been no attempt to criticize us or excite our partisanship. We all know that these investigations which have been made, the investigations of the War Department and the disclosures and the criticism which followed, were not made by a partisan Republican committee, but were made by Democratic committees. The disclosures were brought forward by Democratic committees, and the criticisms have been made more by Democratic Members of Congress than by Republican Members of Congress. Therefore for the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. FERRIS] to inject into this House a charge of that kind is I think entirely uncalled for and is worthy of criticism. Of course the results of these investigations are still pending. Just what a Member of the minority ought to do under the circumstances doubtless we have all of us found difficult to decide. I get letters from my constituents, as I presume you all do, of two different tenors. Some letters are complaining of existing conditions, are complaining of the great powers of the administration and its abuses, and are demanding criticisms and change. On the other hand, I have some letters urging me to continue to support the administration, and I had one yesterday which went so far as to ask me to support the administration and to support every recommendation, general and specific, which the President should make.

If we are to do that, we might just as well resign. That, of course, means that we are never to express our own opinions but we are always to express the opinions which come to us from the White House. I do not suppose any Member on either side of the Chamber would pretend that was a proper attitude for us to take. Now, for myself, I have the greatest admiration for the occupant of the White House. I think in one respect his conduct has been absolutely above all criticism, and our Nation is to be congratulated that he is there and that he is our spokesman in the state papers which he has issued. [Applause.] It seems to me that as the man who is voicing the opinion of the United States, the man who is the spokesman for the whole people and who is placing our case before the world, he has been as high perfect as could be hoped from humanity. [Applause.] In that I yield him honor and praise and unstinted admiration. In the past his wonderful facility in epigrams has sometimes led him to make those which were unfortunate, but since this war began he has been a superb spokesman for the whole American people. But although we admire him in that capacity, I do not suppose it follows that we, as Members of a coordinate branch of the Republic, are bound to think that he is perfect in every other act that he performs. I do not believe it necessarily follows that his selection of agents, his judgment of men, is perfect. I do not believe it follows that his administrative ability is perfect or that his judgment of organization is always beyond criticism. And it seems to me in those matters we must follow our own judgment and perform the duty which has been imposed upon us by our constituents. Now, these investigations which have been made—not by Republicans, but which have been made by Democratic committees—these investigations have borne fruit. Until they were made there was no suggestion in the War Department, for instance, that there should be any changes at all; but, following these investigations, changes of organization have already been inaugurated in the War Department, and whether they may effect good, I am very sure they can not do harm and make it any worse. Of course no mere organization of itself would insure good results. Any personnel can spoil any organization. You must have an efficient man for chief responsibility in order to make any organization effective. But at the same time a good organization with the same personnel will achieve vastly better results than a poor organization. And these investigations have apparently produced changes of organization which I believe will be for the better, and indeed the President apparently up to the time of these investigations did not believe that any reorganization of the department was necessary, although such reorganization was urged and agitated in Congress.

These disclosures were made upon the very heels of these investigations, and now the President comes to Congress and asks it for absolute power to make a reorganization of his department. He does not say to Congress, "You were intrusted by the Constitution with the power of organization of departments, and I would be glad to have you reorganize them." He does not even suggest to Congress what reorganization he would like, what reorganization Congress under its constitutional powers should effect; he simply asks us to abandon all our constitutional rights and to pass them over to the President and allow him to make any reorganization he desires. That may be the wisest plan, but I think any Congress would be somewhat slow in adopting such a plan as that. Now, there is another instance where it seems to me—

Mr. BORLAND. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILLETT. Certainly.

Mr. BORLAND. The gentleman recalls that we gave a former President power in a similar way to reorganize the customs service as being about the only practical way by which that service could be reorganized. We permitted the President to reorganize and redistrict the country for customs purposes and abolish quite a number of customs offices.

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

Mr. BORLAND. That is upon the theory that if we by legislative act should try to abolish any customs office we would get into a great many difficulties that could not be solved in a legislative way. Does not the same principle apply to reorganizations of other departments—that it could be better carried out on a general comprehensive plan than by piecemeal work by Congress?

Mr. GILLETT. Does the gentleman think the best way to reorganize the departments is to give the President the power to reorganize as he pleases.

Mr. BORLAND. I certainly do.

Mr. GILLETT. Well, that is where—

Mr. BORLAND. There exists overlapping authority, and the President, as head of the executive department of the Government, can curtail a great deal of that overlapping authority and produce a great deal better results than—

Mr. GILLETT. He can under the present law.

Mr. BORLAND. I am not so sure.

Mr. GILLETT. That is where the gentleman is mistaken, because, if he will look at the law, he will see that under the recommendation of the Bureau of Efficiency—if that is the right title—the President can already make very extensive reorganizations. And, if the gentleman will recall, the reason we intrusted the reorganization of the customs service to the President was not because the Executive was especially qualified to do it, but because of the fact that it affected interests in this House; because that was a matter which spread all over the country, and combinations were made in the House to prevent such reorganization.

Mr. BORLAND. Did not we realize that it was practically impossible to abolish a single customhouse by action of this House?

Mr. GILLETT. Not a single customhouse, but many.

Mr. BORLAND. And therefore it was necessary to have the President deal with the entire proposition.

Mr. GILLETT. But that has no application, for instance, to such a thing as a department of munitions—no application at all.

Now, another matter which has been suggested to the House by the President, on which it seems to me Members of Congress ought at least to hesitate before following such a suggestion as my correspondent made, is the recent bill which was introduced by the leader of the majority and referred to the Ways and Means Committee, in which one man, the Secretary of the Treasury, is given power over a fund of \$500,000,000, with authority to issue notes for \$4,000,000,000, by which he shall practically finance this war, and which gives him power to practically close any large industry in the country.

Now, that may be wise; but what impressed me in that bill, I wondered at the assurance of the administration in asking that the Secretary of the Treasury, subject to the approval of the President, should have the power to appoint a board of directors, not to be confirmed by the Senate, but to be appointed by himself, the salary to be fixed by himself up to an amount not exceeding \$12,000, and then this board appointed by himself and with the salary fixed by himself could at any time be dismissed by him. He appoints them, he has the power of dismissal, and he has the power of fixing their salary. And yet that great organization, which would be but a puppet of the Secretary of the Treasury, will have the whole business of the country in its grasp. When an administration comes before Congress and asks such authority it seems to me that Members of Congress on both sides of the House might well consider carefully the merits of the question and whether or not authority of that kind should be granted.

Mr. ROBBINS. Who prepared such a bill as that?

Mr. GILLETT. It is prepared by the administration. I can not tell who, but it is sponsored before the committee by the Secretary of the Treasury, its chief beneficiary. All I know is that it is presented as an administration bill, giving the Secretary of the Treasury, who I do not think has the entire confidence of the business world, these unheard of powers.

Now, we on this side have not been backward in giving the President authority. We ought not to be. I recognize that in a time of war the President ought to have very large powers. We certainly have given generously to the administration since this war began powers far beyond what any President of the

United States ever exercised. And I for one expect to continue to grant powers which I deem necessary—not everything, it seems to me, that an administration may ask—but I expect to continue in the future, as I have in the past, to join with that side of the House and loyally grant every dollar which we think he can wisely spend, and to give all the powers which we think are necessary for the prosecution of the war, and to suppress all partisan feeling as far as possible.

But if we granted everything the administration asked this very appropriation bill before us would be \$500,000,000 bigger than it is. The Committee on Appropriations has cut out of it \$500,000,000 which was asked; not because we did not wish to grant the administration everything which we thought they could possibly use, and not from any criticism of the departments in their estimates, but because errors were found—places were found where large amounts could be cut down without any injury to the Government. And therefore, as I say, by refusing to simply blindly grant the requests of the administration we have cut out of this bill \$500,000,000. And last summer we cut out—I do not remember how much, but I venture to say \$1,500,000,000 from the requests that were then made. I do not mean, of course, that that is all saved. Very much of it is postponed, very much of it is uncertain; but, at any rate, for the time being it makes the expenses so definite that you can compare them with the receipts and be able to calculate upon the necessary revenues.

Mr. TOWNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

Mr. TOWNER. In these eliminations which have been made, cutting out the \$500,000,000 from the estimates of the departments, the committee unanimously, without any division, recommends the elimination?

Mr. GILLETT. Certainly.

Mr. TOWNER. So that the eliminations have the approval of both sides of the House?

Mr. GILLETT. Certainly. There never has been since the beginning of this war any partisan division. I think always the Appropriations Committee has been less subject to partisanship than any other committee. But there never has been since the beginning of this war, to my knowledge, the slightest partisan division in the membership of that committee. I am happy to say that the majority of it treat the minority with just as much consideration as if they belonged to their own party, and I think we have tried to cooperate with them, and we have given the administration every dollar which we thought it could wisely expend.

I noticed in the paper last night, in large headlines, that the President had ordered an investigation of the Hog Island yard. Why, my friends, that shows again that Congress ought not entirely to sit here as a rubber stamp for the administration and that the action of our committees is useful, because some weeks ago in this House the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, by unanimous vote I believe, and certainly by no partisan vote, went to the Committee on Rules and asked them to give a rule for the investigation of conditions at Hog Island.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. GILLETT. Yes.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. I know the gentleman desires to be accurate.

Mr. GILLETT. I certainly do.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. The request as it came to the Committee on Rules was not a request for the investigation. It was a request that the Committee on Rules consider a resolution. Subsequently the author of the resolution came before the Committee on Rules and withdrew the request.

Mr. GILLETT. Yes. And I can tell the gentleman, and he probably knows, why he withdrew it. I see no difference in the gentleman's statement and mine, for the gentleman, I am sure, will admit the purpose was for a rule allowing the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to investigate. The reason why that request was withdrawn was that a member of the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries had a consultation with the chairman of the Shipping Board and told him the facts which that committee wished to investigate and the scandals which they thought existed, and the chairman of the Shipping Board asked that he be allowed to make the investigation himself first. And on that assurance the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries did not press their request. But they took the initiative. They had made the request and the chairman of the Shipping Board undertook to make an investigation, and therefore they withdrew their request for an investigation. That was several weeks ago, I think, and now last night the paper said, as if it was a new

thing, "The President has ordered an investigation of the Hog Island scandal."

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. I will say to the gentleman, if he will permit, that I do not know anything about the conference between the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. ENMONDS] and the head of the Shipping Board, Mr. Hurley; but Mr. Hurley appeared before the Committee on Rules and stated that he could see no objection whatever to the investigation; that the investigation which had been carried on by the Senate had been very helpful to the board and he did not oppose in any way action by the Committee on Rules. Nor did the Committee on Rules at any time oppose any investigation. There never was any feeling about the matter.

Mr. GILLET. Exactly. I did not mean to intimate that there was. It was amicably agreed that the chairman of the Shipping Board should make an investigation. I simply use this as an illustration here. So there was something useful that the action of a committee of Congress effected, and that is the attitude which I have assumed on these investigations.

The comments on these investigations are what I object to in that article. These investigations that have caused so much disturbance throughout the country did not originate in partisan feeling. They originated in Democratic committees. Of course, it is always a question to be considered in a war whether you are going to do more good by making an investigation and bringing out disclosures and thereby disquieting the people than by not making the investigation; whether you will do more good and at the same time obtain better results, and whether the obtaining of better results is going to be more important than to excite distress and disquiet among the people. I have felt that it was not for us in the minority to take that responsibility. But I do believe myself that the result of these investigations, judging from the changes that apparently are contemplated by the administration in the War Department, has been helpful.

But I have wandered far afield from what I intended, and that brings me back to my text, this insertion in the Record by a gentleman on that side of the House of charges that I do not believe any man on that side of the House would have wanted to stand up in his seat and make himself, and I think it is unworthy of the gentleman and unwise and objectionable, and I hope it will not be repeated. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. GARNER). The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. GILLET. I yield to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. MONDELL].

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state to the gentleman from Massachusetts that he did not happen to be in the Chair when the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CANNON] was through, but he is informed that the gentleman from Illinois yielded to the gentleman from Massachusetts such time as he might desire.

Mr. GILLET. He did.

The CHAIRMAN. That was 20 minutes. The Chair permitted the gentleman from Massachusetts to run over that time.

Mr. GILLET. When the Chair said my time had expired I asked to be recognized in my own right, and I thought that after that I was talking in my own right.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman desire to yield some of his time?

Mr. GILLET. I desire to yield to the gentleman from Wyoming.

The CHAIRMAN. How much time?

Mr. ROBBINS. Mr. Chairman, how is the time divided in this debate? Is there any limit on it?

The CHAIRMAN. No; only the general rule.

Mr. GILLET. The gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY] consumed two hours and a quarter. I understood the gentleman from Kentucky to say that he hoped to read the bill to-night.

Mr. SHERLEY. I think we can read the bill for an hour to-night.

Mr. GILLET. I yield to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. MONDELL] the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 45 minutes. The gentleman from Wyoming is recognized for 45 minutes.

Mr. MONDELL. Mr. Chairman, on a previous occasion, when we were considering an appropriation bill, I stated, speaking for myself, but I think expressing the views of the members of the committee, that I could not say even in regard to a bill relative to the details of which I might be much more familiar than I am with this bill, that all of the sums proposed to be appropriated were necessary or essential.

The duty of the committee is to scrutinize with care the estimates submitted, and in time of peace the duty of the committee is to guard with very jealous care the Federal Treasury, and to resolve any doubts that they may have in their minds in favor of the Treasury rather than in favor of the estimates.

But in time of war the committee is compelled to adopt a different attitude toward estimates. Its first duty is to see that no sums asked for and necessary, or likely to be necessary, for the prosecution of the war are withheld, and in case of doubt it is the duty of the committee to resolve the doubt in favor of the Government, in favor of the estimates and the opinions of the men who present them.

That is what the committee has done in this bill, as in the case of all other bills that have come before the committee since the war began. It is true there has been a reduction in many of the estimates, more apparent than real in some cases, all of which illustrates how much more careful and thorough and painstaking committees of Congress sometimes are than the gentlemen who prepare estimates, because I believe that the men who appeared before the committee in support of the estimates will admit that after the matter had all been thrashed out and the committee had reached a decision the committee had made a better guess as to the amounts they would be likely to need, even from the standpoint of abundance, than they themselves had made in the original estimates.

Not a necessary dollar has been withheld. Of that I am assured by the gentlemen on the subcommittee who are much more familiar with the items than I can be, and I feel confident of that from what knowledge I have personally of the items in the bill.

The Republican Party, whatever else may be said about it, whatever sins of omission or commission it may have been guilty of as an organization, has beyond all question and controversy been ever and always a party of patriotism. [Applause.] There has never been any question about that in the mind of any honest, unbiased, and unprejudiced well-informed person. The Republican Party during this war is simply marching true to form [applause]; simply pursuing its historic policy; simply maintaining its unvarying and unvaried attitude of patriotism and support of the Government and administration. [Applause.]

Now, the gentlemen on the other side are doing likewise. But it makes a good deal of difference, when you come to all of these matters of legislation and appropriation, whether those who are suggesting and asking for and are to administer and use them are of your own political household of faith or whether they are of another political household. No matter how good a patriot a man may be, if he is a good citizen and worth his salt he is also a partisan, using the term in its proper and best sense, and there is always an inclination to follow your own administration wherever it may lead and whither it may wander, no matter how far afield. There is likewise always a temptation to criticize the opposition, and it is a temptation that within proper lines and limitations should be yielded to, so far as opposition and criticism may be helpful and useful in the establishment of proper policies in the wise development of administrative measures and the economical expenditure of the public money.

As the Republican Party began, so it will continue, so far as this war is concerned and all other wars in which we may ever be involved. It may make other mistakes in other times, but if it remains true to the principles on which it was founded, and which have ever actuated the overwhelming majority of its membership, it will always be found supporting the Government, holding up the arm of those in authority, maintaining the dignity of the Nation, and standing for the honor of the flag. These are somewhat trying times for a patriot, particularly one not of the administration party, but also, I may say in passing, at times for those of the administration party; for revolution succeeds revolution, either in proposal or performance, more rapidly under this flag and in these days than anywhere under popular government. Starting out at the beginning of the war with a Constitution that limited and restricted the powers and prerogatives of Congress, we have been compelled to take a view of the great palladium of our liberties that justified us in granting extraordinary powers to those in control. No sooner do we make one extraordinary grant of power, which seems the very apex and pinnacle, than we are asked to grant other powers that loom so mountain high that the first enactment is as a molehill in comparison. We are asked now, or will be shortly, not only to grant autocratic powers to the President beyond those legally held by any prince or potentate under the sun—we have already done that—but we will be asked to grant powers to reorganize the governmental structure in a way that would leave the President the most unlimited autocrat that the world has seen in many a long day. It may be that a part of these things ought to be done. I am not at this time expressing an opinion.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONDELL. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Does the gentleman desire that last statement to stand fully—to reorganize the entire structure of the Government?

Mr. MONDELL. The administrative structure, perhaps I should have said.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. The Executive.

Mr. MONDELL. Not the judicial structure.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Nor the legislative.

Mr. MONDELL. Well, the legislative structure seems for the time being—and I am not saying that in a criticizing way—to exist only for the purpose of placing autocratic power in the Executive. There is no necessity for changing the legislative structure, so long as the legislative machinery works along the lines of the Executive will in all of these propositions intended to promote executive and administrative power. I thank the gentleman for correcting me, or giving me an opportunity to make a little more clear what I had in mind. And I will say to the gentleman that I am not making any promises or predictions on my own behalf as to what my attitude with regard to those propositions should be. I am simply referring to their very extraordinary character, a character that a short time ago would have shocked us all, but we are getting gradually accustomed to proposals that in other times would have been calculated, as we then viewed the matter, to make the Goddess of Liberty up yonder on the Dome of the Capitol totter on her lofty pedestal. I hope the lady is herself becoming accustomed to these changes, even as we are, because I would not want to have the Dome endangered, or that splendid emblem of liberty unsteady on its foundations.

Mr. SHERLEY. She is used to exalted attitudes.

Mr. MCKENZIE. If the gentleman will permit, is it not a fact that the Republican Party always having stood for and believed in a strong, centralized government, the members of that party received a less shock from some of these proposed reforms than our Democratic brethren, who have always taken the opposite view?

Mr. MONDELL. I think the gentleman is right about that to a certain extent, though we have not stood for an autocratic Government.

Mr. SHERLEY. Does the gentleman's remark, being translated, mean that he is willing to do that in time of peace, when there is no excuse for it?

Mr. MONDELL. That is not so much a matter of party as it is of personal temperament. The gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY], without intending to do it, has cast something of a reflection on these revolutionary performances. Having so far considered, and, finally, with some reluctance, approved and embraced them as necessary in war, I would not venture now to criticize them.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONDELL. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. Are the gentleman from Ohio, the gentleman from Iowa, and myself correct in drawing this conclusion from the profound and philosophic discussion of the gentleman from Wyoming, that there is any general or comprehensive surrender of the Executive jurisdiction of this country?

Mr. MONDELL. I have heard some suggestions that were a little startling, but I think that is the most startling of them all. Has there been any surrender of Executive jurisdiction? Well, not that anybody has heard of.

Mr. MADDEN. Was that a question or a comment?

Mr. MONDELL. A question in the form of a comment, and the questioner knew the answer. Certainly there has been no surrender of Executive jurisdiction, and more power is asked for, and, within certain limits, perhaps it should be granted.

Mr. TOWNER. The inquiry was suggested by the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. GARRETT] as to whether or not the bill to which the gentleman refers was any interference with the powers of the legislative department. I want to call attention, just by way of illustration—

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Will the gentleman permit?

Mr. TOWNER. Did I misunderstand the gentleman from Tennessee?

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. I did not say anything about the bill. I referred to the statement of the gentleman from Wyoming.

Mr. TOWNER. I accept the amendment. Just by way of illustration I should like to call the gentleman's attention to the fact that the bill which we have under consideration makes an appropriation for transportation of the Army of \$125,000,000. Is it not true that if the powers are granted to the President which he desires, he might transfer that appropriation of \$125,000,000 from the transportation of troops to, for instance, the Indian Service or any other service that he desired?

Mr. MONDELL. I think that is undoubtedly true.

Mr. TOWNER. And that would be an entire abrogation to the Executive of appropriations which are specific?

Mr. MONDELL. Assuming that the new organization, or reorganization, or consolidation sought would involve, as I

think it logically would, lump-sum appropriations, that is entirely true. In other words, we could not well appropriate for several branches of the public service under certain heads, and under certain jurisdictions and control, if we had a provision of law whereby all present organizations might be wiped out and those distinctions cease.

Mr. TOWNER. But I will say to the gentleman that that is not left only to inference, because, as I understand the bill, and as it has been published and proposed, it allows the President to transfer these funds by an Executive order, if he so desires.

Mr. GARRETT of Tennessee. Only for the purposes for which they are appropriated, I think.

Mr. MONDELL. Now, while it is true that we, as a party, and gentlemen on both sides, have given the Government all the funds and all the authority and all the man power necessary for the conduct of the war, and shall continue to do so, it is also true that within certain lines, intended to be helpful and constructive, we can not, even while the war is in progress, entirely absolve ourselves from the duty of reasonable criticism. That should be limited to those things which will, as the gentleman from Illinois so well stated a moment ago, be helpful and useful in bringing about reforms.

Mr. LONGWORTH. May I ask the gentleman if another bill recently introduced in Congress, to form a war corporation with \$500,000,000 capital, to be administered by one man, has had the benefit of the gentleman's perusal?

Mr. MONDELL. I must say that I am reserving the shock which I expect to receive when I carefully peruse that bill to a later day.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I think the gentleman, in referring to the bill introduced into another body as being a very great grant of power and authority, will find when he examines this bill more carefully that it confers, on another gentleman it is true, but a member of the family, a far greater power than that which shocked his judgment.

Mr. MONDELL. I think that is probably true, because when in a great industrial country you give control over practically all the industries of the country, you not only grant a most extraordinary power, affecting every individual in the country in his business and in his opportunity to gain a livelihood, but, in addition to that, you place in the hands of the officer who is granted that power, a political power so great that it is altogether possible that it might be so used as to perpetuate a man or party indefinitely. I think that is one of the things that should be very carefully considered, because I hope gentlemen on the Democratic side are no more disposed than gentlemen on the Republican side to create conditions in this country under which men will be greatly tempted to use extraordinary power and authority for the purpose of perpetuating their control. I hope we are all of us willing to take our political chances, and we all realize that it is better for our country that no party shall be so fortified and intrenched that the siege guns and the mortars of an outraged citizenship can not dislodge it from its trench lines and its citadel. [Applause.]

But I am not going to criticize unless I think it will be helpful to better conditions. It requires considerable restraint to withhold criticism when in times like these there is so much that is subject to criticism, but I propose to do it as far as possible and never indulge in criticism except as I hope it may be helpful.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Will the gentleman yield before he goes to another topic?

Mr. MONDELL. I will.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. What does the gentleman think of the practice of a government—I am not speaking of this Government now—in trying to build up public opinion through organs created and managed by itself, as the German Government has done by its control of the press and its publication of articles which originate entirely with the Government, and of course which finds everything the Government does highly satisfactory and worthy of the highest merit?

Mr. MONDELL. I think there will be no disagreement on the proposition that there is very great danger in a press official or otherwise controlled politically by a government by an administration. There is an appropriation bill which we passed regularly through this House that for years has carried legislation which I had some part in framing intending to restrain and control the effort to build up public sentiment favorable to a certain kind of administration. That was in time of peace. We are in war now, and, while I personally think we may be overdoing the matter of official publicity, I think some of it has been helpful and useful in certain lines, and I am not disposed to criticize it, although I do feel that it has gone far afield. Of course, when I say this I do not intend to include the three publicity agents at Hog Island, one drawing a salary of \$10,000,

one at \$7,500, and one \$6,000 a year, whose duty it was to camouflage the situation and cover with an ambuscade of rhetoric and misinformation the patriotic gentlemen who were drawing seven salaries in the alleged behalf of the launching of a merchant marine.

Mr. SLOAN. If the gentleman will yield, I am somewhat concerned about the question submitted by the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GREEN], and I would like to know if he can give the relevancy of that question. I did not understand that there were any publications of that kind in America, and if there are not why take up European government practices as if there were such here in America?

Mr. MONDELL. Well, whatever the facts are let us, for the sake of the argument, assume there are not. [Laughter.]

But there are some things that ought to come out, there are some things that have come out, in regard to some of our cantonments, and shipbuilding, and all that sort of thing, and it is proper they should come out, and they have come out largely through the efforts of Democrats. They have come out in a way I hope may be helpful. You can not properly charge the man at the head of affairs with responsibility for these things. Some of them are perhaps inevitable in times of enormous expansion. The thing to do, when we find them, is to punish the men who are guilty in order that they shall no longer cast discredit on men in authority and bring dishonor to their Government.

There was a cloth-sorting contract made here some time ago. A certain gentleman named Eisenman, of the Council of National Defense, had something to do with it. A gentleman named Pereless, who, it seems, is an organization expert from New York, was invited down here and put in charge of a bureau or division for the reclamation of waste materials. He was given a captain's commission. In due course of time it became his duty to examine into this sorting contract, this contract under which certain gentlemen were to take old uniforms, I believe, and make them over or utilize them as best they could. I know little about the contract. In the course of his service Capt. Pereless made an investigation into this contract. He was called to testify in regard to it before a Senate committee. It is claimed by those who pretend to know that the Government has saved a great deal of money, several millions, by reason of the contract having been annulled or modified. Capt. Pereless was a captain, but he is a captain no longer. He was honorably discharged, it is true, as a man who had so well served his Government should be, but the captain did not want to be separated from the public service. He desired to serve.

He had asked to be put on the inactive list in order that he might secure service somewhere else under the Government, because I assume his service in the particular bureau to which he had been assigned was not altogether pleasant after he had made the investigations and revelations referred to. Instead of a transfer he got a discharge. I commend that particular case to the gentlemen who are responsible under the administration and for the honest conduct of affairs. It may have been entirely proper, but it would be a very unhappy thing at this time of crisis, when we need all of the honest men and all of the careful, painstaking men, and all of the fearless investigators we can get to guard the Government against waste and looting and fraud—it would be most unfortunate in this juncture if it should become known or believed that when men do what they believe to be their duty they soon find themselves separated from the public service and returned to private life. It would be a very sad and unfortunate thing for the country if we should arrive at that condition of affairs, and I hope that some one will investigate that discharged, which is referred to on the first page of one of the morning papers of this city.

Mr. LONGWORTH. May I suggest to the gentleman that he read into his speech the examination in that case?

Mr. MONDELL. I will be glad to do so, if the House will give me that privilege. The portion of the article in the Washington Post of this morning relating to Capt. Pereless's examination is as follows:

SAVED UNITED STATES ABOUT \$2,000,000.

On December 29 he was summoned as a witness before the Senate Military Committee, and described at length the investigation into the sorting plant, the cancellation of which saved the Government about \$2,000,000. The following is the verbatim report of a portion of the testimony, taken from the official committee report:

"Senator McKellar. In your dealings with Mr. Eisenman, was he much interested in this control, retaining this control, through the Base Sorting Plant?"

"Capt. PERELESS. Well, he was very anxious not to have the contract annulled."

"Senator McKellar. What did he say about it?"

RECALLS EISENMAN'S WORDS.

"Capt. PERELESS. I only spoke to him once, when I delivered a letter to him in which the Quartermaster General advised him the contract would be annulled, and he seemed to think it would be a very great mis-

take and a bad thing for the Government; that the Government could not carry on that sorting themselves. He asked me who I reported to and where I got my orders, and he said he would show me where I got my orders."

"Senator McKellar. That he would show you where you got your orders?"

"Capt. PERELESS. Yes, sir."

"Senator McKellar. In other words, he felt offended that you should have brought in any such notice."

"Capt. PERELESS. He probably did not feel I had any authority for doing it, although I had the letter signed by Gen. Sharpe."

"Senator McKellar. And he threatened you for your action in the matter?"

TRANSFER REFUSED HIM.

After this, in January, Capt. Pereless presented a plan for the reorganization of the conservation division, which was not acted upon. Two other men were placed in charge of the reorganization, and Capt. Pereless, who found himself deprived of the opportunity to do the work for which, as an expert, he had been requested to come to Washington, asked to be returned to the inactive list of the Officers' Reserve Corps, with the intention of being assigned to duty in another branch of the service.

Instead, Capt. Pereless received orders giving him an honorable discharge from the Army and dismissing him from the service.

He protested against this discharge, stating that he desired active duty elsewhere. That request was denied.

Naturally the incident has aroused much interest in the Army in view of the testimony of Capt. Pereless before a committee of the United States Senate, where he was summoned to inform Senators of conditions within the department with which he has had to do.

Mr. Chairman, so much for my preface now. I want to discuss an item in the bill, and I may ask the gentleman in charge of the time for a few minutes more in which to discuss it.

Mr. MADDEN. I would like to read the real story if this is but the preface.

Mr. MONDELL. A provision was inserted in the national-defense act which became a law the 17th of last August for a revolving fund of two and a half million dollars, which was to be used for the purpose of purchasing, sorting, storing, and selling seeds for cash. Under that appropriation a large amount of seed corn was secured and a considerable amount of wheat, barley, rye, some cotton, and other seed, and is being distributed and sold. The Department of Agriculture has asked for an additional sum of \$6,000,000 for the same purpose. The committee has reported \$4,000,000 for that purpose. At the proper time I shall ask to increase that amount to \$6,000,000, the amount of the estimate, and shall seek to modify the language somewhat by providing that these seeds in addition to being sold at cost for cash may also be sold on credit not to exceed one year with approved security of local business organizations. I think there is no item in this bill more important in its way than that. Of course, when you are at war the most important items are for guns and powder and uniforms, but at the same time we must sustain the men in the field and we must sustain the populations at home, and we need to encourage agriculture. The item in question has served a useful purpose. It has enabled the department to purchase the seeds and the department is now selling them and will continue to do so. It has obligated the Government in practically the full sum—two and a half million dollars—but can use considerably more.

But so far as a considerable part of the country is concerned, this fund is not available in a satisfactory way so long as the sales must be for cash. There has been a good deal of agitation at one time or another, there always is from time to time when we have droughts, freshets, and that sort of thing, for the free distribution of Government seed. I am one of those who believe we ought to be very careful about making free distributions. They are not very likely to be equitably or wisely distributed. It is not a good thing to get the people to thinking that Uncle Sam is a liberal, not to say spendthrift, father, who can pick dollars off of bushes along the road and hand them out wherever they think they need them. The people of the country, the farmers of the country, hard up as some of them are, are not paupers. I think they want to pay for what they receive. But let me illustrate the condition in a territory some three or four hundred miles wide and stretching from the Canadian border to the Gulf, including the States from Texas north to North Dakota, parts of some eight or nine States. Over a considerable portion of most of those States we have had a condition of drought, very severe in Texas, equally so in some parts of Montana, less severe and less trying in other sections in between. In my own State of Wyoming for a number of years past we have had in several counties local organizations of bankers, merchants, and stockmen who have obligated themselves for a sufficient sum of money to furnish seeds to those who needed them and were unable to purchase and pay cash for them. These local organizations have sold these seeds at cost. They have loaned the money without interest or with a very small interest charge, and in most cases, I believe, they have been successful in securing the return of the loan, all or a very great portion of it.

But there is a condition up there now under which it is more difficult than it ever has been in the past for these local organizations to handle the situation. There are many reasons for that, which I have not the time to discuss, but that such is the fact is known to all of the people of that section. My thought is this: That if we could provide that this fund, or seeds purchased with it, might be loaned on approved security given by business organizations, we could very quickly secure those organizations and thus furnish seeds for which those organizations should become responsible. We might thus very promptly distribute among the farmers of such sections the rye, wheat, sugar-beet seed, potatoes, corn, kaffir corn, millet, and cotton, which they must have if we are to have the maximum production of that great western country. My thought is that the Secretary of Agriculture might call upon such local organizations to inform him as to the amount of money needed in their counties, for instance, assuming the county as the unit of organization for the purpose of securing seed. Local organizations in my State know what is needed, because they have been in the business in the past. The question would be asked of such local organizations, To what extent will you guarantee the Government the return of the funds—\$5,000, \$10,000, \$15,000, or \$20,000—covering the cost of seed needed in that locality by those unable to pay cash? These local organizations could very quickly place before the Secretary statements showing their financial responsibility. They would provide the agency through which the seeds could be distributed. They would be distributed wisely and well through such agencies, because the organization that distributed them would be responsible for the return of the money. I think within 30 days throughout all this section where this help is needed organizations of that kind could be provided.

Of course, where no such help is needed such an organization would not be forthcoming. Where it was needed, public sentiment and the disposition of the business people of the community to meet the needs of the community would immediately lead to the formation of such organization. In my State there are, I believe, several of them that could within a week place before the Secretary every needed evidence of their responsibility. He could furnish them the seed—

Mr. ROBBINS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONDELL. In a moment. Or he could allow them to secure the seeds, giving them the necessary credits, and very promptly the machinery could be put in motion that would get into each section the seed that is needed. Before I yield to the gentleman, may I speak on a line of thought I have in mind? It may be said, if you are to do this in the territory you describe, why not do it everywhere. Because there is this difference in the situation: The country I have mentioned—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MONDELL. Will the gentleman yield me 10 minutes additional?

Mr. SHERLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may continue for 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kentucky asks unanimous consent that the gentleman from Wyoming may continue for 10 minutes. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. MONDELL. I thank the gentleman. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. TOWNER. I was going to make the suggestion that the gentleman ask for time in his own right.

Mr. MONDELL. Why are we asking this kind of aid in that particular section? Because it is a new country; because we have little accumulation of capital. In the older communities of the country, although there may be farmers just as needy as they are in these sections, and no doubt there are, there are men with capital who can handle these matters, who can furnish credit, whereas we are in a position where we lack capital. We lack the capital we have had in past years which has been extending this credit.

Mr. ROBBINS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONDELL. Yes.

Mr. ROBBINS. Is it not a fact that the great difficulty with the American farmer to-day is lack of labor more than lack of seed?

Mr. MONDELL. Well, there is a lack of labor, and there will be a lack of labor; but I do not think we should decline to aid the farmer in securing the seed that he is willing to plant because of the fact that there may be difficulty either in the planting or the harvesting of it. No farmer, as my friend understands, will ask for seed unless he feels reasonably assured he will be able to gather the harvest. No association such as those I have suggested will guarantee repayment except in communities where they feel reasonably confident that there will be labor

enough to gather the harvest. And you would be surprised how the people of a community rise to a situation like this.

The young boys, the girls, the old folks, the clerks, people in all employments give their help in time of need to gather the crops, and to a considerable extent in the planting of them and in the tending of them. I come from a country which mainly gave its quota before the draft, and so we were stripped of the stalwart young fellows early in the conflict. And yet we got along pretty well. I do not think any of our crops were lost because of the lack of labor, but it required the aid and help of everybody in the community. And the communities rose to the occasion. Of course, we brought in help from all directions and we paid perfectly fabulous prices.

Mr. ROBBINS. The trouble with Pennsylvania is this: The State Grange at a session last week passed resolutions from data obtained from members to the effect that they needed 210,000 laborers on the farms of Pennsylvania within the membership of the grange.

Mr. MONDELL. I think that is true, and I think that is a matter we should attend to. What I am interested in now is to get seed, because if we do not have the seed where it is needed there will be no crops. You probably do not have that difficulty, but the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. BAER] knows the situation in his State, as I know it in mine, and that we need the seed, and our people need the aid in securing the seed, and they will be able to pay for it, and local organizations will volunteer to become responsible for the return of the funds and for the handling, administration, and distribution of the seed. All we want is a little credit.

Mr. BAER. Does not the gentleman think that this would bring more valuable results if it were loaned to the farmers on credit to enable them to get food and grain and cotton for our allies than to put it in these vast reservoirs out there where the farmers have not sufficient credit and it will not do any good? That is, if the grain is in the elevators and they have not the cash to buy, it will not do them any good.

Mr. MONDELL. Whatever benefits may follow from other assistance and other help and come from other sources, here, it seems to me, is an opportunity to loan the Federal credit in a way that will certainly bring immediate returns in increased crop production, and it can be done in a way that will guarantee the return of the moneys without loss. Under a procedure of that sort, which is very simple, the Secretary of Agriculture could let it be known that he stood ready to hear from these voluntary associations, not to exceed one in a county, business associations of men who were responsible as to the amount they were willing to guarantee in repayment on seed, and in a very short time the machinery could be set in motion and the seed furnished.

This is a tremendously important thing. I have been hearing from my people for months in this matter of seed. I have said to them that I did not believe that Congress was disposed to make a free-seed distribution; that I doubted the wisdom of that sort of thing.

But there is a way to do it, expeditious, certain, comparatively simple, and I am sure in a great many communities in the State which my friend represents there are volunteer associations of business men and stockmen who would be willing to take this matter up.

Mr. BAER. Does the gentleman's constituents ask for free seed? It is my understanding that my constituents would not take free seed if they could get them. They do not want to be an object of charity. They want to borrow the money to get seed.

Mr. MONDELL. Coming to think of it, I think those people who have suggested free seed come from just over the line; I do not have in mind anybody from Wyoming who has made that suggestion. [Laughter.] But they want an opportunity to plant their fields. They have gone through trying times of drought, and the country is new, and capital is exceedingly limited, and the banks are small.

Mr. COX. How about the labor supply?

Mr. MONDELL. I discussed that with my friend from Pennsylvania awhile ago. If the farmer does not feel that he has labor to plant the fields, he will not want to buy seed, and if a local association that is responsible for the repayment does not believe that the farmer can plant, cultivate, and harvest, it will not help him get the seed.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wyoming has expired. All time has expired. The Clerk will read.

Mr. DILLON. Mr. Chairman, I ask for recognition. I want to speak about 15 minutes.

Mr. SHERLEY. We have had 4 hours and 20 minutes of debate, exactly divided between the two sides. That is very

liberal debate. I hope the gentleman will not prolong the general debate at this time.

Mr. DILLON. I would like to have only 15 minutes.

Mr. SHERLEY. If the gentleman does that, other gentlemen will want time. I do not want to be discourteous to gentlemen, but I am anxious to make progress on the bill.

Mr. DILLON. I have been in attendance for the last four weeks, and I was unable to get a hearing before the Committee on Agriculture. I ask for 15 minutes.

Mr. GILLET. This morning, before any time for debate was fixed, the gentleman from South Dakota had asked for 15 minutes, and he was assured he would get it.

Mr. SHERLEY. Very well. In view of that fact I shall not object.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Dakota asks unanimous consent to address the committee for 15 minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. DILLON. Mr. Chairman, it is constantly asserted that the live-stock market is controlled by the packers. Do these profiteers fix the price the producer is to receive and the price the consumer is to pay? It would seem so.

The cattleman ships his cattle to the stockyards. Wherever the stockyards are located the packing houses have their plants. The buyers of live stock each morning fix the price to be paid for live stock. There is but one price, one lone bidder, and the owner must accept the price offered. Otherwise, he must ship back home, and his losses are beyond repair.

If he ships to another market he finds the same packers, the same profiteers, ready for the big bargains that are to fall into the combination net. They divide among themselves, on the basis of percentage, the live stock coming into the market. They likewise divide the territory and each packer has the exclusive right to sell in his territory. They fix the price for the farmer's stock and likewise the price that the consumer of finished products must pay. Thus they control both ends of the market.

In order to perfect their control they own the market places, stockyards, refrigerator cars, and cold-storage plants. They have driven out of business the small operators who formerly operated slaughterhouses. The local dealer in order to insure a steady supply must now buy from the big packing establishments.

By their combination they control the meat supply from the stockyards to the consumer. No independent operator can break through the operations of these profiteers, who are entrenched behind the market places, the packing plants, the cold-storage plants, and the ownership of the refrigerator cars. They control every artery of trade in these products. In addition to the meat products, they control, in the same manner, all the by-products of the industry, such as lard, hides, fertilizer, and so forth.

The packers, the produce speculators, and the jobbers are in absolute control of all of the instrumentalities of the market. There are 75 cold-storage plants in New York City and 48 in Chicago. In these two large cities are found a combination of food profiteers fixing the selling price of the product in the hands of the producer and likewise fixing the price that the consumer must pay.

The Butter and Egg Board of Chicago fixes the daily price for eggs, butter, and poultry. They gamble in future delivery just the same as is done in the grain products. When these articles are plentiful they fix the price the producer is to receive, and then they buy all the available supply providing for future delivery. Through these gambling devices the price may be forced up or beaten down at the will of the profiteer.

The sale of fictitious eggs is constantly going on in these markets. The honest sale of eggs has almost become a mere incident of the business in these markets. Recent investigation in Chicago disclosed the appalling fact that 4,000 carloads of eggs that had never had any existence were bought and sold on the Chicago Board of Trade.

Every time fictitious eggs are sold the sale is registered and aids in the fixing of prices for the real commodity. On every sale of these fictitious eggs the price is forced up one-half cent to 1 cent per dozen. It is said by one writer that these profiteers on the Easter egg trade alone took \$6,000,000 of excess profits.

Herbert Hoover, before the Senate Committee on Agriculture on June 19, 1917, made the following statement:

Thousands of men in this country who never owned a commodity in their life have bought canned goods, flour, wheat, and every food commodity to speculate for the rise.

He further stated:

Practically the entire wheat supply to Belgium is to-day imported from the United States, and, despite the extraordinary costs of transportation, the price of bread is 60 per cent of the price in New York City. A large portion of the wheat in France comes from this country, and yet the price of bread is, again, 40 per cent below our own. In England, where food control was started too late, the price is 30 per

cent below our price, and in Canada, again, we see a lower range of prices to the consumer than in our own country, although the producer realizes the same price.

John J. Dillon, former commissioner of foods of New York State, says the food exchanges are "gambling dens."

It is said that New York City food profiteers one week in November, 1916, on the item of eggs alone, took a toll of \$1,000,000. These eggs were purchased at about 17 cents per dozen and sold at 60 to 70 cents per dozen, after having been held for months. Investigation shows that it costs 2 cents per dozen to hold eggs for 10 months.

It is estimated that the people of New York City would save \$10,000,000 on eggs, \$7,000,000 on live poultry, and \$10,000,000 on dressed poultry annually by establishing municipal cold-storage plants. Apples are sold in the fall of the year for three to five dollars per barrel. The consumer later pays twelve to fifteen dollars for the same apples.

The earnings of Armour & Co. in 1914 were \$7,500,000, while in 1916 they were \$20,100,000. Swift & Co. earned in 1914, \$9,450,000, in 1916 they earned \$20,465,000. In 1914 the United Fruit Co. earned \$2,264,000 and in 1916 they earned \$11,943,000. This is what the profiteers are doing to the producer and the consumer.

During the canning season, when the price is at the lowest point, the jobbers buy all the product of the plants engaged in canning fruits and vegetables. After the season is over they fix their own price by gentlemen's agreements and the consumer is forced to pay the price the combination fixes. There is no real competition in the jobbing trade on food products.

On account of market conditions vegetables and fruits frequently sell on the market at high prices while the supply is so great that it is rotting on the farms. The food speculators would rather destroy produce than lower the price to the consumer. Our system of distribution has broken down. From all parts of the country comes a demand for some new method of distribution to take the place of the inefficient, worn-out method now in use.

The middlemen have taken possession of the market places and converted them into veritable gambling dens. Nothing except the lash of public opinion will drive them from these public places. The producer must carry his products closer to the consumer, and the consumer must get in closer touch with the producer. Cooperative buying agencies and cooperative selling agencies is one solution of this difficult problem. Through these agencies the profiteer can be eliminated.

It is doubtful if any one can defend the present market system. It is doubtful if a system of markets can be successfully regulated by law. Cooperative methods, if they can be properly financed, ought to remedy the evils existing in our market system. If success can not be acquired along cooperative lines the people will ultimately demand Government control and ownership of cold-storage plants, terminal markets, and public warehouses, operated either by State or National Government. When so operated the gambling dens, the combination of profiteers, and speculators in food products will be eliminated in favor of the producer and consumer. Give the farmer an honest market and he will produce the food. [Applause.]

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DILLON. Yes.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I suggest to the gentleman from South Dakota that if some of these profiteers who are robbing the people were put in the penitentiary, where they belong, it might help the situation also.

Mr. DILLON. I think it would. I think it ought to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

For expenses of experimental work and investigations undertaken by the Council of National Defense, by the advisory commission, or subordinate bodies; for the employment of a director, secretary, chief clerk, expert, clerical, and other assistance, equipment and supplies, including law books, books of reference, newspapers, and periodicals; subsistence and travel, including the expenses of members of the advisory commission or subordinate bodies going to and attending meetings of the advisory commission or subordinate bodies; rent of offices and grounds; repairs and upkeep of buildings occupied by the council; and printing and binding done at the Government Printing Office, \$250,000.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts moves to strike out the last word.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I was unfortunate not to hear the very able speech of the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY], so that I do not know just to what extent he went into some of these various items, but I desire to ask him with reference to this particular appropriation, and to inquire just

what experimental work is being conducted, and whether it comprehends activities by some of the various subcommittees or advisory bodies relating to war problems or tests made of materials used by the War Department?

Mr. SHERLEY. The gentleman means tests by the Council of National Defense?

Mr. WALSH. Yes; under this item.

Mr. SHERLEY. I do not recall that there was any testimony touching the activities of the council in the way of experimental work. There is being done quite a bit of experimental work of a very valuable character by the Bureau of Standards, and some of that may have come about through direction of the council, but I think it more likely to have come as the direct result of the War Department's suggestions or requests.

Mr. WALSH. Would that come out of that appropriation?

Mr. SHERLEY. No. The language that has struck the gentleman is simply the language that was used in the first instance touching the Council of National Defense, and this \$250,000 is largely for the pay of employees and clerks of the various committees under the Council of National Defense. The gentleman will find in the hearings a very interesting account by Mr. Gifford, the director of the Council of National Defense, touching its existing organization and touching the elimination of committees—the subsidiary committees that grew up under the advisory commission. The gentleman will recall that it is both a council and an advisory commission.

Mr. WALSH. Yes.

Mr. SHERLEY. There has been some criticism in the past of the advisory committees because they were composed of men largely representing industries with which they were supposed to deal. Most of these committees have now distributed their duties and the organizations which speak for these industries have no governmental connection. Those former committees have largely been eliminated. The gentleman will find an interesting statement along that line.

Mr. WALSH. This general reorganization that has been effected, I suppose, is set forth in the hearings?

Mr. SHERLEY. There is an attempt by question and answer to give a clear view of the existing relationship of the council and the subsidiary committees to the organization. It is set out in some detail. The statement by Mr. Gifford is a very creditable one. He made a very enlightening statement.

Mr. WALSH. I understand he is still the director?

Mr. SHERLEY. He is still the director.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my pro forma amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's pro forma amendment is withdrawn.

Mr. BLACK. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the gentleman a question right there. What limit is there on the item of subsistence in this paragraph? Is there any limitation by law as to how much could be allowed per day from this amount?

Mr. SHERLEY. Four dollars' per diem allowance in lieu of subsistence or \$5 of actual expense. That is the law.

Mr. BLACK. That is the law, and they could not exceed that amount?

Mr. SHERLEY. That is my understanding.

Mr. BLACK. It would not be necessary to put in any limitation?

Mr. SHERLEY. I think not. I think at some time we shall have to enlarge that limitation of \$4 in connection with certain classes of people, because I think it is not covering their actual expenses in some instances; but I think the limitation as it exists applies to the council without need of further legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS.

The limitation upon the amount which may be expended for office rent in the District of Columbia for the fiscal year 1918, contained in the naval appropriation act approved March 4, 1917, is increased from \$1,500 to \$2,332.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. I rise to obtain information from the chairman of the committee as to whether the subcommittee made any provision or any inquiry as to allowing additional rental to the Vocational Educational Board?

Mr. SHERLEY. No; we did not.

Mr. STAFFORD. There is a bill pending in the House granting them additional authority for rental purposes in the District of Columbia, and I wished to know whether the committee took any action on that subject.

Mr. SHERLEY. We did not, because there was nothing formal before the committee. A gentleman called informally to see me touching the matter to which the gentleman from Wisconsin refers. That bill, in my judgment, ought not to become a law, because it would take all the funds that they have avail-

able for this purpose. Something undoubtedly ought to be done in connection with taking care of their rent situation, but the committee did not and ought not to consider matters that do not come before them in the regular way. At the time I had the talk with the gentleman I suggested that the way that matter would probably be considered would be by the submission of a proper estimate; and I still think that is the way to have it considered.

Mr. STAFFORD. The gentleman recognizes the need of some authorization to this board to provide authority for them to pay for their present quarters.

Mr. SHERLEY. They have an actual deficiency and it will have to be paid; but there are some things in connection with that situation that I think are not altogether to be commended. The committee did not feel that they ought to deal with the matter without a formal request.

I will say further, in reply to the gentleman, that there are a number of things that will probably have to be picked up in the Senate. The committee found itself in a situation where, if it was to report the bill at all, it had to draw a dead line touching new estimates. We could be considering this bill yet if we had permitted the departments to continue to send estimates down; so we finally served notice that estimates that came in thereafter fell outside the dead line and that they would have to be taken up in the Senate.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the pro forma amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

For additional employees in the Department of State, \$50,000: *Provided*, That not more than four persons shall be employed hereunder at a rate of compensation exceeding \$1,800 per annum.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. Will the chairman of the committee kindly explain the reason for granting to the Department of State this additional \$50,000 for clerical services here in the District of Columbia?

Mr. SHERLEY. A part of it was for the purpose of providing for the continuation of the pay of employees that they now have. A part of it represents an increase in the number of such employees. Broadly speaking, the situation is this: The State Department has had and will continue to have a very great expansion under present conditions, and it was important that they not only have additional clerical help, but that to a limited extent they have additional high-paid help, and therefore the provision is carried that not more than four persons may be employed hereunder at a rate of compensation exceeding \$1,800 per annum. The reason for this is that there is a certain character of confidential work, the gathering together of intelligences that come to the Government not only through the State Department but through naval and military sources, and work in connection with the War-Trade Board, that require men of very high grade, who could not be expected to be obtained for \$1,800.

Mr. STAFFORD. I assume that these employees are to be engaged in clerical work? Or will they be employed in other capacities?

Mr. SHERLEY. Most of them will be clerks, except these four, who will be engaged in work of a good deal higher order than just purely clerical work. And as I stated, a large part of it will be in connection with the handling and arranging of the intelligences that are received through the State, military, naval, and other agencies of the Government, and which the gentleman will appreciate is a matter of first magnitude and value at this time.

Mr. STAFFORD. We have had this very problem under consideration in connection with the framing of the legislative appropriation bill. The estimate in that connection is for \$120,000 and the revised estimate for the next fiscal year is \$264,000. The phraseology is somewhat different, and I was wondering whether there is any need of having it in the form of additional employees. As carried in the estimate for the legislative bill the phraseology is "for additional clerical services, to be expended in the discretion of the Secretary of State."

Mr. SHERLEY. As I recall, the request before the subcommittee of which the gentleman is a member was to change the language in which the estimate was originally submitted into language corresponding with this which is now carried in this bill.

Mr. STAFFORD. That may be.

Mr. SHERLEY. I think the gentleman will find that is the situation.

Mr. STAFFORD. I have a note on my copy of the bill, making some suggestions along that line, but I do not recall distinctly whether we were to strike out "clerical services," and just say "additional employees."

Mr. SHERLEY. I think it was desired that we should use the language employed herein.

Mr. STAFFORD. I withdraw the pro forma amendment.

Mr. MONDELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wyoming?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read as follows:

Post allowances to consular and diplomatic officers: To enable the President, in his discretion and in accordance with such regulations as he may prescribe, to make special allowances by way of additional compensation to consular and diplomatic officers in order to adjust their official income to the ascertained cost of living at the posts to which they may be assigned, \$400,000.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. I notice that the committee has extended the authority of the existing phraseology in the diplomatic bill so as to authorize the Department of State to increase the salaries of the consular and diplomatic representatives at all posts rather than the authority, as conferred in the last Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill, to our consular and diplomatic officers of a belligerent country and countries adjacent thereto.

Mr. SHERLEY. This language is in exact accord with the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill as it passed the House. The reason for the change in that bill and in this was this: The need was not confined simply to belligerent countries and to nonbelligerent countries designated heretofore. For instance, there are South American countries where the condition is more acute than it is abroad in the warring countries and countries adjacent to the warring countries. A statement presented by the State Department was of such unquestioned need that we could not do otherwise. For instance, it developed in one instance that there was a loss on exchange of 25 per cent. In other words, the salary of the man stationed there was reduced 25 per cent by the exchange loss. We simply allowed a sum that, in the discretion of the Secretary of State, might enable him to equitably deal with these people.

Mr. STAFFORD. Did the Secretary of State advise the committee whether he intended to pursue a uniform policy in all countries with reference to the salaries of diplomatic and consular representatives?

Mr. SHERLEY. No; I do not know that it is possible to pursue a uniform course. I do say that it would be dependent on the actual situation and need. There are some places where a very slight increase might be necessary, or none at all, and there are other places where there would have to be a large allowance made. There was no way of our undertaking to determine the matter except by general consideration of the situation and the appropriation of a sum that would not permit of great extravagance and yet would relieve the situation.

Mr. STAFFORD. In the bill which passed the House last Saturday, the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill, there is an authorization of \$800,000, which is virtually 50 per cent of the salaries paid to the consular and diplomatic officers.

Mr. SHERLEY. I think the gentleman is mistaken in his figures.

Mr. STAFFORD. I have the bill here.

Mr. SHERLEY. Not mistaken in the amount of \$800,000, but the amount of the salaries to the consular and diplomatic officers—it is more than \$1,600,000 I think.

Mr. STAFFORD. I will give the gentleman the figures carried in the bill. There is \$534,350 to ambassadors and ministers, and for consular officers, \$1,208,500.

Mr. SHERLEY. There are quite a number of other officers that the gentleman has not enumerated.

Mr. STAFFORD. This phraseology only goes to post allowances for consular and diplomatic officers.

Mr. SHERLEY. The post allowance does not mean that it is limited simply to the salaries of consular and diplomatic officers. It relates to other employees of the embassy.

Mr. STAFFORD. Is the phraseology broad enough to warrant that?

Mr. SHERLEY. I think so, unquestionably. We have been acting under it, and we appropriated \$100,000 for officers in China and \$200,000 for officers of belligerent countries at the last session.

Mr. STAFFORD. I wish to have the gentleman's opinion as to whether this phraseology carried in this bill, as well as in the Diplomatic and Consular appropriation bill, is broad enough to allow an allowance to others than the consular and diplomatic officers.

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; it says for post allowances. That means for the post; it does not mean for consular and diplomatic officers alone.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. STAFFORD. I ask for three minutes more.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin asks for three minutes more. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. FLOOD. The secretary to the embassy and legation is a diplomatic officer?

Mr. STAFFORD. Yes.

Mr. SHERLEY. It is a post allowance and not to consular and diplomatic officers alone. In other words, the allowance is to the post. It is not simply to increase the salary of the diplomatic officer and the consular officer, but also for his employees at the different posts.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Does that include the minister or the ambassador?

Mr. SHERLEY. It might include him, but in point of fact it was not intended to include him.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Does it include him, and have any of these salaries been raised?

Mr. SHERLEY. Not that I know of, but the language is broad enough to deal with all of them.

Mr. LONGWORTH. They certainly ought to be, and I would be glad to know that some of them had been included.

Mr. FLOOD. It has not been paid to the minister or to the ambassador.

Mr. STAFFORD. If the gentleman will read the qualifying language after the title he will find that the phraseology is limited to make special allowances by way of additional compensation to consular and diplomatic officers in order to adjust their official income to the ascertained cost of living at posts to which they may be assigned.

Mr. SHERLEY. I think the word "officers" there means clerks, as well as diplomatic and consular officers.

Mr. STAFFORD. It does not say "officer"; it says "officers."

Mr. SHERLEY. "Officers" means more than simply the head officer. The clerk is an officer within the meaning of this.

Mr. STAFFORD. I would not construe the word "clerk" to be an officer.

Mr. SHERLEY. It has been so construed. The gentleman can be perfectly sure that if that were not true the State Department would have asked for a change of language.

Mr. STAFFORD. I am glad to have the statement of the gentleman that this authorization means not only, as it apparently does on its face, to provide additional compensation to officers, but that it can be used also for the secretarial force or the clerical force.

Mr. SHERLEY. They need it more than the others.

Mr. STAFFORD. I know that, but there is no provision in express language covering their cases.

Mr. SHERLEY. I think it does cover their cases.

Mr. LONGWORTH. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Flood] says these are never paid to the ministers or ambassadors.

Mr. FLOOD. I say it has not yet.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Therefore it must be paid to the clerks and secretaries.

The Clerk read as follows:

For washing and hemming towels, purchase of awnings and fixtures, window shades and fixtures, alcohol, benzine, turpentine, varnish, baskets, belting, bellows, bowls, brooms, buckets, brushes, canvas, crash, cloth, chamol skins, cotton waste, door and window fasteners, dusters; flower-garden, street, and engine hose; lace leather, lye, nails, oils, plants, picks, pitchers, powders, stencil plates, hand stamps and repairs of same, spittoons, soap, matches, match safes, sponges, tacks, traps, thermometers, toilet paper, tools, towels, towel racks, tumblers, wire, zinc, and for blacksmithing, repairs of machinery, removal of rubbish, sharpening tools, street car tickets not exceeding \$250, advertising for proposals, and for sales at public auction in Washington, D. C., of condemned property belonging to the Treasury Department, payment of auctioneer fees, and purchase of other absolutely necessary articles, \$3,500.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

I notice in this item and in one or two other items in the bill, an amount specified for street car tickets. I wish to ask if it is the practice to pay the street car transportation of the employees in these departments, or for what purpose these street car tickets are used?

Mr. SHERLEY. That is the usual language carried in the regular appropriation. The enumeration was to prevent the amount being exceeded, and simply applies to those cases where messengers or employees are sent on official business and are given street car tickets for that purpose. It is not the practice nor should it be the practice to pay the car fare of employees generally.

The Clerk read as follows:

For salaries of officers and employees, \$1,268,000; furniture, equipment, and supplies, including not exceeding \$100 for street car tickets, \$121,000; traveling expenses, including not exceeding \$4 per diem in lieu of subsistence, \$24,000; telegraph and telephone service, \$4,800; stationery and miscellaneous expenses, including subscriptions to periodicals, \$20,000; printing and binding, \$60,000; rental of quarters, \$40,000; in all, \$1,537,800.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word in order to ask the chairman of the committee if this appropriation is to cover a deficiency in salaries of officers and employees, in addition to the appropriation which was made when that bureau was authorized?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes. The money that was appropriated then would not have carried it to any extent. Two hundred and fifty thousand dollars was given, and they have had \$500,000 from the President, which I spoke of in my general address, and which they asked to have returned, but which we are not returning. This sum of \$1,537,800 is to carry them up to July. I think this ought to be said about the War-Risk Bureau: They have had a very unusual task. It is no small matter to organize a bureau to deal with a million or more of men in the service, to arrange the allowances that should be made to dependents under the law, to take care of the insurance phase of the law, and to carry on the other activities that existed under the old law relative to insurance of ships and crews. They are getting under way and have now gotten out all of the November and December checks. They have been aided in their organization by the Bureau of Efficiency. The hearings disclose some of the problems and some of the waste that they have undertaken to meet. They have been seriously handicapped by lack of space, and they should and will have, I hope, before we are through, housing capacity in a fireproof building.

They are now scattered around through the National Museum and a number of other places. They have been doing an efficient work, considering their difficulties. The committee allowed them all that they thought they could properly expend between now and July 1, because we believed that everybody in this Congress and this country wanted to make sure the prompt and efficient payment of moneys to the dependents of the boys who were at the front. We have not tried to restrict them unnecessarily. We hope we have supplied them with funds enough for them to go forward economically and take care of this work.

Mr. WALSH. Can the gentleman state the number of employees in this very important bureau?

Mr. SHERLEY. They have about 1,700 now. The gentleman will find in the hearings a detailed statement as to the number and compensation of employees at that time. They expect to have about 1,200 more employees.

Mr. TREADWAY. Will the gentleman allow me to state that it so happened that I made an inquiry of the department on that very question last Saturday, and at that time they had over 2,000 employees and had issued \$7,000,000,000 of insurance.

Mr. SHERLEY. The gentleman's information is a month later than mine. I, of necessity, have to speak of the date of the hearing, and that was about a month ago. At that time they had 1,700.

Mr. TREADWAY. I had the information last Saturday night, and they had then over 2,000.

Mr. WALSH. I am indebted to the gentleman from Kentucky for the information he has given and agree with him that there should be no desire to be parsimonious in the allowance to this bureau. And I am also very much interested to learn that the delay in sending out these checks is being obviated, because I have had several communications and inquiries in reference to the allotment to soldiers, and I understand the delay—

Mr. SHERLEY. I think they are catching up very rapidly, and they expect to be able to stay current. I want to say another thing that may interest the gentleman. I suggested during the hearing, and probably it had been suggested before, that it was greatly desirable that every soldier should have a number that he should always retain, and that the attempt to classify him by name, regiment, company, State, or locality would end necessarily in confusion. That prophecy was more than verified by the very unfortunate loss of life recently in connection with the sinking of one of our transports.

It is my understanding now that the War Department proposes, in connection with the Bureau of War-Risk Insurance, to give a number, which shall remain the same always, to all of our men in the service.

Mr. WALSH. And that will be done for the military branch of the service, for identification for all purposes.

Mr. SHERLEY. The same number will be used always and will make a perfect identification.

Mr. WALSH. I withdraw the pro forma amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

For additional clerks from March 1 to June 30, 1918, inclusive, at rates of compensation as follows: Clerks—1 of class 4 and 1 of class 1; in all, \$1,000.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word in order to ask the chairman of the committee if any request was made from the Secret Service Division of the Treasury for an appropriation to permit that division or branch of the department to increase its force of secret-service men. I understand that they do not have a very large force of men, and that a great deal of the so-called secret-service work is being performed by the bureau in the Department of Justice, and upon inquiry which I have made from time to time of the Treasury Department they stated that they are not able to increase their force because the appropriation is so limited.

Mr. SHERLEY. They did not ask in this bill for anything of the kind. They asked for \$1,500, which was based on the additional clerks needed from January to June 30, and we gave them \$1,000, because this bill will not become a law before March, and, figuring at the rate of four months instead of six months, it makes \$1,000.

Mr. WALSH. Does the gentleman know in connection with any other measure which may come from his committee whether there is any proposition to increase the number of employees in that bureau?

Mr. SHERLEY. My impression is there is an increase asked in the sundry civil bill.

We increased their number slightly last year, and as far as I understand there is a request for an increase now.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the pro forma amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

The unexpended balance of appropriation of \$100,000 contained in the deficiency appropriation act approved October 6, 1917, for repairs, alterations, and extensions of certain buildings and their equipment belonging to the United States on squares No. 226 and No. 228 in the city of Washington, is made available for the repair, alteration, and extension of such buildings and their equipment belonging to the United States on square No. 227, in the city of Washington, as the Secretary of the Treasury may designate, to fit them for temporary use by the Treasury Department.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. Will the gentleman state where these buildings are located?

Mr. SHERLEY. These buildings are located catcorner from the Treasury Department at Fifteenth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, and extend southerly. There are three squares of buildings there. The old Poli Theater is on part of it. And in that connection I want to say for the benefit of the gentleman and the committee that there has been submitted to the Congress an estimate from the Treasury Department looking to the acquisition of the Arlington site and the erection there of a building for the housing of the Internal Revenue Bureau and the War-Risk Insurance Bureau.

Mr. WALSH. The Hotel Arlington?

Mr. SHERLEY. Where the old Hotel Arlington was. That estimate came to the committee too late for it to give it consideration, and it is too important a matter to be acted on without full hearing and consideration. The proposal is for an expenditure of about \$4,200,000, which would acquire the land and give us a 10-story building and an annex.

Mr. WALSH. Will the gentleman permit an interruption? Is not there a building in the process of erection?

Mr. SHERLEY. There is, but it is only in process of erection, and this would acquire the ground and take over the contracts and the fabricated steel—some 80 or 90 per cent of which is already fabricated—and may offer the solution of the housing needs of the Treasury Department, because the proposals made in this bill for buildings are not sufficient to take care of the Treasury needs.

Mr. WALSH. That would be a fireproof building?

Mr. SHERLEY. A permanent building.

Mr. NORTON. As to the building that is going up on the Arlington site now, south of the University Club, has the contract been made for the rent of that by the Government?

Mr. SHERLEY. No; I was just saying that an estimate had been submitted by the Treasury Department asking for an appropriation of \$4,200,000 for the acquiring of the property and taking over of the contract for certain portions of the material, and erecting that building to some 10 stories in height.

Mr. NORTON. The building that is now being put up there is being put up, I understand, by private parties, with the expectation of renting it, though, to the Federal Government.

Mr. SHERLEY. I do not know anything about their expectations. There has no assurance been given of any kind, and there is no authority as yet for the rental of it.

Mr. WALSH. Will the gentleman permit? Is it being built as an office building or as a hotel? I refer to this building that is in the course of erection.

Mr. SHERLEY. It started out originally as a hotel, I think, but is now being erected as an office building.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment.

In the committee this afternoon we had up the subject, and perhaps the chairman of the committee made investigations in his subcommittee as to the Government taking possession of the property to the west of the Poli Theater that for a number of years has been occupied by a moderate-priced hotel. That property would be suitable, I would say, for office purposes, and no testimony has ever been advanced by any of the Treasury officials as to whether that property was available for office purposes or not.

Mr. SHERLEY. I will say to the gentleman that I have made no personal investigation, but it is my understanding that the Treasury Department did, and reported that the size of the rooms and the character of them were such as not to make it worth while to take over the property. It is under a lease, which can be canceled, of course, but I think there is a 30-day limit to it. Now, personally, I know nothing as to the property. I understand the rental is a fair rental as rentals went in the old days, and that the property is not of such a character as to lend itself readily to use by the Government for office purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Detroit, Mich.: Attendants' quarters building, \$31,500.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire of the chairman of the committee when he expects the committee to rise?

Mr. SHERLEY. I will say to the gentleman that I hope very shortly to move to rise. I thought we might run through some of these Treasury items, which would carry us to the District of Columbia items, and the committee could then rise. That will probably take five minutes, unless we strike something that is a matter of controversy, in which event I will move to rise then.

The Clerk read as follows:

New York (Stapleton): Remodeling old white house for attendants' quarters, psychiatric units, female nurses' quarters, ambulance house, junior medical officers' quarters (temporary), temporary hospital ward unit, and approach work; mechanical equipment, including refrigerating plant, telephone and bedside call systems, \$256,500; miscellaneous furniture and equipment, \$45,000; in all, \$301,500.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts moves to strike out the last word.

Mr. WALSH. Can the gentleman from Kentucky state what the general policy of the department is with reference to the extension and remodeling of these marine hospitals?

Mr. SHERLEY. It was to provide for an increase of 744 beds in the marine hospitals. There has been an increased demand upon the marine hospitals, aside from the demands that would come incident to the war. Under our compensation law governmental employees who are injured are eligible to treatment in such hospitals, and then the growth of the merchant marine and the growth of the naval service have put added demands upon the marine hospitals.

The Public Health Service presented plans for the improvement of a number of marine hospitals. The gentleman will find them enumerated throughout the bill. We allowed them, with a cut of practically 10 per cent that was made because there were certain items in connection with officers' quarters and attendants' quarters that seemed to us to be extravagant. I recall that at Boston, Mass., it was proposed to build a \$16,000 frame house of eight rooms. The committee thought that a little skill would enable them to build an eight-room frame house for less than \$16,000. They considered the matter carefully, and were led to believe that the necessary quarters can be provided without spending so much money from the Treasury. We feel sure that can be done.

Mr. WALSH. Can the gentleman state whether the extension or remodeling of these marine hospitals was induced by a possible demand owing to the return in the future of men injured in the service?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes. There has been a presidential order making the marine hospitals open for the use of the Navy, and I have no doubt that if the need should arise they could be used for the Army as well, and probably will be.

Mr. WALSH. I assume that in this remodeling it is an attempt to modernize the equipment?

Mr. SHERLEY. It is in a sense; but the gentleman will find the details set out under each heading. The purpose largely was to increase bed capacity.

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the pro forma amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

Mr. TREADWAY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman from Kentucky how much longer he desires the committee to sit before he will move to rise?

Mr. SHERLEY. I just stated that if we could read until we reached the heading, "District of Columbia," on page 13, I would move to rise. It will take only a few minutes.

Mr. TREADWAY. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

ENGRAVING AND PRINTING.

For engravers' and printers' materials and other materials except distinctive paper, miscellaneous expenses, including paper for internal-revenue stamps, and for purchase, maintenance, and driving of necessary motor-propelled and horse-drawn passenger-carrying vehicles, when, in writing, ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury, \$400,000, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin moves to strike out the last word.

Mr. STAFFORD. I wish to inquire as to what is the reason for authorizing the purchase of passenger-carrying vehicles under the Bureau of Engraving and Printing?

Mr. SHERLEY. That is just the usual language. It is the current language. This \$400,000 was not for commercial vehicles at all.

Mr. STAFFORD. That was the purpose of my inquiry, whether it was planned to authorize the Bureau or the Director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to purchase a passenger-carrying vehicle.

Mr. SHERLEY. It was not. If we had changed the language it probably would mean the opening of a new account on the Treasury books.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

District of Columbia.

Mr. SHERLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GARNER, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill (H. R. 9367) making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, and prior fiscal years, on account of war expenses, and for other purposes, and had come to no resolution thereon.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to Mr. JONES of Texas for 10 days, on account of serious illness in his family.

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR 1918.

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following letter:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 11, 1918.

The SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SIR: At the request of the Secretary of the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, I have the honor to inclose herewith, for the information of the House of Representatives, a copy of a circular issued by the Nobel Committee furnishing information as to the distribution of the Nobel peace prize for the year 1918.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your obedient servant,

ROBERT LANSING.

[Det Norske Stortings Nobelkomité. Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament.]

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE.

All proposals of candidates for the Nobel peace prize, which is to be distributed December 10, 1918, must, in order to be taken into consideration, be laid before the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament by a duly qualified person before the 1st of February of the same year.

Any one of the following persons is held to be duly qualified: (a) Members and late members of the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, as well as the advisers appointed at the Norwegian Nobel Institute; (b) members of Parliament and members of government of the different States, as well as members of the Interparliamentary Union; (c) members of the International Arbitration Court at The Hague; (d) members of the commission of the Permanent International Peace Bureau; (e) members and associates of the Institute of International Law; (f) university professors of political science and of law, of history, and of philosophy; and (g) persons who have received the Nobel peace prize.

The Nobel peace prize may also be accorded to institutions or associations. According to the Code of Statutes, section 8, the grounds upon which any proposal is made must be stated and handed in along with such papers and other documents as may therein be referred to.

According to section 3, every written work to qualify for a prize must have appeared in print.
For particulars qualified persons are requested to apply to the office of the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, Drammensvei 19, Kristiania.

LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS.

Mr. EAGLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record by printing a communication addressed to the President and to the Members of Congress by the executive committee of the Socialist Party of the United States under date of February 9, 1918, and a copy of my reply thereto.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record by printing an address by the executive committee of the Socialist Party of the United States to the President and Congress and the reply of the gentleman from Texas to the same. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. BLACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my colleague [Mr. Jones of Texas] be permitted to extend his remarks in the Record by printing a letter recently addressed to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The SPEAKER. Whose letter?

Mr. BLACK. The letter of my colleague [Mr. Jones of Texas].

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Black] asks unanimous consent that his colleague [Mr. Jones of Texas] be permitted to extend his remarks in the Record by printing a letter written by him to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Is there objection?

Mr. WALSH. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, upon what subject?

Mr. BLACK. It is a short letter in reference to a peace resolution introduced last August.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

Mr. WALSH. I object.

ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. SHERLEY. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 10 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, February 16, 1918, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1. A letter from the treasurer of the Washington-Virginia Railway Co., transmitting report of the Washington-Virginia Railway Co. for the year ending December 31, 1917 (H. Doc. No. 935); to the Committee on the District of Columbia and ordered to be printed.

2. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting deficiency estimate of appropriation required by the United States Public Health Service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, for maintenance and ordinary expenses of the Quarantine Service (H. Doc. No. 936); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. FERRIS, from the Committee on Public Lands, to which was referred the Senate joint resolution (S. J. Res. 104) authorizing the assistant to the Secretary of the Interior to sign official papers and documents, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 316), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. HAMLIN, from the Committee on the Territories, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 9832) to authorize the incorporated town of Seward, Alaska, to issue bonds in any sum not exceeding \$25,000 for the purpose of constructing dikes, flumes, and other works to confine the waters of Lowell Creek for the protection of said town, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 317), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. LANGLEY, from the Committee on Invalid Pensions, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 7738) to increase the rate of pension allowed to Army nurses, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 318), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. MCCLINTIC: A bill (H. R. 9897) to authorize the contesting and cancellation of certain homestead entries, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Public Lands.

By Mr. DENT: A bill (H. R. 9898) to establish in the Coast Artillery Corps of the Regular Army an Army mine-planter service; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9899) authorizing appropriations made for the national security and defense to be used for the purchase of real estate, or the use thereof, when such purpose is not specifically stated in said appropriation; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9900) authorizing the President during the existing emergency to sell war supplies, materials, and equipment heretofore or hereafter purchased, acquired, or manufactured by the United States; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9901) to give indemnity for damages caused by American forces abroad; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9902) to amend section 8 of an act entitled "An act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States," approved May 18, 1917; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9903) to provide for restoration to their former grades of enlisted men discharged to accept commissions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9904) to amend present laws restricting the purchase and distribution of military stores and supplies, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9905) to provide quarters or commutation thereof to commissioned officers in certain cases; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. TINKHAM: A bill (H. R. 9906) providing that post-office laborers be allowed a competitive examination for promotion; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. GOULD: A bill (H. R. 9907) providing commutation of quarters for officers of the Army during the period of war; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. ROWE: A bill (H. R. 9908) to amend sections 4402, 4404, and 4414 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. CANNON: Resolution (H. Res. 250) for the relief of Mary M. Savoy; to the Committee on Accounts.

By Mr. EMERSON: Joint resolution (H. J. Res. 247) to investigate the Brude lifeboat; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. O'SHAUNESSY: Memorial of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island indorsing the so-called daylight-saving bill now before Congress, and urging the Senators and Representatives from that State to give it their cordial support; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. STINESS: Memorial of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island, indorsing the so-called daylight-saving bill now before Congress and urging the Senators and Representatives from that State to give it their cordial support; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island: Memorial of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island, indorsing the so-called daylight-saving bill now before Congress and urging the Senators and Representatives from that State to give it their cordial support; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DILL: A bill (H. R. 9909) granting a pension to Thomas W. Atchley; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. FERRIS: A bill (H. R. 9910) granting an increase of pension to John Short; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FOSTER: A bill (H. R. 9911) granting an increase of pension to John A. J. Hicks; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GALLAGHER: A bill (H. R. 9912) granting a pension to George B. Traves; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GLYNN: A bill (H. R. 9913) granting an increase of pension to Sanford E. Chaffee; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HEATON: A bill (H. R. 9914) granting an increase of pension to George Joseph; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. KEY of Ohio: A bill (H. R. 9915) granting an increase of pension to Harry E. Bryan; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. MERRITT: A bill (H. R. 9916) granting a pension to Carl N. Hubley; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9917) granting a pension to Stephen K. Hamilton; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. STEVENSON: A bill (H. R. 9918) granting a pension to Zebulon R. Campbell; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SWITZER: A bill (H. R. 9919) to correct the military record of Darius Atkinson; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. TAYLOR of Arkansas: A bill (H. R. 9920) granting a pension to Mary A. Himmah; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. TOWNER: A bill (H. R. 9921) granting an increase of pension to Daniel Keene; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. WASON: A bill (H. R. 9922) granting an increase of pension to Francis Roy; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. WATKINS: A bill (H. R. 9923) for the relief of John McW. Ford; to the Committee on Public Lands.

By Mr. WHITE of Ohio: A bill (H. R. 9924) granting an increase of pension to John P. Bateman; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 9925) granting an increase of pension to Thomas R. Thompson; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By the SPEAKER (by request): Memorial of the Irishwomen's Council, asking for the recognition of the independence of Ireland in the form of an Irish republic; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also (by request), resolution of the Grand Army of the Republic, favoring legislation giving American citizenship to aliens who serve in the Army or Navy; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also (by request), resolution of the Grand Army of the Republic, requesting the enactment of legislation for the return of the remains of those soldiers and sailors who may die abroad; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also (by request), resolution of the Grand Army of the Republic, asking for the passage of a bill providing for the payment of pensions monthly instead of quarterly; also a resolution of the same organization, asking for increase of pension to Civil War Veterans and aid to blind veterans; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CARY: Resolution of the Twentieth Century Topic Club, asking for the repeal of the periodical postage provisions of the war-revenue act; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CLARK of Pennsylvania: Petition of Mrs. Margaret Walthausen, Mrs. Louise Lang, Mrs. S. Althof, and 18 others, praying for the passage of House bill 7995, for the preservation of the Niagara, Commodore Perry's flagship in the Battle of Lake Erie; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. DILL: Petition of citizens of Spokane, Wash., asking for the passage of House bill 5531; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. ESCH: Papers in support of House bill 9838, granting a pension to Sarah Morrill; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FOSTER: Petition of citizens of Oblong, Ill., protesting against grading second-class postage on any zone basis; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. FULLER of Illinois: Petition of Dr. F. A. Eastman and 60 other citizens of Rockford, Ill., opposing the zone system for second-class mail; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GALLIVAN: Resolution of the New York Antivivisection Society, protesting against compulsory inoculation of soldiers; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of H. M. McLarin, president of the National Federation of Federal Employees, against the Borland eight-hour amendment; to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of George F. Washburn, president Massachusetts Real Estate Exchange, favoring legislation for Federal acquisition of railways and canals to transport coal from mines near coast to all points along Atlantic coast; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HAMILTON of New York: Affidavits to accompany House bill 9841, granting a pension to Charles B. Carlson; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. HILLIARD: Resolutions adopted by the Woman's Club of Racine, Wis., and by the New Century Club of Wichita Falls, Tex., urging the repeal of that section of the war-revenue act increasing postage rates on periodicals; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. STINESS: Resolution of the General Assembly of Rhode Island, indorsing the daylight-saving bill now before Congress, and urging the Senators and Representatives from Rhode Island to give it their support; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. TILLMAN: Resolution of a mass meeting held in Fayetteville, Ark., expressing loyalty to and confidence in the administration, especially in its conduct of the war, and deploring that criticism of the war management which has been of a destructive character; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

SENATE.

SATURDAY, February 16, 1918.

(Legislative day of Friday, February 15, 1918.)

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a. m.

RAILROAD CONTROL.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3752) to provide for the operation of transportation systems while under Federal control, for the just compensation of their owners, and for other purposes.

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Bankhead	Henderson	Overman	Tillman
Chamberlain	James	Saulsbury	Townsend
Colt	Johnson, Cal.	Shafer	Trammell
Culberson	Johnson, S. Dak.	Sheppard	Underwood
Cummins	Jones, N. Mex.	Smith, Mich.	Vardaman
Curtis	Jones, Wash.	Smith, S. C.	Warren
France	Kellogg	Smoot	Watson
Gallinger	Knox	Swanson	Weeks
Hale	Lodge	Thomas	Williams
Hardwick	McCumber	Thompson	Wolcott

Mr. JAMES. I wish to announce that my colleague [Mr. BECKHAM] is detained on official business.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Forty Senators have answered to the roll call. There is not a quorum present. The Secretary will call the roll of absentees.

The Secretary called the names of absent Senators, and Mr. McNARY, Mr. NEW, Mr. OWEN, Mr. POINDEXTER, Mr. REED, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. SHIELDS, Mr. STONE, and Mr. SUTHERLAND answered to their names when called.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I wish to state that my colleague, the senior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. GORF], is absent owing to illness.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN, Mr. ASHURST, Mr. HARDING, Mr. HITCHCOCK, Mr. KING, Mr. KIRBY, Mr. STERLING, Mr. MARTIN, and Mr. NORRIS entered the Chamber and answered to their names.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifty-eight Senators have answered to the roll call. There is a quorum present.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. I wish to announce that on Tuesday next after the routine morning business, with the consent of the Senate, I shall speak to the pending bill and the demonstrated necessity for Government ownership.

Mr. SMITH of South Carolina. Mr. President, it is very evident that for the time being at least the attention of Senators is given to certain hearings, investigations, and so forth, and Senators are going to committee rooms rather than appearing on the floor of the Senate. So it is almost impossible for us to keep a quorum here, at least to keep enough Senators here to justify business in debating the pending measure.

I wish to give notice now that on Monday next I shall make an effort to have some definite time fixed at which we shall get a vote on this bill. It seems to me that if the procedure we have followed up to the present is to be kept up, it might be a very good plan to adjourn the Senate until the work of the investigating committees has ceased.

Mr. THOMAS. Or adjourn sine die.

Mr. SMITH of South Carolina. As the Senator from Colorado suggests, it might be very well to adjourn sine die and let the business of the country be transacted in the committee